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Attacks on the Warren Court by State




The U.S. Supreme Court is the subject of perennial
political controversy. Since the Court's adjudication of
significant and highly contested issues ensures that the
Court's decisions often will disappoint and offend powerful
interests, the Court throughout its history has provoked
proposals for diminution of its powers. The Warren Court
was the target of particularly virulent hostility since it
rendered dramatic and innovative decisions on so many
politically sensitive subjects, including racial desegregation,
the rights of political subversives and criminals, freedom of
religion, and reapportionment. The many efforts to curb
federal judicial power during the Warren Era have received
considerable scholarly attention.1 These works naturally
t Visiting Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; Professor of Law,
Cumberland School of Law of Samford University. A.B., Stanford, 1976, J.D.,
Harvard, 1979. The author wishes to thank Stephen B. Burbank for his
thorough and thoughtful review of a draft of this article. The author also thanks
Kathryn R. Shelton for her research assistance.
1. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS
(2000); CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE WARREN COURT AND ITS CRITICS (1968); WALTER
F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL PROCESS (1962); C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE
SUPREME COURT 1957-1960 (1961).
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have concentrated on congressional initiatives since many
proposals to curb the Court through federal legislation or
constitutional amendments originated in Congress, and
several congressional efforts to pare the Court's jurisdiction
came perilously close to success.
While these congressional attacks on the Warren Court
were significant, the Court also was subjected to a unique
and now largely forgotten barrage of criticism and Court-
curbing initiatives from state officials. The Court's many
decisions expanding federal judicial power at the expense of
state courts and legislatures provoked a series of state-
based Court-curbing proposals that would have reduced the
Court's power over the states so radically as to transform
the nation into a virtual confederation. At the peak of this
neo-Confederate movement's activities in 1963, the
Amherst historian Henry Steele Commager declared that
"[njot for more than a century has the doctrine of states'
rights been so defiantly proclaimed as now; not since
Appomattox has it found such widespread support."2
This long-simmering states' rights movement began to
boil during the 1950s with southern state legislative
resolutions calling for defiance of the Court's desegregation
decisions. After rendering controversial decisions on
subversion and criminal procedure, the Court became the
target of open and often blistering criticism by organiza-
tions of state chief justices, attorneys general and
governors. The Court's 1962 decision to adjudicate reap-
portionment controversies3 produced the culmination of this
states' rights movement, when a group of state officials
sponsored three constitutional amendments that would
have radically altered the balance of power between the
state and federal governments. The amendments would
have permitted states to amend the Constitution without
the participation of Congress, stripped the Court of
jurisdiction over apportionment, and created a so-called
"Court of the Union" composed of state chief justices to
review U.S. Supreme Court decisions affecting the states.
With only slight exaggeration, Professor Paul Oberst
warned in 1963 that these amendments represented "one of
the most drastic attacks on federal supremacy-especially
2. Henry Steele Commager, To Form a Much Less Perfect Union, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., July 14, 1963.
3. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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federal judicial supremacy-ever mounted on behalf of
'states rights.' ",4 The amendments sailed through the legis-
latures of numerous states until a broad array of prominent
federal officials, journalists, and academics sounded the
alarm.
In contrast to the many studies of congressional efforts
to curb the Court, these proposals have received almost no
scholarly analysis and have largely been ignored ever since
they collapsed during the middle and late 1960s.' This
article will attempt to remedy this deficiency by studying
the origins, development, and ultimate defeat of efforts by
state officials to curb the Supreme Court's powers during
the Warren Era. The article will also place this states'
rights movement in the broader context of other efforts to
curb the Court, during the Warren Era and at other times.
Further, it will explain how this movement offers insights
into the reasons why all movements to diminish the Court's
power have failed throughout American history despite
intense opposition to many of the Court's decisions.
I. QUESTIONING THE COURT
A. Prologue I: Attacks on the Court before 1937
Organized efforts to curb federal judicial power during
the Warren Era were part of a long series of attacks on the
Court that have stretched from the earliest years of the
Republic to the present day. Since the perennial
controversy over the Court's power reflects widespread
misgivings about the Court's countermajoritarian role in
the nation's political structure,6 volleys against the Court
4. Paul Oberst, The Genesis of the Three States-Rights Amendments of 1963,
39 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 644, 644 (1964).
5. For brief discussions, see DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS:
AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 371-74 (1996); JOHN R. VILE,
REWRITING THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: AN EXAMINATION OF PROPOSALS
FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE PRESENT 97-100 (1991).
6. For detailed considerations of these controversies and the tensions
between popular political movements and judicial independence, see Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman,
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajori-




have been fired from many different points along the
political spectrum.
The Marshall Court's decisions undergirding federal
power and vested property rights provoked efforts by
proponents of states' rights to impeach federal judges, and
later to curtail the Court's 'power of judicial review and
limit the Court's jurisdiction. Although the firestorm over
the Court's Dred Scott decision produced no organized
movement to curtail judicial power, anxiety about the
Court's response to reconstruction legislation inspired
numerous abortive proposals for curbing the Court's power.8
Hostility toward the Court reached new levels of intensity
for nearly half a century after 1890, when populists,
progressives, and labor leaders complained that the Court's
decisions frustrated social and economic reform.9 Franklin
D. Roosevelt's unsuccessful effort to pack the Court in 1937
was merely the final and most dramatic chapter of a
prolonged period of anti-Court agitation that had produced
proposals to limit the Court's jurisdiction, permit Congress
to override the Court's decisions, require the concurrence of
more than a majority of justices to nullify legislation, recall
federal judges, allow popular referenda to overturn
decisions, elect federal judges, and limit judicial tenure.1" As
in previous eras, however, the Court emerged from this
crucible with its powers intact in some ways even enhanced.
The failure of persistent Court-curbing efforts between
1890 and 1937 reflected many factors, including a pervasive
public respect for the judiciary as a guardian of personal
and property rights; institutional obstacles that impeded
the viability of legislation to curtail judicial power; divisions
7. See Maurice S. Culp, A Survey of the Proposals to Limit or Deny the Power
of Judicial Review by the Supreme Court of the United States, 4 IND. L. REV.
386, 388-89 (1929) [hereinafter Culp, Survey I]; Maurice S. Culp, A Survey of
the Proposals to Limit or Deny the Power of Judicial Review by the Supreme
Court of the United States-Il, 4 IND. L.J. 474, 482-84 (1929) [hereinafter Culp,
Survey II].
8. See WILLIAM LASSER, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 102-03 (1988); Culp, Survey I, supra note 7, at 389; Stuart
S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925,
928-29 (1965). In contrast to other proponents of Court-curbing, critics of the
Court during Reconstruction did not profess opposition to federal judicial power
itself. LASSER, supra, at 91, 109.
9. See WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES AND
LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, passim (1994).
10. See id., passim.
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and disputes among critics of the judiciary that precluded
agreement on any plan of action; organized campaigns by
the elite bar in opposition to plans to curb judicial power;
widespread public and congressional support for the Court's
decisions; recognition by the Court's critics that judicial
power could ultimately serve their ends; and the flexibility
of judges in adapting their decisions to the changing needs
of society.1' This final factor, judicial adaptability, is
generally regarded as the principal reason for the defeat of
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, although scholars sharply
disagree about the extent to which the Court's attitudes
toward regulatory legislation had metamorphosed even
before 1937 and whether such changes were generated by
the Court's internal dynamics or by external pressure. 2 As
this article will demonstrate, this factor along with the
others that preserved the Court's powers during the
controversies that reached their denouement in 1937
similarly frustrated efforts to curtail judicial power during
the Warren Era.
B. Prologue II: Attacks on the Court, 1937-1954
Studies of Court-curbing tend to skip from the so-called
Judicial Revolution of 1937 to the attacks on the Court by
segregationists in the wake of Brown. It is impossible,
however, to fully comprehend the fury against the Warren
Court unless one considers the growing antagonism toward
the Court by a broad range of conservatives during the
period between 1937 and 1954. While the Court was not a
11. Id. at 2.
12. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998) (arguing that the Court's decisions
after 1937 represented an evolution of existing doctrine rather than a
revolution resulting from external political pressure); Richard D. Friedman,
Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and
Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1896-98 (1994)
(arguing that the Court's transformation occurred gradually during the 1930s
and was jurisprudential); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT
REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995);
LI URA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 18 (1995) (arguing
that the Court's response was heavily influenced by external political
pressures); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998)
(adopting and adapting features of both the "internalist" and "externalist"
positions).
13. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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subject of major political controversy during the period
between the Judicial Revolution of 1937 and the Supreme
Court's 1954 decision in Brown, the Court did not escape
criticism even during these years of relative calm. Many of
the tensions over judicial power that reached a boiling point
during the Warren Era had their origins during this period.
Although the Judicial Revolution of 1937 ended hostility
toward the Court among liberals and organized labor,
antagonism toward the new constitutional order erupted
almost immediately among some economic conservatives
who during previous decades had staunchly defended the
Court. In 1939, for example, the president of the American
Bar Association (ABA) excoriated the Court's recent
decisions for wreaking "the most devastating destruction of
constitutional limitations upon Federal power, and the most
unprecedented expansion of that power over the every-day
affairs of individual citizens in the Republic's history.' '
The following year, a Northwestern University law
professor blamed the Court's unwillingness to check large
scale taxation and public spending for "the low state of
financing new ventures, the huge excess bank reserves, the
low rates of interest, widespread unemployment, and the
ever-mounting national debt."5 Similarly, columnist David
Lawrence alleged that the Court's radicalism in tax cases
was resulting in "confiscation of private property by unjust
administration of the tax laws in violation of the letter and
spirit of the Constitution."6 A Montana congressman hinted
that the House should impeach unnamed Justices for
disregarding "the plain letter and spirit of the
Constitution,"1 and an attorney published a pamphlet sug-
gesting that Congress should impeach Justices who had
transformed the Court "into the strong arm of the New
14. Frank J. Hogan, Important Shifts in Constitutional Doctrines , A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1939, at 638 (delivering presidential address before the Assembly at the
sixty-second annual meeting of the ABA, July 10, 1939).
15. E.F. Albertsworth, The New Constitutionalism, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1940, at
867. Professor Albertsworth concluded that "private capitalism has no large
confidence in the present Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution."
Id.
16. David Lawrence, Today in Washington-Supreme Court Tax Decisions
Always Uphold the New Deal, N.Y. SUN, Oct. 9, 1940, reprinted in 86 CONG.
REC. 6320-21 (1940).
17. 86 CONG. REC. 2147-49 (1940) (remarks of Rep. Thorkelson).
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Deal" and a "battering ram for the destruction of the rights
of the people." 8
Although impeachment of Justices for upholding
congressional legislation was impracticable, this talk of
impeachment reflected the acute frustration of conserva-
tives who had lost control over all three branches of
government and had no reasonable hopes of regaining it at
any time in the foreseeable future. Conservative despair
over Roosevelt's appointment of all but one of the Supreme
Court Justices and the overwhelming majority of lower
federal judges was especially acute because these judges
served for life.' 9
In addition to attacking the Court for assisting with the
alleged drift toward socialism, conservatives throughout the
1940s also castigated the Court for eroding states' rights.
The Court's growing interference with state restrictions on
the liberties of African-Americans particularly antagonized
many Southerners. The Court's 1944 decision requiring
Texas to permit blacks to participate in primary elections"
probably inspired a Texas bar resolution blasting the Court
for unsettling the law by overturning precedents on the
basis of "casuistry and sophistry" rather than logic, and
alleging that the Court was losing the esteem of the
people. The Court's prohibition of judicial enforcement of
racially restrictive land covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer"
provoked especially hostile reactions insofar as it offended
economic conservatives in addition to states' rights
advocates and segregationists. One congressman alleged
that Shelley destroyed "the value of property owned by tens
of thousands of loyal Americans,"23 and a Mississippi
18. Wade H. Cooper, Shall the Judges of the Supreme Court of the United
States Be Impeached for a Gross Perversion of the Constitution of the United
States?, reprinted in 86 CONG. REC. 5046 (1940).
19. See 90 CONG. REC. A1996 to A1997 (1944) (remarks of Rep. Crawford).
20. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
21. Resolution Adopted by State Bar of Texas at 1944 Annual Meeting, Fort
Worth, Texas, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1944, at 484-85. Although the resolution referred
only to the Court's decisions under the commerce clause, critics of the resolution
contended that Allwright probably inspired the motion, particularly because it
overturned the Court's decision in Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). See
Kenneth C. Sears, The Supreme Court and the New Deal-An Answer to Texas,
12 U. CHI. L. REV. 140, 172 (1944).
22. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
23. 94 CONG. REC. 5256 (1948) (remarks of Rep. Rankin). Rankin averred
that the decision must have inspired a celebration in Moscow because "the
489
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
congressman claimed that it brought about "a revival of the
Ku Klux Klan."24 Although proposals to make the Court
more responsive to the rights of private enterprise and the
states were most abundant in the South, they arose in
every part of the nation. In 1951, for example, a New York
congressman sponsored legislation to provide for the
selection of Supreme Court Justices by a majority vote of
the chief justices of the states.25
Already under attack by conservatives for its pro-
nouncements on economic regulation and race, the Court
during the late 1940s ventured into another controversial
line of decisions when it began to hand down rulings on the
Establishment Clause that tended to antagonize those same
conservatives. In particular, the Court's 1948 decision
striking down an Illinois law that permitted voluntary
religious instruction to be conducted in public schools at
private expense provoked allegations that the Court was
unduly interfering with religious liberty. A Florida
congressman complained that the Court had enabled
atheists to "strike down the teachings of our public schools
of religion, which is the strongest power to kill and destroy
... communism,"26 and an Alabama congressman intro-
duced a bill to repeal the Fourteenth Amendment in order
to prevent the Court from applying the First Amendment to
any more state laws affecting religion.27
Meanwhile, hostility toward the Court was stoked by a
series of opinions in which the Court limited the seaward
boundaries of the states.28 The decisions offended some of
the more ardent proponents of states' rights, along with the
oil and gas industry. Petroleum interests were further riled
by a 1954 Supreme Court decision that subjected a
Communists won their greatest victory in the Supreme Court." Id.
24. Id. at 5257 (remarks of Rep. Williams). Similarly, on the eve of Brown,
Representative Forrester of Georgia denounced Shelley as "nothing less than a
deliberate confiscation of property." 100 CONG. REC. 1517 (1954) (remarks of
Rep. Forrester). Likewise, Representative James C. Davis of Georgia
complained in 1954 that Shelley had caused property owners "to sacrifice
property values and lose dollars and cents rightfully theirs." Id. (remarks of
Rep. Davis).
25. S.J. Res. 168 (1951)
26. 94 CONG. REC. A1683 (1948) (extension of remarks of Rep. Rogers).
27. Id. at 4076 (remarks of Rep. Hobbs).
28. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v.
Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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petroleum company to federal regulation.29 When President
Eisenhower vetoed a bill that would have undone the effects
of this decision, the Attorney General of Texas called for the
state to defy the decision, and other critics advocated a
constitutional amendment to exempt oil and gas from
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause."
Growing opposition to the expansion of federal power
produced a split in the Democratic Party in 1948, when a
number of conservative Democrats refused to support
Democratic nominee Harry Truman and formed a States'
Rights Party whose presidential candidate, Strom
Thurmond, carried four southern states and won more than
a million popular votes. 1 The party's platform expressed
opposition to "the usurpation of legislative functions by the
executive and judicial departments." 2
States' rights advocates supported an amendment
proposed by Senator John Bricker of Ohio to limit the
President's authority in foreign affairs. Although the
amendment was partly intended to prevent the erosion of
national sovereignty through American participation in the
United Nations and other international organizations and
to prevent the aggrandizement of presidential power at the
expense of Congress, states' rights proponents also feared
that international accords could enlarge federal power at
the expense of the states.34 In particular, advocates of
29. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
30. Fagan Dickson, The Segregation Cases: Equal Justice Under Law for All
Citizens, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1956, at 731.
31. See ZACHARY KARABELL, THE LAST CAMPAIGN: How HARRY TRUMAN WON
THE 1948 ELECTION 50, 255 (2000).
32. NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1956, at 468 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald
Bruce Johnson eds., 4th ed. 1970).
33. See DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST
OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 70 (1988). The Bricker Amendment
provided:
Section 1. A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution
shall not be of any force and effect.
Section 2. A treaty shall become effective as internal law only through
legislation which would be valid in the absence of a treaty.
Section 3. Congress shall have the power to regulate all Executive and
other agreements with any foreign power or international
organizations. All such agreements shall be subject to the limitations
imposed on treaties by this article.
Id., app. at 224.
34. See 2 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION ITS ORIGINS
AND DEVELOPMENTS 558-59 (7th ed. 1991). The Bricker Amendment would have
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states' rights feared that adherence to such agreements as
the United Nations' 1948 Declaration of Human Rights also
could undermine the constitutional underpinning of state
segregation laws. 5 After protracted deliberations, the
Senate rejected the Bricker Amendment in 1954 by a
margin of one vote. 6 The ability of the amendment to win
the support of nearly two-thirds of the senators and the
endorsement of the ABA and other prominent organizations
was in part an expression of the intensity of states' rights
fervor.
C. Ignoring Appomattox: The Interposition Movement
Ten weeks after the Senate rejected the Bricker
Amendment, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Brown. Adverse reaction by Southern states' rights
advocates was immediate and virulent. As a Georgia
congressman alleged the day after the decision, Brown had
"wiped out every vestige of States rights."7 Although many
commentators pointed out that opposition to Brown was
based more upon unprincipled support for segregation than
upon principled support for states' rights, Brown received
criticism from some conservatives who did not necessarily
favor segregation. Some suggested that the evil of Brown's
damage to federalism was more pernicious than was the
evil of segregation.
After biding their time for a year to see how the Court
would enforce Brown, segregationists began to develop
methods of open defiance after the Court in Brown If
directed lower courts to fashion equitable decrees that
would result in desegregation with "all deliberate speed."
38
School districts throughout much of the South began to
develop such subterfuges and evasions as racially-
discriminatory pupil-placement policies, restrictions on
pupil transfers, state financial support for students to
overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920), which held that a treaty protecting migratory birds did not invade state
powers in violation of the Tenth Amendment even if Congress lacked power to
regulate migratory birds. KELLY ET AL., supra at 558.
35. KYVIG, supra note 5, at 340.
36. See id. at 342-45.
37. 100 CONG. REC. 6777 (1954).
38. 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
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attend private schools, and withholding of funds from
desegregated schools.39 Opponents of segregation under-
stood, however, that such exercises of raw power needed a
constitutional pretext.
Casting about for a legal theory that would justify
opposition to Brown, opponents of integration dusted off the
ancient doctrine of interposition, which would permit the
states to interpose their own interpretation of the
Constitution to oppose assertions of federal authority which
unduly interfered with state sovereignty.4° Although advo-
cates of interposition were fond of pointing out that the
redoubtable James Madison and Thomas Jefferson had
articulated interposition in the Kentucky and Virginia
Resolutions in 1798 and that interposition also found
support in such other dubious precedents as the Hartford
Convention of 1814 and antebellum opposition to the
fugitive slave laws, proponents of interposition were hard-
pressed to explain how their theory had survived the Union
victory in the Civil War.4
Seemingly oblivious to the implications of Appomattox
and the nation's subsequent constitutional history, Vir-
ginia's legislature endorsed interposition in a resolution on
February 1, 1956, declaring that states have the duty
pursuant to their "compact" with the federal government to
interpose their rights whenever the central government
"attempts the deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise
of powers not granted to it." 41 Similar resolutions were
adopted within the next several weeks by the legislatures of
Georgia,43 South Carolina,4 Mississippi, 5 and Alabama. 6
Louisiana followed a year later. The Mississippi resolution
pronounced Brown to be "unconstitutional, invalid, and of
no lawful effect within ... Mississippi." 8 The South
Carolina resolution, for example, declared that the "tragic"
39. PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 1918-1969 339
(1972).
40. See POWE, supra note 1, at 58-60.
41. See id. at 59.
42. 102 CONG. REC. 2020 (1956).
43. Id. at 2453.
44. Id. at 3348.
45. Id. at 3766.
46. 1956 Ala. Acts 42
47. 103 CONG. REC. 244 (1957).
48. 102 CONG. REC. 3767 (1956).
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consequences of Brown "transcend[ed] the problems of
segregation in education" and "planted the seed[s] for the
destruction of constitutional government."49 The resolutions
called obliquely for "appropriate steps by Congress" and the
states to halt the "usurpation."
Since antagonists of the Court recognized that
interposition could not succeed if it remained a southern,
Brown-based phenomenon, some expressed hope that other
states would approve interposition resolutions based upon
non-racial grievances. When the Texas attorney general in
March 1956 disparaged the use of interposition for seg-
regation decisions but expressed support of the doctrine to
overturn the Court's rulings in oil and gas cases,"
proponents of interposition wishfully detected the begin-
nings of a national trend. As the conservative journal
Human Events explained, "[i]f Texas and Oklahoma, for
instance, invoked interposition for this reason, and some of
the mountain states invoked it for some other reason, say of
mineral resources, the issue of interposition and states'
rights might well have a truly broad and national scope."'"
Meanwhile, on March 12, 1956, 101 of the 128 southern
members of Congress signed a "Declaration of Constitu-
tional Principles," which attacked Brown as an exercise of
"naked power" and pledged "to use all lawful means to bring
about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the
Constitution." 2 Like so much other criticism of Brown by
public officials, the Declaration, which became known as
the "Southern Manifesto," complained about judicial
activism and intrusion on states' rights rather than
integration. Members of Congress who signed the Manifesto
likewise defended it as a stand against federal tyranny.
Signers of the Manifesto contended that they were
upholding the law rather than flouting it. They claimed
49. Id. at 3348.
50. Dickson, supra note 30, at 731 (citing Speech of John Ben Shepperd,
Interposition-Fact of Fancy, delivered over Texas State Network, Mar. 22,
1956).
51. Interposition, HUM. EVENTS, Feb. 4, 1956, at 3. Human Events observed
that "[b]ackers of interposition have deemed it rather unfortunate that the
issue is now tied to the race question. But they see no reason why this should
continue to be so." Id.
52. 102 CONG. REc. 4515-16 (1956). The only southern senators who did not
sign the Declaration were Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas and Albert Gore, Sr. and
Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, all of whom had presidential aspirations.
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that allegations of their lawlessness were hypocritical
because civil rights activists had themselves fought
vigorously against the law in opposing segregation."
Representative James C. Davis of Georgia, for example,
explained that he signed the Declaration "because the time
is here to defend free government or to surrender to judicial
dictatorship." 4 As Professor Powe has aptly pointed out,
however, "[o]f course, interposition was about race, but to
admit the truth would result in an easy intellectual loss for
the South. 55
The Southern Manifesto was radical even though it
avoided specific endorsement of interposition and mostly
eschewed the fiery rhetoric with which so many Southern-
ers had blasted Brown in Congress, statehouses,
courthouses, pulpits, and political rallies. Professor Powe
has observed that the Declaration "did not say how there
could be 'lawful' means to oppose a Supreme Court
decision."56 Of course, the signers of the Manifesto knew
that there were no lawful means, even though, as
Alexander Bickel observed, they could not bring themselves
to admit that Brown was "the binding verdict of a tribunal
empowered beyond the shadow of a doubt to render it."
57
They also knew that the unlawful alternative of armed
insurrection would be as futile in the 1950s as it had been
during the 1860s. As a University of Texas law professor
pointed out, "[niullification or interposition just will not
work 5 ' because federal officials have both the will and the
raw power to enforce any judgment of a federal court. Other
critics of interposition likewise warned about the futility of
interposition and its threat to public order. Late in 1956, for
example, a politically and geographically diverse group of
more than one hundred leaders of the bar signed a
statement deploring the "recent attacks" on the Court as
53. A Milestone in the South's Fight, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, reprinted
in 102 CONG. REC. 4693 (1956).
54. 102 CONG. REC. 6821 (1956).
55. POWE, supra note 1, at 59.
56. Id. at 61.
57. Alexander Bickel, Ninety-Six Congressmen Versus the Nine Justices,
NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 23, 1956, at 11. According to Bickel, Brown represented
"the price of deference to the national will which the South must pay for being
neither a province nor an insignificant principality but an integral part of the
greatest and richest civilized power on earth." Id.
58. George W. Stumberg, The School Segregation Cases: Supporting the
Opinion of the Supreme Court, 42A.B.A. J., Apr. 1956, at 318, 319-320.
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"reckless in their abuse ... heedless of the value of judicial
review . . . and dangerous in fomenting disrespect for our
highest law .... ""
Despite the legal and moral deficiencies of the
opposition to Brown, the interposition resolutions, the
Southern Manifesto, and the countless judicial and admin-
istrative efforts to block Brown's implementation made
clear that hostility toward the Court's decision was
formidable and found support at every level of white
southern society. The Wall Street Journal aptly cautioned
that the Manifesto was "not the voice of any calloused [sic]
demagog. The hundred men spoke for millions of people,
some frustrated, some bewildered, some disheartened, and
some fearful.""°
White Southerners warned Northerners that the
Court's "tyranny eventually would intrude upon their own
interests." As Davis cautioned in 1956, "[w]hile it may be
Georgia or Arkansas which suffers today from such
wrongful usurpation of authority, next year it may be
Oregon, Maine, or Illinois., 61 Davis contended that "while
the subject today is schools," the Court's "next usurpation
may involve taxes, or criminal law, or the right to own
property."62 After the Court began handing down its
decisions on subversion, Representative Mason of Illinois
reminded Northerners that the desegregation decisions
affected "the whole country and not merely the South."3
Indeed, the Richmond journalist James J. Kilpatrick, whose
fiery editorials were instrumental in encouraging the
Virginia legislature to enact the first interposition resolu-
tion, believed that Brown was a blessing insofar as it
59. Recent Attacks Upon the Supreme Court: A Statement by Members of the
Bar, 42 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1956, at 1128, 1128-29. The attorneys declared that "the
privilege of criticizing a decision of the Supreme Court carries with it a
corresponding obligation-a duty to recognize the decision as the supreme law
of the land as long as it remains in force." Id.
60. Statement From the South, WALL ST. J., reprinted in 102 CONG. REC.
4693 (1956).
61. 102 CONG. REc. 6821 (1956) (speech of Rep. Davis).
62. Id. Similarly, Senator Eastland warned in 1954 that Brown adopted "a
line of reasoning that would give [the Court] the power to do anything,"
including the imposition of socialism. 100 CONG. REC. 11,524 (1954).
63. Id. at 6386.
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"awakened a legion of conservatives" outside the South to
the erosion of states' rights.
6 4
D. Reactions to the Subversion Decisions: The Beginnings of
an Anti-Court Coalition
These prophecies attained at least some credence when
the already intense controversy over the Supreme Court
suddenly escalated and greatly broadened during the spring
of 1956, as the Court began to hand down decisions that
protected the liberties of political subversives. Undeterred
by the storm from the South that already was raging
around the Marble Palace, the Court announced its first
major Cold War defense of the liberties of subversives early
in April 1956 in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,65 striking down a
state sedition law on the ground that Congress had pre-
empted prosecution of political subversives in the 1940
Smith Act.66 Although the Court's decision arguably
strengthened the battle against domestic subversion by
freeing federal officials from the meddling of state officials,
most conservatives predicted that the decision would
seriously undermine efforts to fight subversion. And,
although the Court had affirmed a decision of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, conservatives regarded the decision
as another blow to states' rights since it nullified a state
statute. Moreover, federal preemption of state law
threatened the right-to-work laws that many states had
enacted at the behest of conservatives to impede the growth
of labor unions.
Two weeks later, in Slochower v. Board of Education,68
the Court aggravated the ire of Cold Warriors and states'
rightists by invoking due process to invalidate a New York
City law that provided for summary dismissal of employees
who invoked the privilege against self-incrimination.69 The
Court's decision in this case, like Nelson, seemed to the
Court's critics to evince a lack of concern about domestic
64. James Jackson Kilpatrick, The Sovereign States: How Americans Can
End Federal Usurpation, HuM. EVENTS, Nov. 3, 1956.
65. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
66. Id. at 518-20.
67. "Curbing" the Court, NATION, June 9, 1956, at 481-82.
68. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
69. Id. at 555.
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subversion. In another decision, Cole v. Young,7° the Court
interpreted the Smith Act as prohibiting summary dis-
missal of federal employees who occupied non-sensitive
positions. 71
The Court provoked even greater controversy a year
later, when in one fortnight it handed down six decisions
that even more sharply limited the attempts to investigate
and regulate subversion. Four of the decisions involved the
federal government"2 and two arose out of actions by state
officials. In the state cases, the Court ruled that due process
prohibited state bar associations from refusing to admit
otherwise qualified candidates because of actual or alleged
communist activities73 and that a state legislature could not
give a state attorney general a roving commission to
investigate subversion." One week later, in Mallory v.
United States," the Court further antagonized conserva-
tives by extending the duty of law enforcement officials to
inform criminal defendants of their rights."
70. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
71. Id. at 546. The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2000), made it a crime to
advocate the overthrow of the federal government by force or violence.
72. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 671-72 (1957) (allowing union
official prosecuted for perjury to obtain and bring into court copies of FBI
reports to rebut testimony about his alleged Communist activities); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 215 (1957) (reversing contempt citation for refusal
to answer questions of House Un-American Activities Committee because
Committee had not explained their pertinence); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298, 334 (1957) (reversing the convictions of nine Communists on the
ground that advocacy of overthrow of the government within the meaning of the
Smith Act required overt action rather than mere argument); Service v. Dulles,
354 U.S. 363, 386-88 (1957) (finding that Secretary of State could not
independently dismiss foreign service officer who had been cleared of disloyalty
through prescribed State Department procedures).
73. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957).
74. Sweezy v. New Hampshire 354 U.S. 234, 254-55 (1957) (reversing
conviction of college professor who had refused to answer questions from state
attorney general concerning his political views).
75. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
76. Mallory particularly vexed many members of Congress because it arose
out of a case in the District of Columbia, where crime was increasing.
Complaining that the Court was turning criminals loose "just as fast as, the
prosecuting officers and the police can send them to jail," Representative
Hoffman noted in a debate in January 1958 that three persons had been
viciously assaulted in the District during the previous night and that the wives
of congressmen were not safe to walk on Capitol Hill. "How long does this have
to go on, or do we have to arm ourselves?" he asked. 104 CONG. REC. 954 (1958).
Meanwhile, the city's chief of detectives and chief of police blamed Mallory for
rising crime in the Capital. Fear in the Streets of the Nation's Capital, U.S.
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The Court's new series of decisions on subversion
renewed outcries of outrage from the Court's critics.7 In
particular, critics of the Court alleged that these decisions
crippled efforts by law enforcement officials to combat
subversion." The Court's decisions on subversion and crime
rapidly transformed organized opposition to the Court from
an isolated southern phenomenon into a nationwide
movement. Conservatives who resented the Court's refusal
to second-guess economic legislation and Cold Warriors who
feared that the Court's decisions on subversion would deter
the nation's ability to ward off threats to domestic security
now joined segregationists in attacking the Court and
demanding curbs on its powers. Between 1956 and 1959,
this formidable coalition of segregationists and hardline
anti-communists sponsored Court-curbing legislation that
made more headway in Congress than had nearly any of the
countless Court-curbing measures that had fallen into the
NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 14, 1958, at 51. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover later
indirectly criticized the Court in a speech before the ABA's Section of Judicial
Administration, warning that excessive judicial solicitude for the rights of
criminals could "infringe upon the freedom of all individuals." J. Edgar Hoover,
The Law and the Layman: Faith in the Courts Must Be Preserved, A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 1958, at 1155, 1157-58.
77. A week after "Red Monday," for example, the Senate's Internal Security
Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Eastland of Mississippi, issued a report
alleging that the Court's recent decisions had provided "comfort for Communists
and criminals, frustration for law-enforcement officials, serious interference
with Congress's self-informing function, and destruction of all efforts of the
American people to protect themselves against subversion at home through
their State governments." Senate Report: Court is Giving "Comfort" to
Communists, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., May 30, 1958, at 46. Similarly, the
past president of the Maryland Bar Association alleged in 1958 that "the Court
has once again extended the Bill of Rights to a point where it presents great
obstacles to the fight against Communism which has been carried on by the
Executive, Congress and the states." Frank B. Ober, Communism and the
Court: An Examination of Recent Developments, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1958, at 35, 89.
He charged that "the net effect of such decisions seems to subordinate the
national security to an extreme extension of civil liberties." Id. With more
bluntness, an attorney declared at a 1958 congressional hearing that
"Communists are dirty rats and there is no use in being so damned considerate
of them, as some agencies of government have been." Limitation of Appellate
Jurisdiction of the U. S. Supreme Court, Hearing Before the Subcomm. to
Investigate the Admin. of the Internal Sec. Act and Other Internal Sec. Laws of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate on S. 2646, 85th Cong. 148 (1958)
(hereinafter Hearings on Limitation of Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction),
(testimony of Irving G. McCann).
78. See, e.g., Harold Lord Varney, Earl Warren: Ike's Worst Appointment,
AM. MERCURY, Aug. 1958, at 10.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
hoppers of the House and Senate during the previous
century and a half. Although virtually none of these
measures was enacted, the remarkable support that they
received in Congress demonstrated that efforts to abrogate
the Court's power were not necessarily chimerical.
The Court's subversion decisions continued to provide a
subterfuge for opponents of desegregation to attack the
Court. As The Nation explained:
Right wing Republicans from Northern states cannot afford to
oppose desegregation no matter how eager they may be to assist
their Dixiecrat coalitionists; but they can, of course, join the
Dixiecrats in a campaign "to curb the Court." Conversely, the
Dixiecrats realize that it is easier to attack the Supreme Court on
the charge that it is "soft on communism" or that it is "usurping
legislative functions," than on the score that it is safeguarding the
civil rights of Negroes. By making common cause in defense of
"states' rights," both factions hope not merely to reverse the trend
of decision in civil-rights and civil liberties cases but to force the
Court to uphold various state right-to-work laws which are now
endangered by the precedent in the Nelson case.79
Similarly, Professor Powe has remarked that Nelson
and Slochower "were a godsend to Southerners. The
decisions gave them allies against the Court's national
security conservatives. The decisions also offered a
potential legitimacy to anti-Court criticism. With a little
care, the claim could be made on the newer and higher
ground of anticommunism without mentioning race."" This
point was not lost on contemporary observers. As one
newspaper observed at the time, the use of the Court's
national security decisions to discredit the desegregation
decisions, however disingenuous, was a clever strategy.81
Like the progressives who had complained of a "judicial
oligarchy" forty years earlier, critics of the Court during the
1950s often accused the Court of tyranny, which in the
1950s was equated with Communism. Early in March 1956,
the president of the National Association of Attorneys
General publicly castigated the Justices as "Constitutional
5th Columnists [who] march with hobnailed boots across
79. "Curbing" the Court, supra note 67, at 481.
80. POWE, supra note 1, at 85.
81. Far Reaching Decisions, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 19, 1957, reprinted
in 103 CONG. REC. 10,295 (1957).
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the face of sacred traditions and with legal sabres slash
whole concepts of free government out of the Constitu-
tion."82 In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Hungary later
in 1956, Senator Strom Thurmond compared Soviet tyranny
with American judicial tyranny." And a Georgia congress-
man warned that the court's steady and insidious erosion of
all protective safeguards against subversion, if not arrested
by the Congress, would prove far deadlier to the nation's
security and future than the hydrogen and atomic bombs.84
Although even the Court's most vociferous critics, generally
refrained from alleging that the Justices were
Communists, a 1957 resolution of the Georgia legislature
accused Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas,
Clark, Frankfurter, and Reed of "high crimes and mis-
demeanors," and "of being involved in activities that were
counter to the United States Constitution."86 Other critics of
the Court were ambiguous, perhaps deliberately, about
whether the Court was the knowing or simply the
82. Dickson, supra note 30, at 730 (quoting Attorney General John Ben
Shepperd, Speech at the Texas Independence Day Celebration at Old
Washington-on-the-Brazos (Mar. 2, 1956)).
83. Thurmond began an attack on the Court by remarking that "[wihile we
are thinking of the tyranny in Hungary, I wish to... discuss... the tyranny of
the judiciary in the United States." 103 CONG. REC. 10,333 (1957). Similarly,
Representative Rivers of South Carolina declared in 1956 that the Justices were
"a greater threat to this Union than... Soviet Russia." 102 CONG. REC. 6385
(1956). And Representative Alford declared in 1959 that "the greatest
emergency which confronts our country today is not the Soviet or Red China or
the Berlin crisis or inflation; it is the destruction of the Constitution ... by the
oath-breaking usurpers who are now members of the Supreme Court." 105
CONG. REC. 7505 (1959).
84. 103 CONG. REC. 9887 (1957) (remarks of Rep. Davis). Likewise, a
Louisiana businessman argued that "while an atomic-weaponed invader could
do us tremendous damage, he could not destroy all of our liberties and blight
our lives with one blow. But the Court could! And the Court will, if it continues
its present course." Paulsen Spence, Get the Supreme Court Out of Politics, AM.
MERCURY, Oct. 1957, at 26-27.
85. Representative Sam Evins, for example, emphasized that he did "not
impugn the patriotism of the members of the Court." 105 CONG. REC.1431
(1959). Brent Bozell of the National Review denied that the Justices were
"partisans of communism," but alleged that "the Supreme Court is living in a
dream world" because "99 percent of the people of the United States know that
the Communist Party is a subversive organization... [b]ut the judicial system
of the United States does not know it." Hearings on Limitation of Supreme
Court's Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 77, at 657-58.
86. Impeachment Pushed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1957, at 63.
502 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
unwitting tool of Communism.87 Defenders of the Court
warned, however, that intemperate attacks on the Court
played into the hands of Communists.88
E. Close Calls: The Rise and Fall of Congressional Court-
Curbing Bills
The firestorm over the Court's decisions inevitably
inspired a spate of Court-curbing legislation. While most
Court-curbing bills vanished into obscurity the moment
they were dropped into the hopper, more Court-curbing
measures received serious consideration during 1957-58
than at any time in the nation's history. Bills to curb the
Court enjoyed formidable support in both the House and
the Senate. Even the valiant efforts of Emanuel Celler, the
chair of the House Judiciary Committee, could not keep a
lid on anti-Court bills in the House. In the Senate, where
Court-curbing bills enjoyed the support of James Eastland,
the powerful Judiciary Committee chair, several proposals
might have received Senate approval but for the brilliant
political skills of Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson. In
87. In 1958, for example, a Senate Subcommittee of the Judiciary
Committee published a thirteen-page document prepared by an unidentified
group called SPX Research Associates entitled: "The Supreme Court as an
Instrument of Global Conquest." Hearings on Limitation of Supreme Court's
Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 77, at App. IV to part 2. The document,
which excoriated the court's decisions on race and subversion, declared that the
Court was "the most powerful ... instrument of the Communist global conquest
by paralysis." The authors did not deign to explain whether the Court
knowingly advanced the Communist cause. New York attorney Charles A.
Horsky spoke for many Americans when he expressed horror that "this
intemperate and unprincipled attack on the Supreme Court should be printed
for general circulation as a separate document of the Committee on the
Judiciary... and without comment on or criticism of its content." Charles A.
Horsky, Law Day: Some Reflections on Current Proposals to Curtail the
Supreme Court, 42 MINN. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1958) (based upon address given
at the University of Minnesota Law School Alumni Banquet, April 29, 1958).
88. See, e.g., Charles S. Rhyne, Defending Our Courts: The Duty of the Legal
Profession, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1958, at 121, 123 (1958). Rhyne warned that
[t]he forces of Communism are constantly trying to undermine our
institutions. One of their principal goals is to create distrust and
dissention within our nation-to make us doubt our way of life.
Certainly this is no time for our own people to add impetus to the Red
attack. For no institution in our government is so directly opposed to
the concept of a supreme state as our courts. The rule of law and the
supreme state cannot co-exist.
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contrast to the broad array of Court-curbing schemes
advocated by earlier critics of the Court, most of these bills
focused on curtailment of the Court's jurisidiction 9
One of the most prominent measures, the Jenner-Butler
bill, received serious attention during 1957-58 and came
perilously close to approval in the Senate. The bill
originated with William Jenner, an Indiana Republican,
who proposed to legislatively overrule the Court's controver-
sial decisions on subversion by stripping the Court of
appellate jurisdiction over a broad range of cases.9° As later
amended by Senator Butler of Maryland, the legislation
would have explicitly deprived the Court of jurisdiction only
over state bar admissions, and would have amended
various federal statutes to clarify and expand congressional
power to combat domestic subversion.9' Prolonged hearings
on the measure during 1958 produced vigorous opposition
from numerous prominent persons and organizations,
including the AFL-CIO, the ABA, the ACLU, the NAACP,
and the American Jewish Congress.92 Opponents of the
measure hailed the Court for protecting civil liberties and
pointed out that the Court should base its decisions upon
the Constitution rather than the transient winds of public
89. As Professor Burbank has observed in discussing efforts to curtail
judicial power,
[tihe verdict of history has struck removal through the impeachment
process, office-stripping, court-packing, and executive defiance from the
list of viable methods of control. Many other methods are in the same
category because they would require a constitutional amendment. As a
result, it is not surprising that Congress has time and again returned
to the jurisdiction and powers of the federal courts as more promising
territory for exercising control.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 315, 324 (1999).
90. S. 2646, 85th Cong. (1957). As introduced in July 1957, the Jenner bill
would have deprived the Court of appellate jurisdiction in cases involving the
acts of congressional committees (to nullify Watkins); the federal employees
loyalty program (Cole); state anti-subversion laws (Nelson); action by state
school boards regarding subversives (Slochower); and state bar admissions
(Schware). LYTLE, supra note 1, at 24.
91. PRITCHETT, supra note 1 at 32; MuRPHY, supra note 1, at 168-69.
92. Hearings on Limitation of Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction, supra
note 77, at iii-iv (table of contents). The American Jewish Congress argued that
"the preeminent position held by the United States today as a leader of the free
world is in large part due to historic rulings of [the] Court condemning racial
inequality and striking down efforts to curb freedom of speech, press, and
religion." Id. at 684.
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opinion.93 The measure enjoyed considerable grassroots
support among conservatives, however. Although it was
tabled in the Senate on August 20, 1958 in a forty-nine to
forty-one vote,94 the Court's foes won a tactical victory in
obtaining so many votes to move ahead with a measure to
impose significant curbs on the Court. As Professor Walter
F. Murphy pointed out, the opposition of forty-one senators
to the tabling motion "was an impressive demonstration of
anti-Court strength, especially considering that Roosevelt's
Court-packing plan in 1937 never had the certain support of
more than thirty senators."95
Another prominent measure was a House bill, H.R. 3,
introduced in 1955, 1957, and 1959, which provided that no
federal legislation preempted state legislation governing
the same subject unless the federal statute explicitly
provided for preemption.96 Although H.R. 3 ostensibly was
aimed at Nelson, its opponents alleged that it would
virtually wipe out federal preemption over countless
subjects, thereby throwing the law into chaos and
substituting confederacy for union.97 The bill received the
93. For example, Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. of Missouri declared in
July 1957 that "[rather than being denounced for its decisions of recent weeks,
the Court should be praised for fulfilling its function as the ultimate guardian
of human rights and freedom in our society." Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., The
United States Supreme Court: The Ultimate Guardian of Our Freedom, A.B.A.
J., Mar. 1958, at 215. Similarly, ABA President Charles S. Rhyne asked in 1957
whether "it would be better to have ... a board of nine pacifiers whose chief
function is to concede some basic value here and withhold a little justice there
in an effort to appease a minimum of, say, 90 percent of the public." Rhyne,
supra note 88, at 123.
94. 104 CONG. REC. 18,687 (1958).
95. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 208.
96. H.R. 3, 84th Cong. (1955); H.R. 3, 85th Cong. (1957); H.R. 3, 86th Cong.
(1959). The bill provided that "No act of Congress shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which such
Act operates, to the exclusion of all State laws on the same subject matter,
unless such Act contains an express provision to that effect ... [or] unless there
is a direct and positive conflict between such Act ... and the State law so that
the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together." Id. The first bill
was designed to preempt the Court's decision in Nelson, and the second bills
were designed to overturn it. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 91, 95.
97. See LYTLE, supra note 1, at 40; MURPHY, supra note 1, at 93-94. For
example, The Reporter warned that H.R. 3 "could throw into unimaginable
confusion statutes already on the books concerning railroads, busses, trucks,
airplanes, oil and gas pipelines, immigration, naturalization, agriculture, labor
relations, pure food and drugs, health, sanitation, and - but perhaps you had
already guessed it - civil rights and desegregation." Here It Comes Again!,
2002] ATTACKS ON THE WARREN COURT 505
explicit endorsement of the National Conference of State
Attorneys General,98 and the tacit endorsement of the
Governors' Conference 9 - further examples of state officials
trying to limit the Supreme Court's powers. The National
Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of
Commerce also endorsed the measure. °° Although the
House approved H.R. 3 in 1958 by a vote of 241 to 15501 the
Senate defeated this measure °2 a month later by a margin
of only one vote.103
In other significant rebukes to the Court during 1957-
58, the House approved bills to reverse Mallory, T to restrict
habeas corpus," to reverse Cole by broadening the scope of
the Summary Suspension Act of 1950 to include "non-
sensitive" as well as "sensitive" positions, and to reverse
Yate's narrow definition of "organize" in the Smith Act.106
In addition to proposals for depriving the Court of
REPORTER, July 9, 1959, at 2.
98. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 94. Professor Lytle found that the National
Association of Attorneys General actually contributed little as a body to the
anti-Court movement beyond its endorsement of H.R. 3. LYTLE, supra note 1, at
121 n.19.
99. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 95-96.
100. Id. at 202-03.
101. 104 CONG. REC. 14,162 (1958).
102. S. 337, 85th Cong. (1958).
103. 104 CONG. REC. 18,928 (1958). The day before its defeat, the measure
appeared headed for victory when the Senate in a late-night session defeated a
motion to recommit it to committee by a vote of 46 to 39. MURPHY, supra note 1,
at 211. This rebuke to Majority Leader Johnson - and to the Court - left the
Senate "in a state of near pandemonium." Id. After succeeding in obtaining an
overnight postponement of the final vote, Johnson strenuously worked to
persuade wavering senators to oppose to the measure, resulting in its defeat by
a vote of 41 to 40. Id. at 211-17.
104. H.R. 11,477, 85th Cong. (1957). The bill provided in relevant part that
"[elvidence, including statements and confessions, otherwise admissible, shall
not be otherwise inadmissible solely because of delay in taking an arrested
person before a commissioner or other officer empowered to commit persons
charged with offenses against the laws of the United States." Id. The Senate
Judiciary Committee reported it favorably after inserting the word "reasonable"
in front of the word "delay." PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at 35. The measure died
in a House-Senate conference committee. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 219-20.
105. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 176-77, 182. The habeas corpus bill would
have permitted state prisoners to seek a writ of habeas corpus in federal court
only when 1) a question of federal constitutional rights had not been previously
"raised and determined" in the state proceedings; 2) the petitioner lacked a fair
opportunity in state courts to raise the federal issue; and 3) the issue could not
later be raised in state courts. Id. at 177.
106. Id. at 181-82.
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jurisdiction over certain types of cases, critics of the Warren
Court regularly advanced an abundance of proposals aimed
at changing the Court's composition. Various proposals
affecting the Court's personnel included popular election of
judges;1 limitation of tenure to specified terms; mandatory
retirement ages; periodic re-confirmation by the Senate;
1 8
requirements of prior judicial experience;"' elimination of
the Department of Justice from its role in advising the
President on judicial nominations;" ° granting the Senate
sole power to select federal judges; removal of judges from
office for reasons other than the "high crimes and
misdemeanors" required for impeachment; and selection
of Supreme Court Justices solely from the ranks of state
supreme courts.113  The most famous of the quixotic
proposals directed against the Justices was the movement
to impeach Earl Warren, which is still widely remembered
for the ubiquitous pro-impeachment billboards that dotted
the countrysides. Critics of the Court also periodically
called for the impeachment of various associate Justices.
Even such radical proposals seemed tame compared with a
retired Marine Corps colonel's public demand for Warren's
execution by hanging."5
107. H.R.J. Res. 476, 85th Cong. (1957); H.J. Res. 536, 85th Cong. (1957).
108. S.J. Res. 114, 85th Cong. (1957) (providing for reconfirmation of federal
judges every four years). See 103 CONG. REC. 12,864-65 (1957) (remarks of Sen.
Johnston).
109. See, e.g., 102 CONG. REC. 8759 (1956) (remarks of Rep. Lanham); John
C. Stennis, Federal Judiciary Selection: The Letter-But the Spirit?, A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 1958, at 1179, 1180-81; S. Res. 264, 84th Cong. (1955) (requiring that at
least one of each two successive nominees confirmed by the Senate have at least
ten years of prior judicial service); 105 CONG. REC. 6827 (1959) (remarks of Rep.
Casey discussing bill to require eight years of prior experience); S. 813, 86th
Cong. (1959) (bill introduced by Sen. Thurmond to require five years of
experience on a federal court or an appellate state court).
110. 104 CONG. REC. 2803-04 (1958) (Remarks of Hon. John Stennis).
111. ROSALIE GORDON, NINE MEN AGAINST AMERICA: THE SUPREME COURT
AND ITS ATTACK ON AMERICAN LIBERTIES 151-52 (1958).
112. See, e.g., 105 CONG. REC. 7508 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Alford).
113. H.R.J. Res. 453, 86th Cong. (1960).
114. As early as February 1957, the Georgia House of Representatives
adopted by a vote of 107 to 33 a resolution calling for the impeachment of Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Black, Reed, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Clark.
Impeachment Pushed, supra note 86, at 63.
115. Bill Becker, Attack on Warren Boomerangs on Anti-Reds School on
Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1961, at 58. The retired colonel's remark, delivered
at a Los Angeles conference sponsored by the right-wing Project Alert, was too
extreme even for many devotees of the far right. Project Alert leaders censured
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In addition to altering the composition of the bench,
other critics sought to alter federalism by denying that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated any of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights into state law.1 ' Some called for repeal
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Advocates of the repeal
included a retired federal judge from Ohio, who contended
that the repeal movement was viable because it would
receive the support of Southerners who resisted integration
and Northerners who opposed centralization of power in
Washington. 117 Although this proposal may seem outr6, we
should remember that liberals, including Felix Frankfurter,
had advocated the same radical remedy earlier in the
century as a means of preventing the federal courts from
nullifying state economic regulatory legislation."8
F. The Federal Government Asserts Its Authority: Bayonets
and Cooper v. Aaron
Meanwhile, rhetorical defense of states' rights turned
into armed defiance of federal authority in September 1957
when Arkansas Governor Orville Faubus ordered state
troops to block implementation of a federal court order for
integration of Little Rock's Central High School. Although
Eisenhower reluctantly sent federal troops to Little Rock to
enforce the integration order, the Little Rock School Board
later persuaded a federal judge to suspend the integration
order for two and a half years on the ground that efforts at
integration had thrown the school into chaos."9 After the
Court of Appeals reversed the stay, the U.S. Supreme Court
convened during its summer recess and unanimously
handed down its landmark decision in Cooper v. Aaron, 10
which categorically re-affirmed the Court's role as the
ultimate arbiter of the Constitution. The Court declared
the colonel, who later retracted his statement. Id.
116. Dan Smoot, We Need to Curb the Court, DAN SMOOT REP., July 3, 1967,
at 107-08.
117. Robert N. Wilkin, A Noted Jurist Says, "Repeal the Fourteenth
Amendment," U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Aug. 24, 1964, at 72-74.
118. The Red Terror of Judicial Reform, Editorial, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 1,
1924, at 113, reprinted in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT-
EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 166-67 (Philip B.
Kurland ed., 1970).
119. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 20-26 (E.D. Ark. 1958).
120. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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that "the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution," as
enunciated in Marbury v. Madison, "has ever since been
respected by this Court and Country as a permanent and
indispensible feature of our constitutional system."121
Although the defeat of the Jenner-Butler Bill three
weeks before the Court decided Cooper may have embold-
ened the Court, many liberals preferred to argue that the
narrowness with which the measure was defeated made
Cooper's uncompromising language all the more remark-
able. The Nation contended that while "the Court might
have concluded that now would be a good time to appease
its Congressional critics," the decision instead reflected "a
keen awareness that certain threats must never be
appeased, regardless of the peril."'22 Moderates and liberals
recognized, however, that the collapse of armed resistence
in Little Rock and the defeat of the Court-curbing bills did
not end the campaign to curb the Court or even necessarily
chill its momentum. Faubus's landslide re-election victory
in July 1958 provided a sharp reminder of the tenacity of
grassroots hostility toward the Court's authority in the
South.123 The New Republic argued in the wake of Cooper
that "It]he immediate aim of the Southerners may be to
undermine the Court's school desegregation order but the
121. Id. at 18.
122. The Courage of the Court, Editorial, NATION, Oct. 11, 1958, at 201.
Noting that the decision was handed down near the twentieth anniversary of
Britain's appeasement of Nazi Germany at Munich, the editors predicted that
the decision "will stand as a lasting testament to the proposition that the way to
meet a challenge to the rule of law is not to whet the appetite of the lawless by
appeasement, but to meet the challenge head-on, at the outset." Id. Some critics
of the Court, however, contended that the Court's delivery of a per curiam
opinion in Cooper indicated that the Court's confidence was so shaken by
opposition among the judiciary, the bar, and Congress, that it had adopted a
siege mentality. Hugh C. Bickford, Did Supreme Court Justices Violate Their
Oaths?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 19, 1958, at 108.
123. As America observed, "[iut is not only significant that [this] defier of the
Supreme Court polled substantially more than twice the combined vote by his
two rivals for the gubernatorial nomination. What is far more alarming is that
his very defiance of the Court made possible his bid for a third term as
Governor." Behind Southern Resistance, AMERICA, Aug. 16, 1958, at 508.
Hailing the vote as a rebuke to the Court, David Lawrence declared that "[tihe
people of Arkansas have refused to uphold the usurped right of the nine
Justices... to say that modern psychology or emotionalism is more important
than the letter of the Constitution itself." David Lawrence, The People Speak,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 8, 1958, at 92.
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target is broader than that: it is civil liberties in general. 124
Opponents of integration denounced Cooper in blister-
ing terms. Virginia Governor J. Lindsay Almond declared
that it was the most
devastating blow ever to bludgeon the reserved powers of the
States ... It is designed to reduce the States to the status of mere
puppets, slavishly manacled to the sociological and personal
predilections of a judicial oligarchy negating the fundamental
concept of a government of law and not of men. It tears the
battered remnant of the Tenth Amendment out of the Constitution
and hurls it into the face of a shocked and beleaguered people.
125
Despite the Court's categorical assertion of its power in
Cooper, segregationists vowed to continue to resist racial
integration. They further devised the doctrine that a ruling
of the Court challenged by a state should be suspended
until the people could ratify it through a constitutional
amendment. This version of interposition was summarily
rejected by a federal court in Louisiana in 1960 in a
decision affirmed by the Supreme Court.
12 6
G. Voices From Bench, Bar, Media, and Academia:
Moderates Criticize the Court
As the Court continued to hand down decisions that
expanded federal power, particularly the power of the
federal courts, the Court began to attract criticism from
moderate or at least respectable voices within Congress and
the legal establishment that bore no apparent taint of
racism or right-wing extremism. As Professor Murphy
pointed out,
[fiar more ominous than wild-haired radical schemes was the quiet
but unmistakable undertone on Capitol Hill, a fear not only among
the conservatives but among moderates and some liberals that the
Justices had gone too far in protecting individual rights and in so
doing had moved into the legislative domain.1
2 7
124. Defending the Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 15, 1958, at 3.
125. J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., What a Southern Governor Says About the
Supreme Court, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 10, 1958, at 43.
126. Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960), affd
365 U.S. 569 (1961).
127. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 116. As Professor Murphy explained, "[t]his
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Such criticism included a remarkable number of
comments from judges. In contrast to the Progressive Era,
when even the most liberal judges generally refrained from
public criticism of the then-conservative Court, many
federal and state judges during the 1950s and 1960s were
less reticent. In April 1957, for example, U.S. Court of
Appeals Judge Warren E. Burger lamented "an unfortunate
trend of judicial decisions ... which strain and stretch to
give the guilty ... vastly more protection than the law-
abiding citizen. In November 1958, a U.S. district judge
for the Northern District of Florida publicly castigated the
Court for disregarding its own precedents in the desegrega-
tion cases." 129 A few weeks later, chief justice John R.
Dethmers criticized the U.S. Supreme Court's activism in a
widely-publicized speech before the Congress of American
Industry."' Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice James F.
Byrnes blasted the Court in a long and acrimonious cover
article in U.S. News in 1956, although the impact of Byrnes'
attack was limited because Byrnes had served on the Court
only for one year, and because this South Carolinian's
wrath was directly mostly at the Court's desegregation
decisions.31
By far the most dramatic volley from the bench came in
February 1958 from the eighty-five-year old U.S. Court of
Appeals Judge Learned Hand, the longest serving and
probably the most widely respected federal jurist. Deliver-
ing the Holmes Lectures at Harvard, Hand implicitly but
unmistakably rebuked the Warren Court for its judicial
activism. Hand argued that the Framers did not envision
center group ... seldom resorted to long speeches in the Congressional Record,
but what they said and did was significant." Id.
128. J. Edgar Hoover, supra, note 76 at 1158.
129. Dozier A. DeVane, Federal Judge Starts A Crusade, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Dec. 26, 1958, at 67.
130. See What a State Chief Justice Says About the Supreme Court, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 12, 1958, at 88.
131. See James F. Byrnes, Former Justice Byrnes Says- "The Supreme Court
Must be Curbed," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 18, 1956, at 50-58. Although
Byrnes predicted that desegregation would have a baneful impact upon the
South, he emphasized that the Court's "usurpation" of power eventually would
negate the freedom of people throughout the nation. U.S. News adorned its
cover with an old photograph of Byrnes arrayed in the judicial robes that he had
not worn since his resignation from the Court fourteen years earlier, beneath a
banner headline quoting Byrnes' declaration that "the Supreme Court must be
curbed."
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judicial review, and that judicial review corroded the
political process by substituting the judgment of the Court
for the will of the people.132 Hand argued that judicial
review "should be confined to occasions when the statute or
order was outside the grant of power to the grantee, and
should not include a review of how the power has been
exercised." '133 Hand even suggested that the Court over-
reached in Brown.'
Segregationists naturally attempted to adorn their
attacks on the Court with the cloak of Hand's respectability.
Senator Talmadge of Georgia gleefully described Hand's
speech as "one of the most stern and devastating rebukes of
the Supreme Court and its arrogant arrogation of legisla-
tive power ... 135
Although many liberals alleged that Hand's remarks
were too extreme, 13criticism of the Court continued to come
from other informed and respectable sources. A month after
Hand's lectures, Princeton Professor Edward S. Corwin, one
of the nation's leading constitutional scholars, alleged that
"the Court went on a virtual binge and thrust its nose into
matters beyond its competence" in its June 1957 decisions
on subversion, which Corwin denounced as "irresponsible,"
"weird," and "vicious nonsense."'37 And Yale Law Professor
Alexander Bickel alleged in 1957 that the Court had "shown
an increasing incidence of the sweeping dogmatic state-
132. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 66-74 (1964).
133. Id. at 66.
134. Id. at 54-55.
135. 104 CONG. REC. 3198 (1958).
136. For example, Anthony Lewis complained that Hand's "negative tone"
went "too far ... for there are more positive values in judicial review than he
would concede." Lewis believed that the Court served useful functions as a
forum for moral protest, as a catalyst for congressional legislation, as a
nonpolitical arbiter, and as an instrument of national unity. Anthony Lewis,
The Supreme Court and Its Critics, 45 MINN. L. REV. 305, 314-19 (1961).
Another commentator derogated Hand's deference to the legislature as "a
dangerous doctrine, all the more so in view of the frequency with which
legislative bodies take a cavalier attitude toward civil liberties, confident that
the courts will remedy any abuses of which they may have been guilty."
Maurice J. Goldbloom, Judicial Review, COMMENTARY, June 1958, at 548
(reviewing LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958)).
137. Edward S. Corwin, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1958. But while
Corwin believed that the Court should have its "nose well tweaked," Corwin
opposed the Jenner bill because it would "throw the baby out with the bath."
Instead, Corwin proposed congressional legislation to assert the correct
meaning of the Constitution in the cases decided by the Court.
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ment, of the formulation of results accompanied by little or
no effort to support them in reason."'38 Noting the "rising
consensus of dismay" even among informed and often lib-
eral academics, one commentator in 1959 pointed out that
"the Court is wholly dependent on such men for defense
against critics less informed, much more numerous and
infinitely more virulent."3 9
In milder tones, Harvard Law Dean Erwin Griswold
warned that the Court was deciding some cases on grounds
that were broader than were necessary for their decisions.
Griswold suggested, however, that part of the reason for ill
considered decisions was that the Court was overworked,
despite its sparing use of certiorari, and that "it just does
not have adequate time to do all of its work as it really
should be done."14 Harvard Law Professor Paul A. Freund
complained that "this mounting docket of cases looms as a
serious barrier to the true mission of the Supreme Court, to
clarify, expound, and develop the law in its most significant
national aspects, and not to act as a mere further appellate
court for the correction of possible error."'41 Other academic
critics of the Court suggested that the Court's decisions
lacked coherence because they were too geared toward
promoting harmony within the Court,'42 while other critics
138. 105 CONG. REC. 3313, 3314 (1959).
139. C.P. Ives, Now the American Bar Association, BALT. SUN, Mar. 2, 1959,
reprinted in 105 CONG. REC. 3313, 3314 (1959).
140. Erwin N. Griswold, Morrison Lecture Before the State Bar of California
(Oct. 9, 1958), in 43 MAss. L.Q. 98, 109 (1958). Pointing out that the Court was
"inevitably in a vulnerable position," Griswold averred that it could "do much to
protect itself-and thus its essential function in our remarkable governmental
structure-by hewing to the narrow line, by deciding only what it has to decide,
and then only in precise terms limited to the particular case." Id. at 111.
Griswold explained that the Court "should never decide anything that it does
not have to decide in the constitutional field, and that what it does decide
should be put on the narrowest appropriate ground. The Court's function is far
too important to be subjected to attack on grounds which bear no necessary
relation to the substance of its decisions." Id. Griswold pointed out that "to work
as hard and conscientiously as they have to, and then be kicked around as they
are, must be rather trying at times. Even more important.., it cannot help but
to have an impact on the quality of their work." Id. at 108.
141. Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court Crisis, N.Y. ST. B. BULL., Feb.
1959, at 75-76.
142. Yale Law Professors Bickel and Wellington expressed concern in 1957
that the Court had responded to controversy by brokering opinions that would
command the support of as many Justices as possible and fashioning language
that would steer clear of controversy. Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H.
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Power: The Lincoln Mills Case,
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urged the Court to write opinions that would be more
comprehensible to the general public."'
Other liberals warned that the Supreme Court was a
brittle vessel for civil liberties. Reminding liberals that the
Court traditionally was no defender of civil liberties, the
philosopher Sidney Hook argued that "a truly democratic
community does not need a Supreme Court as an arbiter of
its destinies," even though a Supreme Court was needed for
every system of law.144 Similarly, Earl Latham cautioned
liberals that:
[T]he real victories in libertarian issues must be won.. .not in the
courts, but at the polls and in the legislatures. Freedom is won and
maintained by self-help in democratic political actions. A victory in
the legislature makes a trip to the courthouse unnecessary, but a
victory in the Court may be reversed by the legislature-or by the
judges themselves under pressure from the legislature. The
legislature derives strength from its contact with the people,
constantly renewed, and in the end, must prevail.
14 5
71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957). "Hence," they noted, "we get opinions which have
the vacuity characteristic of desperately negotiated documents. Moreover, the
less an opinion says, the less there may be in it for critics of the Court to seize
upon for their own purposes." Id. Bickel and Wellington complained that the
Court had:
shown an increasing incidence of the sweeping dogmatic statement, of
the formulation of results accompanied by little or no effort to support
them in reason.., of opinions that do not opine and of per curiam
opinions that.., fail to build the bridge between the authorities they
cite and the results they decree.
Id.
143. For example, The New Republic contended that some of the blame for
the over-anxious reaction to the Jencks decision must be attributed to
Brennan's opinion, which was cloudy when it needed urgently to be clear,
earthbound when it should have been eloquent in expounding our traditions of
criminal procedure. Jencks Revised, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 16, 1957, at 5-6. The
political scientist C. Peter Magrath, however, believed that
friendly critics are unlikely to succeed in their campaign to direct the
Supreme Court onto a path labeled 'public understanding,' 'unity of the
Justices,' and 'uniformity of law.' For one thing, the general public
knows little and cares less about the Court. Its interest is of a most
sporadic kind and focuses only on the actual results-not on the
judicial craftsmanship that went into them.
C. Peter Magrath, Nine Deliberative Bodies: A Profile of the Warren Court,
COMMENTARY, Nov. 1961, at 399, 405-06.
144. Sidney Hook, Liberalism and the Law, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1957, at 46,
47-49.
145. Earl Latham, The Supreme Court's Crusade For Freedom: Balancing
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Meanwhile, University of Chicago Law Professor Philip
B. Kurland warned that:
[Jiudicial activism should be rejected because the exercise of such
naked power invites a reply in kind from those on whose domain
the Court is poaching. And in a pitched battle between Congress
and the Court, Congress is endowed with the stronger weapons:
the jurisdiction and membership of the Court are at its mercy.
Shorn of its shield of judicial objectivity, in a day when its opinions
are not likely to be popular, it has no adequate defense against
such potential legislative attack, the reality of which is all too
patent in the Bills which have been introduced in Congress. 146
Even many of the Court's most staunch defenders
acknowledged the usefulness of constructive criticism.
Professor Freund, for example, believed that the bar and
the universities had a duty "not indeed to shield the Court
from all criticism but to make sure that judgements of
approval or disapproval are raised to the level of genuine
understanding."' Similarly, Anthony Lewis remarked that
"no institution in the country more desperately needs
critics," since a Justice "lacked the freedom of other office-
holders to discuss his work with experts in the field. He is
alone and immune, and he may be particularly susceptible
to vanity, basking in the sunshine of his friends' compli-
ments."1" As Freund pointed out, however, the Court's
candor in exposing "the reasons for its decisions and even
the disagreements entering into them, which is far from
characteristic of courts around the world, presupposes a
mature people who in the end will judge their judges
rationally. Unless this maturity exists, the whole system is
in danger of breaking down." 49
the Interests of the Society and the Individual, COMMENTARY, Aug. 1959, at 108,
117.
146. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court and Its Judicial Critics, 6 UTAH
L. REV. 457, 466 (1959). Kurland believed the Court should avoid judicial
activism for three reasons. First, he believed that "judicial activism is
undemocratic. To the extent that a check on democracy is necessary, its
function should be confined to those areas in which it is essential." Second, he
feared that judicial activism would undermine "public faith in the objectivity
and detachment of the Court," and finally that it invited retribution from
Congress. Id.
147. Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court Under Attack, 25 U. PIrr. L. REV.
1,3 (1963).
148. Lewis, The Supreme Court and Its Critics, supra note 136, at 331-32.
149. Freund, The Supreme Court Under Attack, supra note 147, at 7.
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Immoderate attacks on the Court by states' rights
advocates, particularly segregationsists, may have inhibited
moderates and liberals who had misgivings about the
Court's activism from expressing their concerns. Defenders
of the Court expressed fear that irresponsible criticism of
the Court would silence constructive criticism. Freund
remarked that "it would be a great disservice if it came to
pass that the only alternatives open to observers of the
Court were unbridled abuse or indiscriminate praise.""15
One lawyer was reported to express the wish that the
Court's right-wing critics "would shut up so that I can take
issue with some of the Court's opinions. But I don't want
people thinking that I'm in ageement with the rash
charges that have been made." 1 Accordingly, one com-
mentary complained in 1958 that "many of those who have
attacked the Court in past months have actually forestalled
effective criticism.' 52
H. State Judges Smite the Court: The Report of the
Conference of Chief Justices
By far the most dramatic and unprecedented judicial
criticism was delivered in a long and remarkably astringent
report issued by the Conference of Chief Justices on August
23, 1958, only two days after the Senate's defeat of the
Jenner-Butler bill. 5 ' In its resolution approving the 11,000-
word report, the Conference, comprised of the chief justices
of each of the forty-nine states, urged the Court to exercise
the "power of judicial self-restraint" by recognizing the
difference between what the Constitution may prescribe or
permit and what a majority of the Justices "may deem
desirable" or undesirable.'54 The report was all the more
remarkable because the vote in favor of it was so lopsided,
150. Freund, The Supreme Court Crisis, supra note 139, at 70.
151. John E. Dunsford & Richard J. Childress, Attacks on the Supreme
Court, 4 CATH. LAW. 57, 63 (1958).
152. Id.
153. PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at app. 2, 141-59. The Report was prepared by
a committee that the Conference had appointed at its 1957 meeting to study the
role of the judiciary in federalism. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 119. At the 1957
meeting, the Conference had expressed its profound concern for the retention
and exercise of the constitutional power of state governments, but had rejected
proposals to censure the Court. Id.
154. PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at app. 2, 158-59.
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thirty-six to eight. 15 Chief justices from every region of the
nation voted for the report, which received support even
from chief justices of such liberal bastions as Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
15 6
Surveying the Court's decisions in many different fields,
the chief justices concluded that "the Supreme Court too
often has tended to adopt the role of policy maker without
proper judicial restraint."'57 The report expressed particular
concern about the aggrandizement of federal power,
explaining that "the overall tendency of decisions ... over
the last 25 years or more has been to press the extension of
federal power and to press it rapidly."' 8 Denying that
"either the framers of the original Constitution or the
possibly somewhat less gifted draftsmen of the Fourteenth
Amendment ever contemplated that the Supreme Court
would, or should, have the almost unlimited policy-making
powers which it now exercises," the report expressed regret
that the Court had attained "the immense, and in many
respects, dominant power which it now wields.""9 Decrying
the frequency of closely divided decisions and the
overturning of precedent, the report declared that recent
decisions "will raise at least considerable doubt about
whether the United States remained a government of laws
rather than men." Chiding the Court for manifesting "an
impatience with the slow workings of our federal system,"6 °
the report expressed "earnest hope" that the Court would
exercise to the full its power of judicial self-restraint by adhering
firmly to its tremendous, strictly judicial powers and by eschew-
ing, so far as possible, the exercise of essentially legislative powers
when it is called upon to decide questions involving the validity of
state action, whether it deems such action wise or unwise.1
6
'
The report averred that it was the "spirit of self-govern-
ment, of local self-government, which has been a vital force
in shaping our democracy from its very inception.'
12
155. Id. at 22.
156. See id. at 159 (listing Chief Justices who submitted the report).
157. Id. at 157.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 158-59.
161. Id. at 158.
162. Id. at 143.
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The wide ranging and rather rambling report directly
or implicitly found fault with the Court's decisions in such
diverse areas as preemption of state law, 163 labor law, 1
64
state legislative investigations, 165 admission to the bar, '
66
and state administration of criminal law.67 The report also
described the Court's encouragement of expansion of federal
regulatory legislation and its contraction of the power of the
163. Id. at 145. The report pointed out that the Court recently had given the
preemption doctrine a "wide sweep, extending it beyond its traditional use in
connection with commerce clause cases, most notably in Nelson." Id.
164. In a long section on labor relations cases, the report complained that
"the doctrine of pre-emption, coupled with only partial express regulation by
Congress, has produced a state of considerable confusion in the field of labor
relations." Id. at 146. The report alleged that the Court's decision in
Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383
(1951), which nullified a state statute designed to prevent strikes and lockouts
in public utilities, left the states powerless to protect their own citizens against
emergencies created by the suspension of essential services. Id. The report also
alleged that Textile Union v. Lincoln, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), which permitted
federal courts to fashion a body of common law in suits for violation of labor
agreements, created confusion about what law a state court could apply in a
labor dispute. Id.
165. In discussing Sweezy, the report commented that the Court
disingenuously suggested that the state's delegation of power to the Attorney
General to investigate subversion was unduly vague rather than admitting that
the state legislature could not delegate such power. Id. at 148-49.
166. In a long discussion of Konigsberg, the report complained that the
Court had denied to a state the power to keep order in its own house. Id. at 149.
The report quoted with apparent approval passages of Justice Harlan's dissent
accusing the Court of substituting its own notions of public policy for those of
the state on a subject to which the Court normally had accorded state courts a
high degree of deference. Id. at 152. In criticizing Konigsberg, the chief justices
expressed awareness that "adverse comment.., lays us open to attack on the
grounds that we are complaining [about] the curtailment of our own powers and
that we are merely voicing the equivalent of the ancient protest of the defeated
litigant." Id. at 149. The chief justices explained that they "accepted this
prospect in preference to remaining silent on a matter which we think cannot be
ignored without omitting an important element of the subject with which this
report is concerned." Id.
167. In this, the longest section the report, the chief justices complained
that the Supreme Court in its exercise of appellate review of state criminal law
decisions "not only feels free to review the facts, but considers it to be its duty to
make an independent review of the facts." Id. at 152-53. The report also
criticized the Court's decision in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and
Eskridge v. Wash. State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958),
which required states to provide indigents with a free copy of their trial
transcript for use on appeal. Id. at 154-55. The chief justices remarked that
"[t]he danger of swamping some state appellate courts under the flood of
appeals which may be loosed by Griffin and Eskridge is not a reassuring
prospect." Id. at 156.
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states in public employment cases such as Slochower, but it
did not editorialize on these developments. The report
actually seemed to express satisfaction with some of the
Court's work, particularly the Erie doctrine168 and the
Court's expansion of the states' constitutional latitude to
assert in personam jurisdiction over non-residents.'69
The report's criticism of the Court in areas which
received little media attention and its emphasis on eco-
nomic issues helped to create the perception that discontent
with the Court was broad-based rather than confined to
racists or right-wing cranks. Although the report blamed
Congress in part for eroding federalism in some areas'70 and
creating confusion in others, the report seemed to place the
blame for both largely with the Court. The final version of
the report omitted perhaps the most incendiary language of
the version originally adopted by a committee of ten of the
justices: "If reasonable certainty and stability do not attach
to a written constitution, is it a constitution or is it a
sham?" 171
Some of the handful of chief justices who voted in
opposition to the report strenuously attempted to persuade
their fellow chief justices that the report was wrong-headed
and would embarrass the Conference. Urging the Confer-
ence to reject the report, Chief Justice Charles Alvin Jones
of Pennsylvania alleged that
168. Citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal
courts in cases in which federal jurisdiction is based upon diversity of
citizenship must apply the common law of the state in which the federal court
sits), the report pointed out that "[n]ot all of the decisions of the Supreme Court
in recent years have limited or tended to limit the power of the states or the
effect of state laws." Id. at 147.
169. Citing Int'l Shoe v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and McGee v. Int'l Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the report stated that the "Court has tended to
relax rather than tighten restrictions under the due process clause upon state
action in this field." The report seemed to express satisfaction that "[flormalistic
doctrines or dogmas have been replaced by a more flexible and realistic
approach," although the report noted that the trend had been halted in Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 214 (1958). Id. at 147.
170. For example, the report stated that "[i]n the field of taxation the
doctrine of intergovernmental immunity has been seriously curtailed partly by
judicial decisions and partly by statute. This has not been entirely a one-way
street." Id. at 147.
171. "Is it a Constitution or is it a Sham?," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug.
29, 1958, at 128.
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no matter how meticulously reference to the school desegregation
case is avoided, it must be recognized that the principal cause of
the present-day criticism of the Supreme Court is that decision...
The segregation issue is ... inextricably embedded in the
background of the resolution you are asked to adopt. You might as
well face that fact.
172
Jones, who authored the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia decision that the Court affirmed in Nelson, also denied
that any of the Court's decisions on subversion extended
federal power at the expense of the states because "each
was merely an 'application of a long-ordained federal power
to a new set of circumstances.' ,,' Jones contended that
Nelson would not "interfere with the detection, prosecution
or conviction of a single Communist or other subversive....
What the Nelson decision did was to recognize in the
Federal Government the unrestricted right to control its
defense against internal subversion, unhampered by
meddlesome or officious interference from any subordinate
sovereignties.
Moreover, Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub of New
Jersey argued that the Report exceeded the proper scope of
the Conference's responsibilities and that the judges should
not second-guess the Supreme Court's decisions without
having studied the full records in those cases.7 5 Weintraub
also warned that the Report "readily lends itself to misuse
by anyone who tilts with the Federal Government."'76
Although some of the dissenting chief justices also may
have felt that the Conference should avoid intervention in
national politics, the Conference was no stranger to such
forays. In 1956, the Conference urged William J. Brennan's
appointment to the Supreme Court in an apparent, and
ironic, belief that the appointment of this New Jersey state
judge would help to balance the federal-state relationship.7 7
The willingness of three-quarters of the nation's state
chief justices to issue so stern a rebuke to the Court is a
172. Charles A. Jones, Strictures on Supreme Court are Uncalled for, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 24, 1958, at 115 (address to Conference of Chief
Justices).
173. Id. at 113
174. Id.
175. Rights of a State Must Yield to Federal Needs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Oct. 24, 1958, at 115.
176. Id. at 116.
177. ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 323-24 (1997).
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telling index of the degree to which the Court's decisions in
a broad range of areas had antagonized even informed
opinion. Even so, it was strange that normally circumspect
judges would deliver such a stinging and public rebuke to
the nation's highest tribunal. The report itself was
curiously devoid of any apology for its boldness. Implicit in
the report was the theme that a venerable body such as the
Conference needed to sound an alarm because the Court's
alleged usurpation of power and the erosion of federalism
imperiled self-government in America.
The chief justice of Illinois contended that he had voted
for the Report because he believed that the state judiciary
should "zealously guard its own prerogatives and areas of
activity" and that such criticism afforded "a better method
of shaping [the Supreme Court's] policy of future action
than does legislation withdrawing from it appellatejurisdiction in given areas."'78 Indeed, the chief justices who
joined the report do not appear to have had any particular
affinity for Court-curbing, and the report itself called for
internal rather than external restraint. Michigan Chief
Justice John R. Dethmers, who voted for the report, warned
in a public speech in December 1958 that limitations on
judicial review would make constitutional rights depend
upon the whims of Congress and "would mark the
beginning of parliamentary, and the end of constitutional
government, in the United States."179 Dethmers neverthe-
less expressed "alarm" over decisions that aggrandized na-
tional power at the expense of state and local govern-
ments.
Many judges from northern states were reported to
have voted for the resolution because they wanted to spare
embarrassment for their southern counterparts, who faced
re-election. 8' This theory, however, is implausible because
southern office holders of this era tended to glory in defend-
ing lost causes, sometimes wore their isolation from the
North as badges of honor, and often won votes by defending
positions such as segregation that were unpopular in other
parts of the nation. Southern chief justices who voiced
178. Charles H. Davis, Constitutional Law: The States and the Supreme
Court, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1959, at 312.
179. John R. Dethmers, What a State Chief Justice Says About the Supreme
Court, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 12, 1958, at 91.
180. Id.
181. Judicial Steamroller, NATION, Sept. 6, 1958, at 102.
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minority criticism of the Court amidst a host of their
Yankee counterparts were more likely to find themselves
acclaimed than embarrassed when they returned home.
One commentator suggested that the resentment
among the state judges over the U. S. Supreme Court's
reversal of some of their decisions may have contributed to
the judges' antagonism toward the court, for "even detached
judges may take pride in their work, and intellectual pride
is a very tender thing."'82 Moreover, the apparent haste with
which the Conference adopted the report may suggest that
the chief justices did not devote serious attention to it, a
possibility in which critics of the report took some comfort.
The thirty-one page document was not made available to
Conference members until the morning of the opening
session and was adopted with little discussion."'
The report provoked predictable outcries of shock and
dismay. Denouncing the report as "inexplicable" and
"inexcusable," Bickel remarked that the issuance of non-
technical manifestos by judges assembled in convention was
"easily as novel a development as Sputnik I.,,184 Bickel
expressed facetious hope that "perhaps it doesn't exist.
Perhaps it is a hoax or an awful dream." 185 Pointing out
that the state supreme courts often were no models of
judicial restraint, the columnist Anthony Lewis expressed
the wish that "some of the critics would tend to the beam in
their own eye before attacking the mote in the Court's."1 '
Similarly, Dean William B. Lockhart of the University of
Minnesota Law School stated that while "the modern
Supreme Court has been extremely careful not to substitute
its judgment of what is wise or sound for State legislative
judgment in social and economic legislation," the "same
cannot be said of a number of the State courts represented
by the chief justices who voted to indict the Supreme Court
for lack of proper judicial restraint."'87 As Philip B. Kurland
pointed out, however, "the wrongs of the Supreme Court
182. James 0. Monroe, Jr., The Supreme Court on Trial: A Perspective, 11
HASTINGS L.J. 369, 387-88 (1960).
183. Judicial Steamroller, supra note 181, at 105.
184. Alexander M. Bickel, An Inexplicable Document, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept.
29, 1958, at 9, 11.
185. Id. at 11.
186. Anthony Lewis, A Newspaperman's View: The Role of the Supreme
Court, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1959, at 990.
187. 105 CONG. REC. 6771, 6773 (1959) (address by William B. Lockhart).
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cannot be deemed expiated by the equal or grosser errors on
the part of the courts over which the Chief Justices of the
States preside."188
Other critics of the resolution minimized its importance
because the Conference was merely a consultative body,
concerned mostly with technical legal procedures, and was
not authorized to make public pronouncements in the name
of the courts on which its members served. 189 Other critics,
however, suggested that the resolution was all the more
disturbing because it so far exceeded the Conference's
purpose. Reporting that "some lawyers were shocked at the
apparent impropriety and others were incredulous," The
New Jersey Law Journal warned that the resolution set "a
dangerous precedent" because it broke the ancient tradition
that barred judges from criticizing the decisions of higher
courts.' 90
Moreover, some critics of the report hinted that race
was at its root. Even though the report did not mention the
Court's desegregation decisions, those decisions seemed to
provide at least a partial pretext for the report. As Bickel
asked, "who in 1958 can devote any thought to the work of
the Supreme Court.. as it affects federal-state relation-
ships and not have the school desegregation decisions
prominently in mind?"191 Similarly, New York attorney
David L. Weissman observed that "there is something
unreal about a report issued in 1958 on the work of the
Supreme Court as it affects federal-state relationships
which completely ignores the desegregation cases,"
particularly since he contended that the cases that the
Report criticized did "not justify the sweep and sting of that
criticism."' Along the same lines, Paul Freund pointed out
that the subversion cases were "as popguns to the crack of
doom" in comparison with the desegregation cases, and that
"without the segregation issue, it is hardly likely that the
188. Kurland, The Supreme Court and Its Judicial Critics, supra note 146,
at 458.
189. Judicial Steamroller, supra note 181, at 102.
190. An Unprecedented Report and Resolution, NEW JERSEY L.J., Sept. 11,
1958, at 4.
191. Bickel, An Inexplicable Document, supra note 184, at 11.
192. David L. Weissman, The Warren Court and Its Critics, PROGRESSIVE,
May 1959, at 21, 23.
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actions of the court would have aroused so vehement a
response. " "'
Many critics of the report took pains to point out flaws
in its reasoning. Lockhart, for example, contended that any
blame for the expansion of federal power during recent
decades ought to have been directed toward Congress
rather than the Court. Lockhart explained that "Congress is
the agency that has expanded the national powers, and the
Court has practiced judicial restraint in leaving these policy
determinations to Congress. If the chief justices want the
court to check this legislative expansion of Federal powers,
the Court must exercise less judicial restraint, not more.
194
Lockhart also contended that the report missed its mark in
accusing the Court of diminishing the power of the states.
He pointed out that the Court had actually increased the
power of the states over taxation and regulation of
interstate commerce. Only in the area of preemption,
Lockhart argued, had the Court restricted state power. He
noted, however, that the Court left Congress free to
overturn its decision in Nelson, and that the Court's labor
relations decisions had stopped short of holding that
Congress had preempted the entire field of labor relations
affecting interstate commerce.'9 5  Similarly, Professor
Freund pointed out that the Court had deferred to state
power to impose economic regulation, tax businesses
engaged in interstate commerce, and to tax property despite
some degree of federal ownership. 96 Freund argued that
"there has been growing acceptance of state legislation in
the matters that really count for the states."'1 97 Such
defenses, however, overlooked the widespread animosity
toward taxation and economic regulation even at the state
level that prevailed among many of the Court's critics.
Some critics of the report also pointed out that the
Court was more committed to judicial restraint than was
193. Paul A. Freund, Storm Over the American Supreme Court, 21 MOD. L.
REV. 345, 346 (1958).
194. 105 CONG. REC. 6772 (1959). Despite his disapproval of the Report,
William B. Lockhart conceded that such an august body's reminder of the need
for judicial restraint might have some value, even though "all of the Justices
appreciate this need for moderation and restraint." Id. at 6773.
195. See id. at 6772..
196. See Lewis, The Supreme Court and Its Critics, supra note 136, at 310
n.27.
197. Freund, The Supreme Court Crisis, supra note 141, at 78.
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the pre-1937 Court, for the Court no longer scrutinized the
wisdom of economic regulatory legislation.'98 Indeed, Lewis
argued that the Court's present activism paled in
comparison with its robust review of the constitutionality of
state and federal economic legislation before 1937.199 "How
gravely, in comparison, do justices of today approach a
question of constitutionality!" Lewis exclaimed. "They have
been so conditioned by criticism of that earlier Court...
that they use their great power to review legislation almost
gingerly, and with frequently professed reluctance.""° Of
course, the Court's deference to Congress and the states in
challenges to economic regulation might actually have
antogonized many of the economically conservative chiefjustices, notwithstanding their advocacy of judicial
restraint.
Despite the many attacks on the report, criticism of the
Court by such distinguished jurists could not help but to
exacerbate the controversy over the Court's decisions. As
Professor Lytle has observed, "[tihe state Chief Justices
created a fresh wind to fan the flames of criticism, and
raised the temperature of the blaze which had appeared to
be cooling down. In a sense they placed a mantle of
legitimacy and respectability u on what was largely
emotional and irrational criticism." 01
The report particularly vexed contemporary observers
because it seemed likely to bolster the resistance to racial
integration and civil liberties for unpopular political
minorities. Indeed, as America suggested, the justices could
hardly have been oblivious that their report would
stimulate opposition to the desegregation decisions." 2
Kurland remarked that
if there [was] any reason to challenge the action of the Chief
Justices, it is on the ground that it gave aid and comfort to the
enemy... It was the warm greetings of brotherhood from the
Southern demagogues and the paeans of praise from the American
witch-hunting fraternity that did the harm.
2 0 3
198. See, e.g., 105 CONG. REC. 6372-73 (1959).
199. Lewis, A Newspaperman's View, supra note 186, at 912.
200. Id.
201. LYTLE, supra note 1, at 70.
202. The Court Criticized, Editorial, AMERICA, Oct.18, 1958, at 60.
203. Kurland, The Supreme Court and Its Judicial Critics, supra note 146,
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Similarly, Harvard Law Dean Erwin Griswold declared that
"considering the comfort that the Chief Justices' statement
gives to our southern friends, I wish that they had not said
it. 2 0
4
Such fears were not unfounded. Senator Sam Erwin of
North Carolina claimed that "when a majority of the chief
justices of the supreme courts of our States ... censure or
condemn the decisions and the trend of decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court, certainly we are more than justified in
exploring all means possible to resolve these serious
conflicts.,2" Erwin, himself a former state supreme court
justice, pointed out that "our judges are not prone to
condemn other judges and therefore their action in this
instance is most significant. 2 °6 Indeed, Faubus immediately
seized upon the report in support of legislation permitting
the closing of any Arkansas public school to maintain public
peace or prevent its integration under threat of force from
federal authorities.27 And, in a flight of fancy, conservative
commentator Dan Smoot claimed that the thirty-six chief
justices could testify for the prosecution at Warren's
impeachment trial.2"8
The state chief justices were far from the only jurists
who were dissatisfied with many of the U.S. Supreme
Court's recent decisions.2 9 Shortly after the Conference's
report was issued, forty-six percent of the lower federal
court judges who responded to a U.S. News & World Report
survey expressed agreement with the conclusions of the
report, thirty-nine percent disagreed, and fifteen percent
gave no opinion.210 Southern judges expressed approval by a
two to one margin while judges outside' the South were
evenly divided. 2' Although only one-third of the nation's
at 459.
204. Griswold, supra note 140, at 106.
205. 105 CONG. REC. 1431 (1959).
206. Id.
207. See Pro and Con on Little Rock-Record of Week of Controversy: On
Mixed Schools: The Key Speeches, the Court Arguments, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Sept. 5, 1958, at 96 (statement of Governor Faubus).
208. See Dan Smoot, Impeaching Earl Warren-Part I, DAN SMOOT REP., Jan.
30, 1961, at 36.
209. See How U.S. Judges Feel About the Supreme Court, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 24, 1958, at 36-37.
210. Id. at 37.
211. Id. at 37. Some 55.5 percent of the Southern judges expressed approval,
28 percent registered disapproval, and 16.5 percent preferred to provide no
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351 lower federal court judges responded to the survey and
many of the non-participating judges publicly expressed
disapproval of the survey,212 the poll further underscored
the controversial nature of the Court's decisions.
I. The Furor Subsides, 1958-1962
Although the Conference's report, which was released
only three days after the Senate's defeat of Court-curbing
legislation, came too late to influence the 1958 attacks on
the Court, it may have encouraged a new wave of Court-
curbing efforts during the following year. In 1959, the
House once again approved H.R. 3, the Nelson measure, the
habeas corpus bill, and the bill to modify Mallory.213
Meanwhile, in February 1959, the ABA's House of
Delegates adopted a report of the ABA's Special Committee
on Communist Tactics, Strategy, and Objectives accusing
the Court of rendering decisions "in such a manner as to
encourage an increase in Communist activities in the
United States.214
The attacks on the Court during 1959 were more
restrained that were those of the previous year. As
Professor Murphy observed, "[tihe spark was missing from
the Court critics .... The Court foes had reached a peak of
excitement during the summer of 1958, and in spite of the
additional ammunition supplied by the state chief justices
and the American Bar Association, they could not achieve
that fever pitch again the next year."215 The change in
temper partly was attributable to defeat of numerous
northern conservative Republicans in the 1958 congres-
sional elections and the retirement of others, including
view. Of judges outside the South, 42.4 percent approved, 43.5 percent
disapproved, and 14.1 percent gave no opinion. See id. at 37.
212. See id. at 36-37.
213. See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 236.
214. The full text of the resolutions appear in PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at
137-40. The report, which averred that it was not intended "to indicate censure
of the Supreme Court," expressed disapproval of the Jenner bill. It
recommended, however, much of the legislation that the House passed during
1959, including legislative reversal of Nelson, and redefinition of the word
"organize" in the Smith Act. Id.
215. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 237
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Jenner.216 Public opposition to Court-curbing ma X have
accounted at least in part for the Democratic sweep.
Notwithstanding the Court's boldness in Cooper, the
Court handed down so few controversial decisions during
the next several years that it seemed to many observers to
be avoiding conflict. Whether this was prudent or craven
was in the eye of the beholder. As Commonweal pointed out,
efforts to curb the Court "were suddenly made to seem
superfluous" after the "new series of conservative decisions
by the Court.""21
Professor Powe has observed that "[t]he Court's race
cases from 1958-1962 were in a holding pattern. In the
school area, the Court was missing in action. Moreover,
during 1959 the Court handed down several decisions that
upheld the criminal convictions of alleged subversives.
Although these decisions did not completely 211pacify
conservatives since they were decided five-to-four, they
helped to diminish the sense of urgency among conserva-
tives for the need to curb the Court. The decline in anxiety
about the Court's decisions on subversion also was
attributable to a diminution of fear of Communist subver-
sion."'
216. Id. at 237-38. See POWE, supra note 1, at 140.
217. Professor Powe contends that judicial issues were not a factor in the
defeat of senators who had supported Court-curbing measures. POWE, supra
note 1, at 140. Similarly, Professor Murphy could identify only one senator
whose defeat might have been attributable even in part to his support of Court-
curbing legislation. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 237. With regard to the defeat of
conservative House members who supported Court-curbing legislation,
Representative O'Hara of Illinois remarked that:
[tihe casualties were large among the Republicans from the North who
for a political price had been parties to a coalition with Members from
the South intent on punishing the Supreme Court of the United States
for upholding the Constitution of the United States in the matter of
desegregated public schools.
He contended that "the difference between the 103 majority of last year to swat
the Supreme Court and the 32 majority of this year [on H.R. 3] tells the story."
105 CONG. REC. 11,828 (1959).
218. A Changing Court?, COMMONWEAL, July 17, 1959 at 363.
219. POWE, supra note 1, at 177.
220. See, e.g., David Lawrence, What "Written Constitution"?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., June 29, 1959, at 104.
221. Writing shortly before hostility against the Court reached its 1958
peak, political scientist Earl Latham and sociologist Michael Harrington had
foreseen that the end of the Korean War, the demise of McCarthyism, and the
detente of the Eisenhower Administration could pave the way for public
acceptance of the Court's decisions on subversion. Michael Harrington, Civil
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By late 1961, one political scientist wrote that "the
worst of the furor has obviously passed, possibly because it
has, indeed, had some effect. The Warren Court, which in
1956 and 1957 seemed determined to wield a civil liberties
sword at every opportunity, has since used the sword
sparingly.222 Criticism of the Court now began to come from
the Left,223 where many felt that the Court had unduly
capitulated to right-wing pressures. At a National Lawyers
Guild conference in 1961, UCLA Law Professor Arno Van
Alstyne accused the Court's majority of appeasing
"dominant public sentiment" in order to protect the Court
from "destructive attack."24 Van Alstyne complained that
the Court was behaving like "a watchman who has
voluntarily handcuffed himself just as the burglars are
breaking into the warehouse. '2 5
J. The Furor Revives: Reapportionment and School Prayer
The uneasy truce between conservatives and the Court
was abruptly shattered during the spring of 1962, when the
Supreme Court handed down two of the most controversial
decisions in its history. In March, Baker v. Carr 226 removed
the political question doctrine's long-standing obstruction to
adjudication of malapportionment when the Court held that
the apportionment of congressional districts was a
judiciable issue. Although the ultimate implications of
Baker were unclear, its critics correctly feared that the
Court also would adjudicate apportionment of state
legislatures and rule in favor of reapportionment, thereby
vastly diminishing the influence of rural interests. Three
months after Baker, the Court in Engel v. Vitale 2 7 shocked
Liberties-by Fiat, COMMONWEAL, Mar. 28, 1958, at 654-55. Earl Latham,
Perspectives on the Warren Court, NATION, Jan. 18, 1958, at 49.
222. C. Peter Magrath, "Nine Deliberative Bodies:" A Profile of the Warren
Court, COMMENT, Nov. 1961, at 400.
223. See, e.g., The Supreme Court Sounds Retreat, NATION, June 20, 1959, at
545 (complaining that the Court's recent decisions on prosecution of subversives
had taken back about half of what it said in the earlier, and parallel, decisions).
224. Arno Van Alstyne, Self-Government and the Supreme Court: The
Constitution in Crisis, 22 L. IN TRANSITION 1, 17 (1962).
225. Id.
226. See 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
227. See 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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conservatives by ruling that the First Amendment
prohibited state-sponsored prayer in public schools.
The eruption of controversy over reapportionment and
religion in schools revived the Court-curbing coalition of
southern segregationists and northern conservatives that
had waned in the wake of the defeat of the anti-Court bills
in 1958 and the diminution in public alarm over domestic
subversion. As the journalist Fred C. Cook observed,
Southerners
had long dreamed of fusing Dixie with the Midwest farm belt and
the Mountain states in a rural-oriented complex that could
counterbalance the voting power of the great industrial states ...
In Baker, the Southerners found a fulcrum with which to lever
national political action, and.., the more perceptive among them
seized the opportunity.22
Both Baker and Engel precipitated a spate of legislation
to restrict the Court's jurisdiction over apportionment and
school prayer 2 1 or to alter the means for selecting and
retaining Supreme Court justices. Once again, however,
state officials also took the initiative to propose Court-
curbing measures. By far the most prominent were
proposals for three amendments to the Constitution that
would have had the net effect of radically tilting sovereignty
from the federal government back to the states.
II. THE STATES' RIGHTS AMENDMENTS
A. A New Strategy: The Origins of the States' Rights
Amendments
The states' rights amendments had their genesis in
July 1962 in Biloxi, Mississippi at a routine conference of
southern state officials organized by the Council of State
Governments, 2' ° an agency supported by the governments of
228. Fred J. Cook, The Federal Union Under Fire, PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1963,
at 10, 11.
229. See, e.g., JOHN HERBERT LAUBACH, SCHOOL PRAYERS: CONGRESS, THE
COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC (1969); See Michal R. Belknap, God and the Warren
Court: The Quest for a Wholesome Neutrality, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 401,
444-50 (1999).
230. Thomas B. Morgan, Seventeen States Vote to Destroy Democracy As We
Know It, LOOK, Dec. 3, 1963, at 76, 78.
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all fifty states.23' Although the conference was intended to
address administrative and managerial subjects, talk
among the politicians naturally turned to broader public
issues, including desegregation, the Supreme Court's recent
ban on school prayer, and tensions between the United
States and Cuba.23 It was the Court's recent decision in
Baker v. Carr, however, that provoked the most buzz.
Officials from a region that was riddled with rotten
boroughs naturally feared that Baker could profoundly alter
the political complexion of their states and perhaps consign
them to political oblivion. Already riled up over the
quickening pace of the civil rights movement and frustrated
by the Kennedy Administration's increasingly liberal bent,
these mostly Democratic officials now felt anxious that
reapportionment could seal the doom of their increasingly
threatened political order.2 3 3As Cook remarked, "[tihey were
possessed of a states' rights fervor which John C. Calhoun
might have envied.
2 4
Taking advantage of the sultry political and physical
weather of the Biloxi meeting, a Florida delegate named
William V. Chappell, Jr. urged the conference to express its
discontent in action rather than mere words.235 Chappell, a
forty-year old Florida legislator who had championed
segregationist causes, persuaded the conference to adopt
resolutions urging Congress to prepare a constitutional
amendment restricting the jurisdiction of federal courts in
reapportionment cases. A second resolution called for strict
231. The Council of State Governments was founded in 1933 to replace the
American Legislators Association. It is a joint agency of the governments of all
of the states, commonwealths, and territories. The governing board is composed
of the governors of each of the fifty states and two legislators from each state.
The agency's mission is to "strengthen state government by: improving
administrative and managerial capability and performance; promoting
intergovernmental cooperation; collecting, processing, generating, and
determining information needed by states; assisting states in solving specific
problems of policy formulation and operations; and serving as a catalyst and
representative in issues and opportunities affecting the states." See
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 716, entry 5577 (30th ed. 1996). In view of the
critical role that the Council played in launching the neo-confederate
amendments, it is ironic that right-wing groups in the past often had attacked
the council for its "socialistic tendencies." See Silent Amendments, NEWSWEEK
May 20, 1963, at 36.
232. Morgan, supra note 230, at 76.
233. Id. at 76, 78; Cook, supra note 228, at 10-11.
234. Cook, supra note 228, at 10.
235. Morgan, supra note 230, at 78.
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separation of state and federal powers, demanded judicial
restraint, and called for legislation to curb federal judicial
power.236
After returning to his home in Ocala, Chappell immedi-
ately began to plan his strategy for presenting his proposals
for the upcoming annual meeting of the National Legisla-
tive Conference, an organization affiliated with the Council
of State Governments that was composed of state
legislators and legislative staffers.237  In preparation,
Chappell appointed two Florida legislative committees, one
to study apportionment and the other to study "dual
sovereignty." Chappell believed that "something should be
visualized that would be brought to the attention of all the
fifty states, at the same time, the same hour, to awaken the
country."
239
The National Legislative Conference met in September
in Phoenix, a hotbed of right-wing politics and the home of
Senator Barry Goldwater, whom conservatives were urging
to seek the 1964 Republican presidential nomination. As
one person observed, the 750 delegates from forty-six states
included "aggrieved men with power back home-united for
'states' rights.' They were against integration, the ban on
school prayers, reapportionment or the welfare state-but
most of all, against the power exercised by the Supreme
Court. 2 4' The Conference included many prominent state
officials, including W. Stuart Helm, the conference chair-
man, a Republican who was the speaker of the Pennsylva-
nia House of Representatives and an oil company executive.
Like Helm, many delegates were legislators representing
rural districts who faced loss of their seats if the Supreme
Court extended the logic of Baker v. Carr to the state-
236. Cook, supra note 228, at 11.
237. Morgan, supra note 230, at 78. The National Legislative Conference
was one of the loosely affiliated organizations of the Council of State
Governments. Cook, supra note 228, at 10. The overlapping directorates of the
Council of State Governments, the General Assembly of the States, and the
National Legislative Conference enabled "an inside power complex of extreme
conservatives in the National Legislative Conference also to exert influence on
the General Assembly of the States and to a marked degree on the highly
prestigious Council of State Government itself." Id. at 11.





houses. 241 Baker quickly emerged as the lightening rod for
criticism of the Court.
Opposition to reapportionment-and hence to federal
power-among these legislators crossed sectional lines. As
Cook has remarked, "[f]rom as unlikely a state as New
Jersey (heavily industrialized, in 1960 the second state in
the nation in population density), came a delegation as
united in purpose as any delegation from the South."
24 2
Among the leaders of the New Jersey delegation was Wayne
Dumont, a Republican state senator from rural Warren
County, who fervently wished to preserve New Jersey's
legislative apportionment, which gave each of the state's
counties one senator and at least one assemblyman.
Dumont feared that apportionment based upon population
would permit the populous areas of the state to "dominate
everything, and [smaller areas] would be lucky if [they]
even got crumbs."243
As numerous speakers denounced the Supreme Court
in general and Baker v. Carr in particular, several specific
remedies began to emerge. The most obvious was the Biloxi
proposal for restricting the Court's jurisdiction over
apportionment cases. 244 Another idea, also appealing to
state legislators, was for a constitutional amendment to
permit state legislatures to amend the Constitution without
congressional participation.2 5 A third proposal, by Warren
Wood, an Illinois legislator, was to establish a court
composed of all fifty state chief justices to review U.S.
Supreme Court decisions in cases involving rights reserved
241. See Cook, supra note 228, at 11-12. As Cook explained, the delegates
feared that Baker v. Carr would "affect them personally-things were going to
be done to them." Id. at 12 (emphasis in original). Cook also observed that the
delegates were "highly-placed men, jealous of their own prerogatives. The
Southerners, in their segregationist fervor, were a dynamic force but they were
only part of a national coalition which powerful leaders had been assembling for
months." Id.
242. See id.
243. Id. Dumont stated that:
[w]e have built into our [state] Constitution a system of checks and
balances, and if you do not have such a system in the legislature, the
smaller counties will never get any legislation passed. People who want
to base everything on population may be idealists, but.., they've never
served in a legislature. If they had, they'd soon have found things don't
work that way. You have to have bargaining power.
Id.
244. Morgan, supra note 230, at 78.
245. See Cook, supra note 228, at 14.
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to the states or to the people.246 Wood, a fifty-two-year old
longtime Republican banker who had served in the Illinois
legislature for many years, including several as speaker,
was widely known for his frequent lament that the Tenth
Amendment had "been raped twice a day for ten years. 247
Although most delegates presumably assumed that the
conference would appoint a committee to study federal-state
relations... or endorse the Biloxi resolutions,"' Chappell
advocated more specific action. He proposed that the
conference's Federal-State Relations Committee draft
constitutional amendments to present to the upcoming
biennial meeting of the Assembly of the States, another
agency of the Council on State Governments, and that it
begin planning a strategy for calling a constitutional
convention. The convention would be called pursuant to the
never-used provision of Article V of the Constitution which
provides that Congress, on application by two-thirds of the
state legislatures, shall call a convention for proposing
constitutional amendments. Conservatives since 1939 had
attempted to use this convention route to effect a repeal of
the income tax amendment.25 The conference authorized
this procedure, in addition to passing a resolution of its own
that complained about "the increasing concentration of
power in Washington."251
Helm personally appointed a nine-member committee,
all but one of whom were known to favor curbs on judicial
power. The committee's most active members were
Chappell and Wood. Other members who favored Court
curbs were committee chair Lloyd W. Lowrey, a California
assemblyman and rancher; James Thurman, speaker of the
Texas House; Thomas D. Graham, speaker of the Missouri
House; Robert D. Haase, speaker of the Wisconsin assem-
bly; Clarence L. Carpenter, president of the Arizona Senate;
and Frederick H. Hauser, a New Jersey assemblyman. The
token defender of the Court was Frank King, an Ohio state
senator. Helm said that he asked King to serve in order
that the committee could receive the opinion of at least one
246. Morgan, supra note 230, at 81.
247. Cook, supra note 228, at 13-14.
248. Morgan, supra note 230, at 81.
249. Cook, supra note 228, at 12.
250. Fred P. Graham, The Role of the States in Proposing Constitutional
Amendments, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1963, at 1176-77.
251. Cook, supra note 228, at 12.
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person who did not favor curbing the Court.252 The
committee met in Chicago two days after the 1962 general
election. Working with judges, lawyers, and sundry
constitutional experts, the committee in one day drafted
three proposed amendments which were consistent with the
ideas presented at the Phoenix conference.253
The first amendment called for alteration of the
constitutional amendment process itself, introducing a
procedure whereby two-thirds of the state legislatures could
amend the Constitution without participation by Congress
or any other agency. 1 4 Although the amendment retained
the alternative provision for amendment by a two- thirds
vote of both houses of Congress and three-quarters of the
state legislatures, it eliminated the procedure for amend-
ment of the Constitution by constitutional convention. The
Article V proposal may have been inspired by an Oregon
attorney named John B. Ebinger, who had proposed a
constitutional amendment that would have permitted
three-quarters of the states to amend the Constitution
252. Id. at 14. As Cook noted, "[t]his passion to hear both sides did not
extend to the point of setting up an even debate; Frank King was left alone to
battle eight opponents." Id. Although King had not attended the Phoenix
conference, he was well known to Helm because King served on the executive
board of the National Legislative Conference. Id.
253. Id. at 15.
254. The proposed amendment provided:
Section 1. Article V of the Constitution of the United States is hereby
amended to read as follows:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the
several states, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which
shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution,
when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several states.
Whenever applications from the Legislatures of two-thirds of the total
number of states of the United States shall contain identical texts of an
amendment to be proposed, the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House shall so certify, and the amendment as contained
in the application shall be deemed to have been proposed, without
further action by Congress. No State, without its consent, shall be
deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.
Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the Legislatures of
three-fourths of the several states within seven years from the date of
its submission.
Amending the Constitution to Strengthen the States in the Federal System, 36
ST. GoVT. 10, 11-12 (1963).
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without the consent of Congress.25 5 Bills embodying his idea
were introduced in Congress in 1954.256
The second amendment would have overturned Baker v.
Carr by withdrawing the Court's jurisdiction to hear actions
concerning apportionment of state legislatures.57
The third amendment would have created a so-called
Court of the Union, composed of chief justices of all fifty
states, which could overturn by majority vote any U.S.
Supreme Court decision "relating to the rights reserved to
the states or to the people" under the Constitution. The
amendment provided that the Court of the Union could be
summoned by a petition from the legislatures of five states,
no two of which could share a common boundary. The
requirement of non-continguity apparently was intended to
ensure that the demand for the summoning of the Court
was not strictly regional. The Court would have power to
adopt procedures for its internal operations, and Congress
would make provisions for housing the Court and paying its
258
expenses.
255. Oberst, supra note 4, at 657. See William Logan Martin, The Amending
Power: The Ebinger Proposal, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1954, at 767 and Nov. 1954, at
974.
256. H.R.J. Res. 568, 83rd Cong. (1954); H.R.J. Res. 569, 83rd Cong. (1954).
257. The amendment provided:
Section 1. No provision of this Constitution, or any amendment thereto,
shall restrict or limit any state in the apportionment of representation
in its legislature.
Section 2. The judicial power of the United States shall not extend to
any suit in law or equity, or to any controversy, relating to
apportionment of representation in a state legislature.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the Legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of
its submission.
Amending the Constitution, supra note 254, at 13.
258. The amendment read as follows:
Section 1. Upon demand of the legislatures of five states, no two of
which shall share any common boundary, made within two years after
the rendition of any judgment of the Supreme Court relating to the
rights reserved to the states or to the people by this Constitution, such
judgment shall be reviewed by a court composed of the justices of the
highest courts to be known as the Court of the Union. The sole issue
before the Court of the Union shall be whether the power or
jurisdiction sought to be exercised on the part of the United States is a
power granted to it under the Constitution.
Section 2. Three-fourths of the justices of the Court of the Union shall
constitute a quorum, but it shall require concurrence of a majority of
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At the committee's request, the Council of State
Governments placed the proposals on the agenda of the
General Assembly's upcoming Chicago convention. The
committee encouraged the Council's governing body, its
Board of Managers, to endorse the amendments in its
meeting in Chicago on the day before the Assembly met.
Although the Board, which included Helm, Lowrey, and
Carpenter, did not formally endorse the proposed
amendments, the Council's executive director, Brevard
Crihfield, issued a report which denounced Baker v. Carr
and tacitly endorsed the Article V and apportionment
amendments. 9
B. A New Crusade: The Campaign For The States' Rights
Amendments
At its meeting on December 6, 1962, the General
Assembly of the States endorsed the committee's proposals.
Like the Biloxi and Phoenix meetings, the Chicago
conference was a cauldron of simmering hostility toward
the federal government's alleged intrusions on states'
rights, particularly Baker v. Carr. Members who attended
the conferences may have been more radical than the
overall membership because activists who had some type of
the entire Court to reverse a decision of the Supreme Court. In event of
incapacity of the chief justice of the highest court of any state to sit
upon the Court of the Union, his place shall be filled by another justice
of such state court selected by affirmative vote of a majority of its
membership.
Section 3. On the first Monday of the third calendar month following
the ratification of this amendment, the chief justices of the highest
courts of the several states shall convene at the national capital, at
which time the Court of the Union shall be organized and shall adopt
rules governing its procedure.
Section 4. Decisions of the Court of the Union upon matters within its
jurisdiction shall be final and shall not thereafter be overruled by any
court and may be changed only by an amendment of this Constitution.
Section 5. The Congress shall make provision for the housing of the
Court of the Union and the expenses of its operation.
Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the Legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of
its submission.
Id. at 14.
259. See Cook, supra note 228, at 15.
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agenda were more likely than moderates to incur the time
and expense necessary for attendance.26 ° One person who
attended the meeting as an observer commented that the
state officials evinced a "mob hysteria. There was nobody
actually foaming at the mouth, but they were certainly
wrought up." " The most vocal proponent of the
amendments was Millard F. Caldwell, chief justice of the
Supreme Court of Florida, and a former Florida governor.
Caldwell, an ardent segregationist, was known for his
contempt for liberals and intellectuals. 262
In a Statement of Principles that the committee
presented to the conference along with its amendment
proposals, the committee endorsed the concept of dual
sovereignty.263 This Statement also frankly admitted that
the Court of the Union proposal was designed to strip the
Supreme Court of its role as the ultimate arbiter of federal-
state relations. 64 In addition to contending the Founding
260. As Cook explained:
[t]here is no formal selection of those who should attend; the only
determining factors are private desire and financial means. As a result,
attendance is likely to be composed principally of axe-grinders who
have been supplied with either public or private resources to get to the
site of the grinding.
Id.
Cook remarked that the antagonism toward Baker caused "more and angrier
axe-grinders to turn out for the Assembly's meeting in 1962." Id. at 15. Cook
also quoted an unnamed person who was familiar with these organizations as
commenting:
Most state legislators tend to be quite conservative, and usually it is
the more conservative of these conservatives who attend the meetings.
It is the old story. Those who are passionate against something, those
who are really wrought up, are the ones most likely to show. The good
guys, the lofty idealists.., tend to be less -well-organized and they
don't charge into the breach until the damage has been done and the
crisis is at hand.
Id. at 11-12 (emphasis in original).
261. Id. at 15.
262. See id. at 16.
263. Amending the Constitution, supra note 254, at 10.
264. According to the Statement of Principles of the Committee on Federal-
State Relations of the National Legislative Conference ("NLC"):
[tihe basic difficulty is that the Supreme Court's decisions concerning
the balance between federal and state power are final and can be
changed in practice only if the states can muster sufficient interest in
Congress, backed by a three-quarters majority of the states themselves
to amend the Constitution. While the founding fathers fully expected
and wished the words of the Constitution to have this degree of
finality, it is impossible to believe that they envisioned such potency for
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Fathers had not anticipated the Court to have this power,265
they complained that the power to determine the contours
of federal-state power should not reside in an agency of the
federal government."' Like other antagonists of the Court,
the committee expressed impatience with the constitutional
amendment process as a means for overturning objection-
able Supreme Court decisions."7
The amendments received scant consideration, with
most delegates seeing the proposals for the first time when
they arrived at the meeting. Only one day was devoted to
deliberations, and most of the discussions consisted of
diatribes against the Court. Ohio state Senator Frank W.
King, the lone dissenter in the NLC Federal-State Relations
Committee, was the only person to seriously challenge the
amendments. In opposing the Article V proposal, King
argued against bypassing Congress in the amendment
process, and he pointed out that the amendment would
exclude the people from the amendment process insofar as
it would eliminate Article V's procedure for allowing
Congress to permit ratification by state conventions.268 King
opposed an amendment process that would give state
legislatures the sole power to both propose amendments
and ratify them, especially since malapportionment often
made such legislatures unrepresentative.69 In opposing the
the pronouncements of nine judges appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate.
Id. at 10.
265. See id.
266. See id. As the Statement of Principles observed:
[tihe Supreme Court is, after all, an organ of the federal government. It
is one of the three branches of the national government, and in
conflicts over federal and state power, the Court is necessarily one of
the parties in interest. As such, its decision should not be assigned the
same finality as the words of the Constitution itself.
Id.
267. See id. The Statement of Principles declared that:
[T]o amend the Federal Constitution to correct specific decisions of the
federal courts on specific points is desirable, but it will not necessarily
stop the continuing drift toward more complete federal domination.
The present situation has taken a long time to develop and may take a
long time to remedy. Accordingly, some more fundamental and far-
reaching change in the Federal Constitution is necessary to preserve
and protect the states.
Id. at 10-11.
268. See id. at 12.
269. See id.
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reapportionment amendment, King argued that the
measure was hastily adopted without due consideration and
that it would deny the people equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment."' King's reasoned arguments fell
on deaf ears, with the assembly approving all three
amendments.
The vote on the Article V amendment was thirty-seven
to four, with four delegations abstaining and five states not
represented. 7' It is noteworthy that the proposal received
nationwide support and that there were no significant
geographical divisions. Although it predictably was weakest
in New England, where only delegations from New Hamp-
shire and Rhode Island supported the proposal, the
measure was endorsed by delegations from such liberal
strongholds as New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin-hardly hothouses of neo-
Confederates. A New York State Bar Association committee
concluded that "the lopsided vote indicated that the
proposal has a deceptive appearance of harmlessness ....
Evidently it is hard to realize that once the lid to the
amending process is lifted, other less appealing changes
will fly out easily."'272
The reapportionment proposal passed by a majority of
twenty-six to ten, with ten state delegations passing and
another four not present. Sectional and political divisions
were more pronounced on this vote than on the Article V
vote, with southern states most likely to favor it and
northeastern states least likely. Nevertheless, there was
considerable blurring of sectional lines and traditional
political allegiances.
270. See id. at 13.
271. See id. at 12. Voting against the proposal were the delegations of
Connecticut, North Dakota, Ohio, and Vermont. The delegations of Arizona,
Hawaii, Michigan, and Washington passed on the roll call. Not represented
were Alaska, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Montana. See id.
272. The Federal Constitution: Reports on Three Amendments Proposed by
the Council of State Governments, 35 N.Y.ST.B.J. 458, 460 n.7 (1963)
(hereinafter referred to as New York State Bar Association Report).
273. Voting for the resolution were the delegations of Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Opposing it were the delegations of
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, New York, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. Abstaining were the delegations of
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The Assembly originally rejected the Court of the Union
by one vote, but it passed by a bare plurality of one vote
after Caldwell made an impassioned plea for it."' The final
vote was twenty-one to twenty, with five delegations
abstaining and four not represented. Here the geographical
and political divisions again were clear. The proposal was
endorsed by delegations from nine of the eleven states of
the Old Confederacy-all except Tennessee and Arkansas-
but it received no support from any delegation in the
Northeast except for Maine. Nevertheless, it drew support
from a number of midwestern and western states with a
strong unionist and progressive tradition, including Califor-
nia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.275
One observer speculated that the fact that the second
proposal received fewer votes than the first and the third
obtained fewer than the second may have reflected the
haste of consideration insofar as "the delegates became
more informed as the afternoon wore on."276 Indeed, many
commentators questioned whether the Council would have
adopted the resolutions if it had not acted in such haste."
"Hence", as one observer wryly noted, "as a special order of
business, on the sixth of December 1962, it was proposed
completely to revamp the government of the United
Arizona, Hawaii, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, and Virginia. See Amending the Constitution, supra note 254, at
13.
274. See Robert L. Riggs, States Trying To Change Basic Law of the United
States-Details of a Three-Point Drive to Curb the Highest Court, CHI. DAILY
NEWS, May 6, 1963, reprinted in 109 CONG. REG. 8762 (1963). Caldwell insisted
that the measure was urgently needed because Americans were losing their
liberties so rapidly as the result of the Supreme Court's usurpation of power.
Cook, supra note 228, at 15. Wood also spoke strongly in favor of the measure,
describing it as the first and only attempt to take specific action to prevent the
erosion of state's rights rather than merely to complain about it. Id. at 14.
275. See Amending the Constitution, supra note 254, at 15. Voting for the
resolution were delegations from Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Opposing it were delegations from Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.
Abstaining were the delegations from Arizona, Arkansas, Hawaii, Michigan,
and Nebraska. Id.
276. See Albert E. Jenner, Observations on the Proposed Alteration of the
Constitutional Amendatory Procedure, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 625, 626 (1964).
277. See id. at 626.
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States."278 Similarly, King remarked that "the whole thing
had caught the delegations, most of them, flatfooted. They
had only the vaguest idea what it was all about, and in
these circumstances ... some of these glib-tongued birds
can make you believe almost anything the first time you
hear it."
27
In advocating constitutional amendments, the Council
had chosen a particularly arduous method of curbing the
Court. Antagonists of the Court traditionally have preferred
the generally less complicated route of federal legislation.
The constitutional amendment process, of course, was the
only procedure available to state officials since the route of
congressional legislation was not open to them. Despite the
difficulties of the amendment process, proponents of Court-
curbing amendments during the Warren Era often with
great bravado denied that the process was too strenuous
since the Constitution had been amended twenty-two
times."' Pointing out that many of these amendments had
been enacted quickly and arguing that many involved
"questions of relatively minor importance compared with
the overwhelming urgency of the one that now faces us,
Representative Alford of Georgia insisted in 1959, for
example, that antagonists of the Court should approach the
amendment process with confidence."281 This confidence was
misplaced, however, since only three constitutional amend-
ments-the Eleventh, the Fourteenth and the Sixteenth-
had overruled Supreme Court decisions. Even though
conservatives recently had pushed through the Twenty-
second Amendment with relative ease, the principal
proponents of the states' rights amendments recognized
278. Id.
279. Cook, supra note 228, at 16.
280. E.L. Forrester, The Manifesto and the Supreme Court, FACTS F., July
1956, reprinted in 102 CONG. REG. 12233 (1956).
281. 105 CONG. REG. 7508 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Alford).
282. See KYVIG, supra note 5, at 327-34. Kyvig points out that:
[Sluccess in obtaining the Twenty-second Amendment gave birth or
new life to other midcentury conservative efforts to reverse the New
Deal and rein in the presidency through constitutional reform.
Amendments, after all, could be obtained by exclusively legislative
action at the federal and state level. They therefore particularly
appealed to persons politically alienated from an executive and




that the amendment route would be difficult, even though
they seemed loath to admit it.
Recognizing the obstacles faced by any constitutional
amendment, proponents of the measures took great care to
consider the procedure and strategy for their approval by
state legislatures. In making its recommendations to the
Assembly, the committee emphasized that the legislatures
should adopt the proposed amendments "without change
and in a uniform manner which will leave no question as to
the intent of the several States."283 The committee presuma-
bly emphasized the importance of uniformity insofar as
previous attempts to call a constitutional convention
"invariably foundered because the texts of the proposed
amendments were not uniform."'284 Although some scholars
believed that the amendments did not need to be identical
in order for Congress to call the convention,285 one propo-
nent of the amendments pointed out that "the only prudent
course is for the states not to rely on doing the minimum
which they might have reason to believe would suffice to
meet the requirements ....
The committee also urged that, "to the fullest extent
possible, all State Legislatures cause themselves to be in
session on Wednesday, January 16, 1963, for the specific
purpose of introducing the joint resolutions., 287 The goal was
momentum and maximum publicity. One observer
concluded that "it is apparent from the Council's releases
that it hopes, should a sufficient number of states file
identical amendments, that Congress will itself be induced
to propose them."288 Since the alternative process for
amending the Constitution never had been used there were
doubts about how it would work.289
283. Amending the Constitution, supra note 254, at 11 (emphasis in
original).
284. Walter Dean Burnham, Hobbling the Constitution, COMMONWEAL, Sept.
6, 1963, at 532.
285. See Frank E. Packard, Constitutional Law: The States and the
Amending Process, 45 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1959, at 161.
286. Frank E. Shanahan, Proposed Constitutional Amendments: They Will
Strengthen Federal-State Relations, A.B.A. J., July 1963, at 632, 633.
287. Id.
288. William G. Fennell, The States Rights Amendments-Debates of the
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In order to maximize the viability of the amendments,
their proponents also followed the traditional procedure for
amendment of the Constitution. In February 1963, Senator
Thurmond sponsored a bill for adoption of the Article V and
Court of the Union proposals.290 In March, Representative
Sydney A. Herlong of Florida introduced the apportionment
resolution in the House,291 and three Alabama congressmen
offered bills for a Court of the Union. 292
In an effort to obtain approval of the amendments, their
proponents sought the help of the National Conference of
State Legislative Leaders, an organization of presidents pro
tem of state senates, speakers of the lower houses of state
legislatures, majority and minority leaders of statehouses,
and other principal state legislative leaders that had been
formed in 1960 with financial help from a conservative
foundation.293 Meanwhile, proponents of the amendments
organized the Voluntary Committee on Dual Sovereignty,
chaired by Helm and vice chaired by six men: Chappell;
Wood; Hauser; Haase; J.D. McCarty, Democratic speaker of
the Oklahoma house; and Lieutenant Governor Harold H.
Chase of Kansas. 294 The sources of funding for the Com-
mittee, which issued press releases and retained the paid
services of one administrator, George Prentice, and one or
two stenographers, is unclear.295 The Committee claimed
290. S.J. Res. 42 (Article V); S.J. Res. 43 (Court of the Union), 88th Cong.
(1963).
291. H.R.J. Res. 300, 88th Cong. (1963).
292. H.R.J. Res. 364; H.R.J. Res. 370; H.R.J. Res. 371, 88th Cong. (1963).
293. See Cook, supra note 228, at 16.
294. See Riggs, supra note 274, at 8762. Riggs remarked that "[t]o carry on
the theme that this is not a Dixiecrat movement, the supporters of the
amendments have placed their campaign in the hands of a committee composed
largely of northerners." Id.
295. See Cook, supra note 228, at 17. Riggs wrote that "[t]he committee's
operations are in low key and apparently on a small budget, though there seems
to be little question it can get such money as it needs as the occasion arises."
Riggs, supra note 274, at 8762. The administrator was George R. Prentice, a
thirty-seven year old native of Kansas who had worked as a news reporter in
Little Rock and Birmingham. See id. As Riggs explained, "[hlis main efforts
have been neither to publicize the movement nor hide it, but to keep in touch
with legislators of the various States who are pushing one or more of the three
proposed amendments." Id. Prentice conducted his operations from Tallahassee
and claimed that seventy-five percent of his monthly budget of $1500 per month
came from the Committee and the remainder from the office of the speaker of
the Florida House of Representatives, for whom Prentice worked when the
legislature was in session. See Cook, supra note 228, at 17. Helm, however,
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that it rejected offers of funding from the White Citizens
Council of Mississippi and the National Citizens Council, 296
and it tried to avoid association with the John Birch
Society.297 As Prentice explained, "[wie have steered clear of
the isms, . . . the Citizens Councils, that sort of thing ....
We've done everything we can to get rid of the Southern
stigmatism [sic]." '298 Even many neutral observers and
opponents of the measures acknowledged that they bore no
taint of blatant racism. As one commentator observed,
"[tihe sponsors of the three amendments have gone to great
lengths to keep their campaign clear of southern coloration,
clear of any connection with racial strife."299 Of course, the
Committee had little need to fan anti-Court antagonism in
the South since bitterness over the desegregation decisions
there was already so intense."' Accordingly, one commenta-
tor explained that the Committee had "more to gain by
seeking Northern support on a straight-out conservative
economic argument-especially since some of its northern
friends have to compete with Democrats for Negro votes.""'
Indeed, the Court's decisions on economic issues may
have motivated the states' rights amendments as much as
did the Court's decisions on race, subversion, or reap-
portionment. Proponents of the amendments were reported
also to be disgruntled over the Court's decisions permitting
denied that the Committee spent any money. See id.
296. See Cook, supra note 228, at 17.
297. Riggs, supra note 274, at 8762. As Riggs explained,
[olne of Prentice's tasks is to see that the committee avoids undesirable
companions. While he recognizes that anyone who wants to do so can
join the cheering section, he tries to keep the working ranks cleared of
members of the John Birch Society, the racist White Citizens Council
or any other groups on the radical right.
Id. Opponents of the amendments nevertheless alleged that members of these
groups tended to be the supporters of the amendments. Professor Kurland, for
example, contended that "only those close to the lunatic fringe, the Birchers and
the White Citizens Councils and others of their ilk, are prepared to support the
purported court-of-the-union plan." Kurland, The Court of the Union or Julius
Caesar Revised, 39 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 636, 637 (1963-64). According to
Kurland, "[tihe few legislatures that have voted in support of this amendment
are those normally concerned with their war on Robin Hood and similarly
dangerous radicals." Id.
298. Anthony Lewis, 10 States Ask Amendment to Gain Districting Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1963, at 1.
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Congress to establish the social security system; set
minimum wages and maximum work hours; regulate
tobacco grading" and provide for collective bargaining in
labor disputes."
Other opponents of the measures, however, were less
ready to remove the stigma of extremism from proponents
of the amendments. Many persistently denounced them as
the products of right-wing extremism and as inspired
principally by opposition to racial desegregation. As a
Newsweek columnist wrote, "[t]he moving spirits are some
of the most reactionary state politicians in the country.
They have kept white Citizens Councils and the John Birch
Society out of sight but the movement is strongest in parts
of the South and West where these organizations thrive."'
Critics of the proposals alleged that proponents were
attempting to maximize the secrecy in order to stifle
opportunity on debate. As Professor Burnham alleged:
Remembering how the 2 2 d Amendment was ratified virtually
without debate, they have consistently sought to secure adoption
by state legislatures with the least possible publicity. They
correctly realized that if these amendments were publicly debated,
the defensive advantage inherent in our political system would
work against them: the opposition from Newer-America opinion
leaders and publics would be so intense that they would have no
chance of adoption by the necessary two-thirds majority. 4
Proponents of the measures, however, claimed that they
had made futile attempts to generate media attention and
correctly pointed out that the media had ignored the
movement.0 5 For example, there was virtually no press
coverage of the General Assembly's adoption of the
amendments, even though the General Assembly's meet-
ings were open to the public and were attended by news
reporters.
Other observers, however, attributed the early success
302. Id. at 8763.
303. Kenneth Crawford, Reaction's Refuge, NEWSWEEK, June 3, 1963, at 31.
304. Burnham, supra note 284, at 533. Burnham remarked that "[t]he
proponents of these three amendments, quite unwittingly paying a deep tribute
to the common sense and intelligence of the American people, have responded to
requests for public debates on the merits by proceeding doggedly with their
silent campaign." Id.




of the movement more to apathy among natural opponents
of the amendments rather than to stealth tactics by the
amendments' proponents." 7 According to Cook,
the cardinal and glaring and most unpalatable fact is that, in this
stultifying age of conformity and non-dissent, few persons were
awake; few gave a damn. This applies with almost equal
impartiality to virtually everybody-to a soporific and superficial
press, to labor leaders, to liberals, to lawyers, and to
intellectuals.
3 0 8
Most observers did not at first take the movement
seriously, believing that it lacked political viability and was
merely the latest of countless movements to amend the
Constitution that had disappeared without a trace.3 0 9 As
King remarked "[a]t the outset.., a lot of people tended to
dismiss this business too lightly, to laugh at it as a crackpot
affair."3 10 In January, for example, an Illinois newspaper
predicted that only Alabama and Florida and perhaps
Mississippi would endorse the amendments.3 ' Accordingly,
the movement attracted little media attention. A New York
City newspaper strike that extended from December 1962
to March 1963 further ensured that the movement at-
tracted little national attention.312 Opponents also may have
feared that public discussion would give the proposals
credibility and legitimacy. In denouncing the measures on
the Senator floor in May 1963, Senator Paul Douglas
expressed concern that "official notice of these applications
for amendments may unnecessarily and undeservedly
dignify them."13
Moreover, another reason why even sophisticated
persons failed to perceive the seriousness of the movement
307. See id.
308. Id.
309. As Robert L. Riggs observed, one reason why the amendments did not
generate more attention during early 1963 was that "most legislatures are
accustomed to having before them futile and offbeat proposals to amend the
Constitution." Riggs, supra note 274, at 8762.
310. Cook, supra note 228, at 18.
311. States' Rights and Wrongs, INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 24, 1963, reprinted in
109 CONG. REC. 11,992 (1963).
312. See After a Three-Month Shutdown What Striking Printers Got, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 18, 1963, at 98.
313. 109 CONG. REC. 8755 (1963).
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was that it generated virtually no grassroots support. 314 One
observer remarked that the campaign for the amendments
was "something of a family matter among legislators."315 As
Cook explained, "there had been no public demand for such
drastic changes, and it seemed inconceivable, to anyone
who recalls how difficult the amendment process has been
for even widely publicized causes, that the three-amend-
ment package could get anywhere without a strong basis of
grass-roots support."16 Cook and other opponents of the
amendments were worried that the ability of proponents of
the amendments to make so much headway without mass
support suggested that democracy itself had grown
flaccid. 17
By March 21, 1963 one or more of the amendments had
been introduced in the legislature of twenty-six states, and
the amendments were introduced in more state legislatures
during the spring.18 An accurate account of legislative
action in the various states may never be possible because
Congress lacked any formal procedure for reporting actions
by states on applications for amendments.' By mid-June,
the Article V amendment was estimated to have received
the approval of both houses of thirteen state legislatures
and the approval of one house in four states.320 Meanwhile,
314. Cook supra note 228, at 18.
315. Riggs, supra note 274, at 8762.
316. Cook, supra note 228, at 18 (emphasis in original). Cook observed that
the emergence of the amendment drive as a menace, even though it lacked
grassroots support, "expresses something new in the American experience-the
determination and ability of top-ranking, ultra-conservative elements of the
Establishment to engineer and organize changes from the top downward while
the people sleep." Id. at 18-19. Helm admitted to Cook that the amendments
germinated without any broad basis of public support. Id. at 19
317. See id. "That so much could be accomplished," Cook wrote,
by a small cabal of strategically-placed officials, backed by wealthy and
largely hidden interests, aided by the frenzied cries of racists, states
righters, ruralists, and Birchites-all without any perceptible stirring
or demand among the people themselves-this is a pattern that speaks
of a deep and fateful schism in the American body politic.
Id.
318. Constitutional Amendment Sought, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
March 21, 1963, at 11. See William F. Swindler, The Current Challenge to
Federalism: The Confederating Proposals, 52 GEo. L.J. 1, 11 (1963).
319. 109 CONG. REC. 8755 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Douglas).
320. See Shanahan, supra note 286, at 636 n.4. Although this count was
prepared by a proponent of the amendments, it was accepted as accurate by a
staunch opponent, William F. Swindler. See Swindler, supra note 318, at 11.
Swindler prepared the following table:
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both houses of fifteen legislatures and one house of eight
others had approved the apportionment amendment. 1 The
Court of the Union proposal had fared less well, having
received the endorsement of both houses in only four states
and one house in four others. 22
Although approval of the measures came disproportion-
ately from southern legislatures, a substantial number of
western and midwestern legislative bodies also approved
them. Conservative New Hampshire, where both houses of
the legislature approved the Article V amendment, was the
only northeastern state to endorse any of the amendments.
The amendments were passed in at least one house of seven
legislatures among the eleven states of the Old Confederacy
and were approved by at least one house of thirteen
legislatures of the remaining thirty-nine states. All of these
states had conservative political climates, with the
exception of Illinois, where both houses approved the
Article V amendment and one house endorsed the
apportionment amendment; Wisconsin, where the Article V
and Court of the Union proposals received the approval of
one house; and Washington, where both houses approved
the apportionment amendment. Both houses of the
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Wyoming legislatures approved
all three amendments, and at least one house approved at
least one amendment in Colorado, Florida, Kansas,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New
amendment one house both houses total states
approving approving considering
article V 4 18 22
Apportionment 8 15 23
Court of Union 4 5 9
Id.
Despite many news reports to the contrary, Alabama does not appear to have
adopted any of the proposals. See Silent Amendments, supra note 231, at 36
(listing Alabama as having adopted the Court of the Union proposal); The
States' Rights Amendments, TIME, June 7, 1963, at 22 (reporting that Alabama
had ratified the Court plan); Anthony Lewis, Growing Opposition Slows Drive
for States'-Rights Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1963, at 1 (stating that
earlier reports that Alabama had adopted the Court plan were erroneous). See
generally JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA
(1963); JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA (1963) (neither
journal mentions the amendments).
321. See Swindler, supra note 318 at 11 (1963).
322. Id.
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Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, and Utah.323
The contest over the amendments in Ohio was
particularly hard-fought because it provided a critical test
of the amendments to make headway in industrial northern
states. Since Ohio was one of the more conservative
industrial states, it seemed like an ideal place for pro-
ponents of the amendment to begin to make inroads into
the urbanized North. The amendments seemed headed for a
victory in the state senate until a Cleveland radio station
called attention to the amendment campaign. 24 Major
newspapers afterwards publicized the campaign and some
editorialized against the proposals.325 Meanwhile, the AFL-
CIO and the League of Women Voters vigorously lobbied
against the amendments in the state senate.326 A
Republican senator who had introduced the Article V
amendment abandoned it, explaining that he had "become
aware that certain groups on the ragged fringe were
pushing it,"327 and another key Republican senator
abandoned the apportionment amendment, explaining that
he could not support a proposal that would "perpetuate a
miserable situation.3 28 In Ohio, King fought what he
described as the "toughest battle of my political life" to
defeat the proposals. 29 King believed that the Ohio
legislature would have endorsed the measures if the state's
leading newspapers had not tirelessly editorialized against
them.
Pennsylvania, where Helm served as speaker of the
house, was another important battleground. As in Ohio, the
success the amendments in this highly industrialized and
populous state could have produced much national
momentum for the proposals. While Helm lobbied for the
amendments, U.S. Senator Joseph Clark wrote a letter in
323. Id.





328. States' Rights Plan is Set Back in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1963, at
63.




opposition to every member of the legislature. 31 The
amendments had withered in the legislature by June, after
national opposition had galvanized.3
The amendments were predictably less popular among
legislators in more liberal states. The Massachusetts State
Senate rejected the Court of the Union proposal in January
by a vote of thirty-seven to zero.3  The New Jersey State
Senate unanimously approved the reapportionment amend-
ment, presumably because senators feared the impact of
reapportionment in a state in which each county was
allocated one senator. 4 After the New Jersey senate
approved the Article V and reapportionment amendments,
Governor Richard J. Hughes and Senator Clifford P. Case
urged the senate to rescind the resolutions and called upon
the assembly to block them.
In Wisconsin, where Democratic Governor John W.
Reynolds denounced the Court of the Union proposal as "a
last-ditch attempt on the part of frustrated Southern
segregationists to avoid the consequences of Supreme Court
decisions forcing them to guarantee equal rights to all
citizens,"'3 6 the apportionment and Court of the Union
proposals received the support of one house of the
legislature. In Nebraska, the unicameral legislature
approved the Article V and apportionment amendments,
but the Democratic governor vetoed the proposals."7
In mid-May, Senator Douglas of Illinois expressed fear
that "there is a greater danger that these amendments will
331. Id.
332. See id.
333. Irving Dillard, Federal System Under Attack, CHICAGO'S AM., Jan. 31,
1963, reprinted in 109 CONG. REC. 12,829-30 (1963).
334. Lewis, 10 States Ask Amendment to Gain Districting Rights, supra note
298. The Senate included eleven Republicans and ten Democrats. Id.
335. George Cable Wright, Bar Amendments, Jersey is Urged, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 1963, at 16.
336. Lewis, 10 States Ask Amendment to Gain Districting Rights, supra note
298. Reynolds also stated,
That serious consideration could have been given to this proposal in
our State seems incredible to me. Its approval would bring disgrace to
Wisconsin. The authors offend our intelligence if they expect us to
believe that a court of 50 different men and 50 different political views
could possibly produce the kind of impartial and consistent judicial
decisions rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Irving Dillard, The Courage of Governor Reynolds, CHICAGO'S AM., April 7, 1963,
reprinted in 109 CONG. REC. 12,830 (1963).
337. Burnham, supra note 284, at 533; Riggs, supra note 274, at 8762-63.
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finally be adopted than many of the commentators seem to
believe."338 Douglas believed that a number of legislatures
that were dominated by segregationists or opponents of
reapportionment would approve these "time bombs" during
the next year, thereby creating "a bandwagon psychology
which will sweep other states into the fold."339 Similarly,
Commager warned against complacency, reminding
moderates and liberals that the Bricker Amendment came
within one vote of approval by the Senate and that the
Twenty-Second Amendment, limiting presidential terms,
"slipped through the Congress and the state legislatures
almost without notice. 34 °
During the late winter and spring of 1963, the
amendments began to encounter serious opposition even in
the South. In June, all three proposals were defeated by the
North Carolina legislature, where they nevertheless
enjoyed substantial support. The Article V amendment was
defeated in the House only after the Speaker broke a tie
vote of fifty-four to fifty-four.3 4' The House defeated the
reapportionment amendment by the narrow margin of fifty-
nine to fifty-six.3 2 Although the House approved the Court
of the Union proposal, the Senate defeated it by a vote of
twenty-eight to twelve.3 In Louisiana, the measures won
approval in the House, but were defeated in the Senate,
where they received support from a majority but failed to
win the requisite super-majority. '44 Many observers were
surprised that one house of the Mississippi legislature
rejected all three proposals. One theory was that the
legislature feared that a constitutional convention might be
too liberal on civil rights issues. 45 Others speculated that
legislators were loath to stimulate controversy in the wake
of two deaths at the University of Mississippi in September
1962 during a clash over integration. 6 After approving all
338. 109 CONG. REC. 8755-56 (1963).
339. Id. at 8755-56. Douglas warned that "[t]hese proposals are indeed time
bombs under the American constitutional system." Id. at 8756.
340. Commager, supra note 2, at 5.




344. Kennedy Forces Win in Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1963, at 33.
345. Crawford, supra note 303, at 31.
346. Riggs, supra note 274, at 8762.
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three amendments on a voice vote, the Tennessee Senate
reversed itself
47
C. Defenders of the Court Oppose the States'Rights
Amendments
By April, opponents of the measures were expressing
frustration that natural antagonists of the amendments
were so apathetic. Praising Wisconsin's governor as a voice
in the wilderness, the Chicago journalist Irving Dillard
lamented the failure of other state and national leaders to
stop the movement in its tracks by speaking out against
it.3 Dillard, one of the first persons to sound the alarm
about the amendments, wrote as early as January that
since it was difficult to know whether to treat the proposals
seriously or dismiss them as absurd, "the only safe
approach is to take the movement seriously."349 Similarly, a
correspondent for The Economist warned that "[o]ne danger
is that State Legislatures are so used to adopting harmless
resolutions which are never heard of again that some of
them may not appreciate that the present batch is a very
different kettle of fish.,
350
During the early months of 1963, the only person other
than Dillard to campaign aggressively against the
amendments was a practicing attorney, Arthur Freund. In
his memoirs, Warren averred that "[i]t can reasonably be
said that one man, Arthur Freund, a prominent lawyer of
St. Louis, was more responsible than all others combined in
finally, bringing the danger of the proposals into public
view. ' Warren wrote that:
When it looked as though either or both [sic] of the amendments
might succeed in obtaining the endorsement of the requisite
number of states, Freund made a one-man crusade of the issue. He
wrote to legislators, lawyers, scholars, and newspapers until
finally a few of the important newspapers of the country took
347. The States' Rights Amendments, supra note 320, at 22.
348. See Dillard, supra note 336, at 12,830.
349. Dillard, supra note 333, at 12,829.
350. States Fight Back, ECONOMIST, May 11, 1963, at 540. Similarly, the
Washington Post expressed doubt that any of the legislatures that had approved
the amendments "has seriously weighed the consequences of this Union-busting
device." WASH. POST, April 20, 1963.
351. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 311-12 (1977).
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cognizance of the situation, wrote articles about it, and pointed up
its dangers. Only then did the movement die aborning.
If Warren intended to credit Freund with defeating the
amendments, Warren exaggerated Freund's ultimate role
since the continued progress of the amendments ensured
that they sooner or later would have attracted formidable
opposition. Freund, however, was indeed a lonely voice
during the early months of 1963, when the amendments
slipped almost unnoticed through so many state legislative
chambers. Beginning in April, however, opponents of the
measures began to make up for lost time. Within a period of
several weeks, a wide range of prominent public officials,
academics, and journalists attacked the amendments, often
ferociously. Although liberals naturally were the most
numerous and vocal critics, the amendments also attracted
opposition from moderates and conservatives.
Shortly after Governor Reynolds's blast, the New York
Times began to call attention to the amendments and
editorialized against them.53 A few other newspapers soon
followed. Yale Law Professor Charles Black initiated a
torrent of academic criticism when he published a biting
commentary about the amendments in the April issue of
the Yale Law Journal.3 54 The proposals never received
substantial attention in the popular news media,355 aside
from a long and detailed article in Look, a mass circulation
weekly, in December 1963.356 Although the Look article
warned that the amendments "would destroy democracy
here as we know it," its publication occurred after the
movement had lost momentum." 7 The paucity of news
media coverage probably reflected general public apathy
about legal and constitutional issues.
352. Id. at 312.
353. Upsetting the Constitution, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1963, at 28.
The editorial cautioned that the "amendments would effect a states' rights
counterrevolution of dismaying dimensions." Id.
354. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A
Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957-66 (1963) (hereinafter The Proposed
Amendment of Article V).
355. In June, Senator Morse expressed disappointment that so few
newspapers had "taken up the cudgels" in opposition to the amendments. 109
CONG. REC. 10,037 (1963).




Frustrated that the amendments had failed to attract
more scrutiny, Warren warned in a speech at Duke
University on April 27 that the proposals "would make
profound changes in the judiciary, the relationship between
the Federal and state Governments, and even the stability
of the United States Constitution." '358 Warren expressed
regret that the proposals had received so little attention
and that lawyers had failed to do more to alert the nation to
the danger that the amendments posed. 9 Several weeks
later, on May 22, Warren amplified these remarks in an
address to the American Law Institute.36 ° Warren refrained
from commenting on the merits of the amendments, urging
only that such sweeping measures receive thorough
consideration. His remarks, however, left no doubt that he
strongly opposed them-as, of course, one would expect.
Calling for a "great national debate" on the amendments,
Warren urged attorneys to speak out on the amendments in
order to prevent the Constitution from being altered
"unwittingly."'' Warren's tacit disapproval of the proposals
ensured that opposition to the amendments would continue
to gather momentum. As Professor Murphy observed,
Warren's sPeech "effectively blew the whistle on the
proposals."'
Meanwhile, President Kennedy expressed public
opposition to the amendments. Asked about the proposals
at a press conference on May 8, Kennedy declared that "I
would think that the efforts will come to nothing and I will
be glad when they do not."'363 The President was bemused
that persons who purported to defend the Constitution
would seek "to change it in such a basic way."64
358. Warren Is Critical of Lawyer Silence, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1963, at
L44.
359. See id.
360. See Warren Cautions On Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1963, at 1.
361. Id. Warren stated that "[a]ny serious effort to amend the Constitution
of the United States should provide the occasion for a great national debate." Id.
362. MURPHY, supra note 39, at 479.
363. Transcript of the President's News Conference on Domestic and Foreign
Affairs, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1963, at L16. The question was one of twenty-seven
put to Kennedy at a conference that primarily concerned racial strife in
Birmingham.
364. See id. Kennedy's remark about the radicalism of avowed conservatives
won praise from the New York Times for directing "national attention to one of
the anomalies in the pressure campaign conducted by the super-patriots of the
radical right." Who's for the Constitution?, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1963,
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After Kennedy and Warren had denounced the
amendments, Time expressed confidence that "[w]ith such
powerful voices sounding the alarm, it appears that durable
old structure, the U.S. Constitution, is in no danger of
burning down." '365 Similarly, the New York Times on May 24
remarked that the amendments "represented a danger only
so long as they were advanced in relative obscurity,"'366 and
the Jesuit journal America expressed confidence in June
that "this move to turn the United States into a confederacy
will ultimately fail."367 Numerous commentators expressed
regret, however, that the personal intervention of the Chief
Justice was needed to alert a slumbering bar and public to
the dangers of the proposals.368 Others feared that the
threat still was not sufficiently recognized. 369 In response to
Warren's remarks, some conservatives contended that the
lack of national alarm over the proposed amendments was
quite natural since so many of its decisions were so
unpopular. As columnist Arthur Krock wrote, when the
Supreme Court's own actions "weaken the people's respect
for it as an institution, they are less disposed to equate
at L32.
365. The States' Rights Amendments, supra note 320, at 22.
366. Defending the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1963, at 30. The Times
remarked that "[t]he possibility that they might be carried to ratification
virtually disappeared once legislators were obliged to take note of the character
of the proposals they were rubber-stamping in such heedless fashion." Id.
367. The Confederacy Revived, AMERICA, June 8, 1963, at 821.
368. Although the vice president of the Pennsylvania Bar Association
expressed satisfaction that Warren's speech had sparked "a chain reaction" and
that "the organized bar accepted the challenge," he found it "disheartening to
note the apathy of individual lawyers to a burning Constitutional issue upon
which should long have been focused the enlightened thought of the leaders of
our Bar." C. Brewster Rhoads, Three Proposed Amendments to the United States
Constitution-A Challenge to Our Form of Government, 35 PA. B. ASSN. Q. 8, 8-9
(1963).
369. As Cook remarked,
[miore than six months after the Chicago meeting, long after Professor
Black and Chief Justice Warren had sounded the alarm bells, there
was an amazing paucity of information in usually well-informed circles.
In Washington, even in the offices of liberal Senators worried about
Birchite threats in their states, the files were barren of any useful
information about the amendment drive and the forces behind it. Most
labor circles, stirring slowly to opposition, acknowledged that they had
done virtually no spadework.
Cook, supra note 228, at 18.
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irreparable damage to the republic with limitations of the
highest tribunal's powers by fully constitutional process."37 °
Warren and Kennedy were naturally circumspect in
their rhetoric, although the fact that either the Chief
Justice or the President would comment upon an amend-
ment process in which they had no official role was itself
remarkable. Other critics were not so restrained. Numerous
commentators castigated the proposals and their advocates
in extravagant terms that expressed amazement that such
radical proposals could have made so much headway. Cook
described the amendment proposals as "a racist, ruralist,
right-wing attempt at a counter-revolution."37' Similarly,
Senator Young of Ohio described supporters of the
apportionment amendment as "lunatic rightwing fringers in
the North as well as racists in other sections of our
country."3 2 And Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon called
proponents of the amendments "ultrareactionaries, which
have so many characteristics of the Fascist mind."33
Professor Commager described the Court of the Union as "a
fantastic proposal," Professor Black dismissed it as
"patently absurd, ' two Duke law professors denounced it
as "crackpot,"375 The New Republic labeled it "daft,"7 6 and
Commonweal decried it as "simply ridiculous." 7 Similarly,
William and Mary Law Professor Swindler denounced the
Court of the Union as "frivolous" and "ludicrous," and he
warned that it was "an invitation to chaos" since it "would
reduce federal judicial processes and administrations to a
shambles, not to mention what it would do to the business
of state courts." '378 Walter Lippman tagged the Court of the
Union as "patently foolish" and the Article V proposal as
"sinister" and "shocking." '379 The ferocity of this rhetoric was
no substitute for reasoned argument, for opponents of the
370. Arthur Krock, Court and Critics: Its Rulings and Divisions are Said to
Prompt Demands for Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1963, at E13.
371. Cook, supra note 228, at 10.
372. 109 CONG. REC. 10,036 (1963).
373. Id. at 10,037.
374. Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V, supra note 354, at 957.
375. Brainerd Currie & Lawrence G. Wallace, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 1963, at 24,
376. Disunited States, NEW REPUBLIC, May 4, 1963, at 5.
377. States'Rights?, COMMONWEAL, May 31, 1963, at 269.
378. Swindler, supra note 318, at 33-34.
379. Walter Lippmann, The Assault on the Union, NEWSWEEK, June 10,
1963, at 25.
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amendments offered many carefully reasoned critiques of
each of the proposals. In contrast, proponents of the
measures made few efforts to defend them in any detail.
But while the critics of the states' rights amendments
correctly perceived that at least the Amendment V and the
Court of the Union proposals would wreak havoc with
federalism, probably to the nation's detriment, these critics
often failed to appreciate the frustrations that had provoked
such radical measures. Although many state legislators and
judges were men and women of limited experience and
vision, the chronic disparagement of these officials as
racists, idiots, lunatics, and subversives was overwrought.
While the remedies that they proposed were indeed sub-
versive of federalism, even many liberal and moderate
critics of the Court acknowledged that the activism of the
Warren Court raised grave constitutional issues. As the
chair of New York's Conservative Party argued in
discussing the states' rights amendments:
The wisdom of these provisions is open to debate. But in view of
the distinguished authorship (the nationwide 30-year-old Council
of State Governments), criticism leveled against the expansive
tendencies of the Supreme Court by the late Learned Hand, the
Conference of Chief Justices of the State Supreme Courts, and
many other manifestly competent observers, it is hardly proper to
dismiss the proposed amendments as the handiwork of right-wing
fanatics. Our nation is, after all, the United "States" of America,
however bitterly our liberal brethren may resent this keynote of
our political and legal system.
3 8 0
The irony that such amendments were proposed during
the centennial of the Civil War was not lost on opponents of
the amendments, many of who alleged that the
amendments would nullify the outcome of that war.38' As
Chicago attorney Albert E. Jenner remarked, "[t]he blood
bath of the Civil War, fought in great part to accentuate the
indissolubility of the Union, will have been for naught."382
Similarly, a University of Delaware professor described the
movement for the amendments as "the most drastic
internal attack upon the security of the nation since the
380. J. Daniel Mahoney, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1963, at 26.
381. See Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V, supra note 354, at
960.
382. Jenner, supra note 276, at 625.
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Civil War."'83 Various opponents also contended that the
amendments would return the nation to the government of
the Articles of Confederation. 84 Some dubbed them the
"disunity amendments."385
Critics of the proposals frequently echoed Kennedy's
observation that it was ironic that such radical measures
were advanced by persons who called themselves conserva-
tives. 86 As Professor Black observed, "[it must be a matter
for astonishment that these proposals should find support
among those to whom the honored word conservative is
often applied. The proposals are radical in the extreme." '87
One critic went so far as to declare that "[tihe threat to our
institutions posed by this counterrevolution is as real and
dangerous as the threat of Communism."388 The New York
Times sardonically suggested that congressional commit-
tees concerned with subversion should investigate the
proposals and their methods of promotion.389
At least some proponents of the amendments admitted
383. Paul Dolan, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 1963, at 36.
384. For example, Professor Swindler argued that the proposals would
"extinguish the very essence of federalism which distinguishes the Constitution
from the Articles of Confederation. Swindler, supra note 318, at 12. Senator
Douglas of Illinois remarked that the amendments "would help to make this
country a confederacy instead of a nation." 109 CONG. REc. 8755 (1963). See also
Jenner, supra note 276, at 625. Similarly, a Connecticut congressman expressed
"shock" that so many states had acted on the amendments, and warned that
they would "reduce our Nation to an ineffective confederation, bound by
ephemeral ties and immeasurably and irreparably crippled by the forces of
disunion and disagreement." 109 CONG. REC. 10,219 (remarks of Rep. Giaimo).
385. See, e.g., 109 CONG. REC. A-4537 (1963).
386. See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 284, at 532 ("[t]he quality of such so-
called conservatism can best be appraised by reflecting on the nature of
proposals such as this."); See generally Commager, supra note 2.
387. Black, Proposed Constitutional Amendments: They Would Return Us to
a Confederacy, A.B.A. J., July 1963, at 637 [hereinafter Proposed Constitutional
Amendments]. Similarly, Senator Young stated that proponents of the
amendments
claim to be conservatives, but they dishonor that appellation. They are
not acting to conserve the American way of life and the traditions that
form the foundation of our country. These proposals aim, not at the
preservation or conservation of our form of government, but at the
subversion of the balance of Federal-State relations which has enabled
us throughout our history to escape the evils of despotism and
totalitarianism.
109 CONG. REC. 10,036 (1963).
388. Fennell, supra note 288, at 472.
389. Upsetting the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 1963, at L28.
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that the measures were radical, but they insisted that the
increasing centralization of power in the federal govern-
ment required a fundamental response. As Frank E.
Shanahan, a Mississippi legislator, argued in an ABA
Journal article in July 1963, "[tlhe trend toward
centralization of power in the Federal Government has
become so pronounced that only a solution based on reforms
on the most basic level will have any probability of
success.
390
Meanwhile, National Review columnist L. Brent Bozell
expressed gratification that the scathing terms in which
opponents attacked the amendments indicated that the
movement had indeed alarmed the liberal establishment.
Bozell found that the movement particularly scared liberals
because "it wasn't easy to dismiss the campaign as one of
those Southern things," or as "a backwoods affair."
391
Proponents of the amendments claimed that they would
renew and refresh federalism rather than to destroy the
Union. Shanahan argued that the amendments would help
"achieve a vigorous federal system in which dynamic states
combine with a responsible central government for the good
of the people." '392
D. Arguments in Opposition to the States' Rights
Amendments
1. Procedural Arguments. Although some scholars who
opposed the amendments conceded that advocates of the
amendments were proceeding in a perfectly constitutional
manner,393 many others argued that the apportionment
amendment could be unconstitutional even if it were
enacted pursuant to the procedures of the Constitution. As
University of Minnesota Law Professor Carl A. Auerbach
explained, Article V "postulates the illegitimacy of an
amendment which would destroy the democratic character
of our system of government-for example, an amendment,
even if supported by a majority of the people, which would
390. Shanahan, supra note 286, at 632.
391. L. Brent Bozell, Watch Out for the Subverters!, NAT'L REV., May 21,
1963, at 398.
392. Shanahan, supra note 286, at 636.
393. Morris D. Forkosif, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1963, at 32.




establish the framework for totalitarian dictatorship in the
United States.394
One commentator argued, however, that the proposal
would not exclude Congress because the amendment would
retain as an alternative the time-tested procedure under
Article V by which Congress could approve amendments
and send them to the states.395
Some scholars contended that the state applications for
the convention were unconstitutional because they called
for a convention to approve or disapprove specific constitu-
tional amendments, in contravention to Article V's provi-
sion for Congress to "call a Convention for proposing
Amendments" on the "[a]pplication" of two-thirds of the
legislatures." '396 As Professor Bonfield explained,
the resolutions in issue really call for a convention empowered
solely to approve or disapprove in a mechanical way the text of
specific amendments that have already been "proposed" elsewhere.
In this sense, the proponents of these resolutions seek to make the
"Convention" part of the ratifying process, rather than part of the
deliberative process for proposing constitutional amendments. 7
Similarly, Professor Black asked whether the
resolutions constituted an application for a convention or
"an application for something quite different-for a
'Convention' to consider whether an amendment already
394. Carl A. Auerbach, Proposal II and the National Interest in State
Legislative Apportionment, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 625, 631-32 (1964). Professor
Auerbach explained that
such an amendment would upset the basic system of government
envisaged in the Constitution at least as much as an amendment
depriving the states, without their consent, of their equal
representation in the Senate-which Article V prohibits expressly.
That the federal government will remain republican in form is a
postulate on which the whole Constitution is based; there was no need
to make it explicit.
Id. at 632
395. See Stanley Meisler, Silent Amendments: Thorny Path Lies Ahead for
Constitutional Changes, NEW HAVEN REG., May 28, 1963, reprinted in 109
CONG. REC. 10,225 (1963).
396. Arthur Earl Bonfield, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by
Convention: Some Problems, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 659, 662-63 (1964). See also
Black, Proposed Amendment of Article V, supra note 354, at 962-63.
397. Bonfield, supra note 396, at 662-63.
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proposed shall be voted up or down."398 Black explained that
this was important, because
[tihe issue is whether it is contemplated that measures
dominantly of national interest should be malleable under debate
and deliberation at a national level, before going out to the several
states. Such a conception of the 'convention' contemplated by
article V makes the second route to amendment symmetrical with
the first, in the vital respect that, under both, the national
problem must be considered as a problem, with a wide range of
possible solutions and an opportunity to raise and discuss them all
in a body with national responsibility and adequately flexible399
power.
Other opponents of the amendments expressed
confidence that Congress could stymie the amendments
even if the requisite number of states made application for
a convention since Congress presumably could heavily
influence the outcome of the convention by establishing
rules for its composition and procedure. As The New
Republic explained in August 1963,
li]f Congress is hostile to the proposals, its control of Convention
procedure can easily be used to scuttle the whole business. The
Convention could reject the original proposal, water it down, or
propose an amendment with an entirely different effect. Congress
would then determine whether the proposal would be ratified by
state legislatures or state ratifying conventions.
Similarly, another commentator pointed out that
"Congress has the sole power to determine when a constitu-
tional convention has been validly called for, how the
398. Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V, supra note 354, at 962.
399. Id. at 963. In response to Black's argument, one commentator pointed
out that at least one scholarly commentary published before the states' rights
amendments controversy assumed that the state applications could dictate the
terms of the proposed amendment. Paul L. Hanes, The Proposed Constitutional
Amendments: A New Definition of Federalism, 12 J. PUB. L. 448, 452 (1963)
(citing Note, Proposing Amendments to the United States Constitution by
Convention, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1067, 1074 (1957)). The author therefore
concluded that "an application containing the text of an amendment is not so
diabolical or unique" as Black contended. Hanes, supra, at 451.
400. Stalled at Sixteen, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 7. Accordingly, The
New Republic contended that "sponsors of the so-called states' rights
amendments pulled off the grandest political spoof of the year-they fooled the
legislatures of 16 states into thinking that they had discovered a back door
means of changing the US Constitution." Id.
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convention should be selected and operated, and by what
means any proposed amendment would be ratified."4°1 The
New Republic believed that "no proposal could move
through this series of amending steps (thirty-four state
applications, Congress, Constitutional Convention, thirty-
eight state ratifications) unless there was a deep national
consensus favoring it. Thus far, there is not."40 2
Moreover, Black contended that Congress would not be
bound to call the convention if its format failed to
"safeguard... vital national interests"4 3 and that the Presi-
dent would have power to veto it.4 4 In concluding that
Congress was not bound to call a convention even if the
requisite number of states requested one, another scholar
stated that "Congress can ignore or block an amendment
campaign unless the proposal is so popular that the voters
would be aroused to retaliate at the polls. 4 5 According to
this commentator, "a state application under Article V has
no more effect than a simple memorial petition to
Congress-both are judged by the political force behind
them." The author warned that "[i]f the state legislatures
fail to appreciate this reality, they may tarnish their own
prestige by allowing themselves to be drawn into highly
publicized campaigns to obtain applications which do not
have popular support and which are certain to be ignored
by Congress.' '0 6
2. Arguments Against the Article V Amendment.
Critics of the Article V amendment argued that any
exclusion of Congress from the amendment process would
subvert federalism and permit malapportioned legislatures
401. Graham, supra note 250, at 1177.
402. Stalled at Sixteen, supra note 400, at 7.
403. Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V, supra note 354, at 964.
404. See id. at 965. Black found this power in Article I, section 7, clause 3,
which provides that
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary.., shall be
presented to the President ... and before the Same shall take Effect,
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be
repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives.
Id. Black stated that "[i]f the President believed the structure and mandate of
the convention significantly wrong, and dangerous to the national well-being,
then he would surely be justified in vetoing the Resolution." Id.
405. Graham, supra note 250, at 1177.
406. Id..
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to approve amendments that could imperil basic civil
liberties.
Opponents of the amendment emphasized that
amendments that affected the entire nation should receive
consideration in a national forum. As Professor Black
argued, the "amendment proposal would subvert the
deepest principle of our political life-that we are a whole
nation, and that resolution of national questions calls for
debate and action in a national forum.""4 7 Similarly, St.
Louis attorney Arthur Freund argued that "[t]he entire sum
of discussions by 50 state legislatures does not arise to the
point of nationwide knowledge or deliberation.""4 8 Likewise,
Solicitor General Archibald Cox warned that it was
unsound to eliminate "the national voice and the popular
voice from the amending process and put it entirely in the
hands of the states."' 9 Although Cox acknowledged that the
"states are terribly important" because they allow for self-
rule and diffusion of power, he pointed out that "the genius
of our system is its balance" and he contended that "the
proposed amendment would place this balance in jeop-
ardy."
410
Similarly, the New York State Bar Association's Com-
mittee on Federal Constitution concluded that the proposal
"would destroy the present balance in amending the
Constitution, and permit revising the national charter by a
series of local actions.' Critics pointed out the Constitu-
tional Convention in 1787 had rejected the original proposal
of the Virginia plan to amend the Constitution without
participation by Congress.4 12 Likewise, Senator George
McGovern of South Dakota observed in a law review article
that "[n]ational questions ought surely at some stage to be
deliberated upon in a national forum. Only thus can they
407. Black, Proposed Constitutional Amendments, supra note 387, at 638.
408. Arthur Freund, A Clear and Present Danger, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS MAG.,
Fall 1963, reprinted in 109 CONG. REC. 20,799 (1963).
409. Amendment Plan Is Assailed by Solicitor General, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
1963, at 48. Cox stated that the amendment "ignores the most profound lessons
of our national history by proposing to revert to state rule only on the basis of a
state-by-state count through state institutions only." Id.
410. Id.
411. New York State Bar Association Report, supra note 272, at 460.
412. As Fennell pointed out, "it is clear that the Constitutional Convention
covered the ground which the Council of State Governments' proposal now
raises for national debate and ended by rejecting what the Council now
proposes." Fennell, supra note 288, at 469.
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receive the consideration of representatives whose
responsibility in office is the welfare of the country as a
whole."413 As McGovern explained:
State legislatures, by the very nature of their purpose and
function, have relatively small acquaintance with problems of a
national character. They have little or no experience in dealing
with problems in such perspective. Even given the best of intent
on the part of any state legislature there would be great difficulty
in acquainting the members with the attitudes, views, and needs
of sections of the country other than their own. The Congress with
its nationwide views is best designed to generate the kind of
national debate and public scrutiny that is needed to prevent
hasty or ill-advised changes in our Constitution.
414
Black pointed out that the proposal also could permit a
relatively small minority of Americans to force a
constitutional amendment upon the entire nation. Black
calculated that the thirty-eight least populous states, which
could form the three-quarters majority necessary for the
enactment of an amendment and could include the two-
thirds of the legislatures forcing submission of an
amendment, had only forty percent of the nation's
population. Furthermore, Black posited that an amendment
could obtain ratification with the support of far less than
even forty percent of the voting population insofar as
malapportionment meant that a majority of legislators in
both houses of most state legislatures were composed of
"constituencies containing a distinct minority of the state's
population."415 Since thirty-eight percent of the people of the
413. George McGovern, Confederation vs. Union, 9 S.D. L. REV. 1, 5 (1964).
McGovern wrote that "[t]he political philosophy behind this proposal
mistakenly considers that the United States exists only as fifty and separate
political groups and that a national interest, if it does exist, can and ought to
find expression only through the separate action of a qualified majority of fifty
geographical political units." Id.
414. Id. McGovern concluded that "[tihe issue, in short, is whether or not
measures of national interest should be subjected to debate, deliberation and
publicity at a national level before going out to the several states for their
adoption. Do we favor a union of states or a return to the Articles of
Confederation?" Id.
415. Black, Proposed Constitutional Amendments, supra note 387, at 638.
Black declared that
[t]his want of popular representation in the proposed amending process
is made the more dangerous by the fact that many of our state
legislatures are grossly unrepresentative of the people within their
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thirty-eight least populous states formed constituencies of
the more representative house of the state legislature,
Black concluded that a mere fifteen percent of the voters
could freely amend the Constitution under this proposal.
Although Black acknowledged that it was statistically
unlikely that such a small minority could form a coalition to
ratify a constitutional amendment, he pointed out that even
an amendment that represented, say, thirty or thirty-five
percent of the voters would thwart the principle of majority
rule. " 6  Moreover, Black argued that relatively small
minorities could easily coalesce in favor of an amendment
since "the skewing of the state legislatures is virtually all in
favor of nonurban interests."417 The desire of proponents of
the amendment to favor rural interests was underscored,
Black alleged, by their exclusion of state governors from
any role in the amending process."' Similarly, Albert
Jenner pointed out that "this process would not be a mere
transference of power to the states as states, but to the state
legislatures.""'
In response to these arguments, Caldwell insisted that
domination of the nation by fifteen percent of the popula-
tion was preferable to domination by five members of the
U.S. Supreme Court. 2 ° Moreover, Jesse Helms, then a
states. Whether we approve of Baker v. Carr... and whatever may be
the appropriate federal constitutional standards for representation in
state legislatures considered strictly in their local character, how could
we wish to commit the process of federal constitutional amendment to
the uncontrolled action of legislatures that (as published statistics
irrefutably show) are very far from reflecting with accuracy the
composition even of their own state citizenry?
Id.
416. Id.; Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V, supra note 354, at
960.
417. Professor Black observed that
[wie are used to negative minority power in the United States, and
most of us think it well that there will be checks on majority will. What
is here proposed is not that. It is the very opposite thing-it would
confer on the minority uncontrolled power to override the majority with
respect to the most fundamental innovations.
Black, Proposed Constitutional Amendments, supra note 387, at 639 (emphasis
in original).
418. Id. at 638.
419. Jenner, supra note 276, at 625 (emphasis in original).
420. Transcript of proceedings at taping of TV program, June 26, 1963,
taken at studios of KMOX-TV, St. Louis, Mo., reprinted in 110 CONG. REC.
A4835 (1964) [hereinafter Transcript]
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Raleigh television commentator, argued that representa-
tives from the nation's five most populous states presently
had the power to block any constitutional amendment.421
Opponents of the amendment warned that it would
provide benighted state legislatures with virtually unfet-
tered power to amend the Constitution in any ludicrous
manner that suited their fancies, even if such an amend-
ment trampled on the most basic civil liberties. Black
warned that "[t]hree-fourths of the state legislatures,
without the consent of any other body, could change the
presidency to a committee of three, hobble the treaty power,
make the federal judiciary elective, repeal the fourth
amendment, make Catholics ineligible for public office, and
move the national capital to Topeka."422 Similarly, Albert
Jenner argued that the combined effect of the three
amendments could "include the destruction of the Supreme
Court of the United States, the elimination of Congress, and
the sharp modification of at least the first eight amend-
ments to the Constitution, at least as applied to the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment."423
Opponents of the amendment were particularly fearful
that it would permit the states to subvert the Supreme
Court's desegregation decisions. Arthur Freund alleged that
[tihis proposal opens the flood gates to those who would eliminate
desegregation in the public schools and other public facilities; to
those who would pack the Supreme Court or provide different
methods for selection of Federal judges; to those who would
abolish the Federal graduated income tax, or social security
taxes,... or aid to any education whatever; [and] to those who
would prohibit U.S. participation in the United Nations.
42 4
421. Jesse Helms, Curb the Supreme Court, HuM. EVENTS, July 13, 1963, at
15. Actually, it would have taken the votes of the seven most populous states to
provide the one-third of votes in the House needed to block a constitutional
amendment.
422. Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V, supra note 354, at 959.
423. Jenner, supra note 276, at 627.
424. Freund, A Clear and Present Danger, supra note 408, at 20,799. Freund
wrote that
[als bizarre as these doleful speculations may appear, it is implicit that
should the bow of this first proposal be placed within the effective
hands of the State legislatures, the first shafts from a taut string will
be aimed at the Supreme Court, the commerce clause of the
Constitution, the due process clause and equal protections clauses of
the 14h amendment, and the blessings of liberty protected and
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Freund warned that "[t]he possibilities for special groups to
work quietly and beneath the surface for any fundamental
change are without limitation.4 25 Similarly, Cox warned
that the measure would cause "endless delay and
frustration in civil rights cases."426
Dean Joseph 0' Meara of the Notre Dame Law School
feared that the new amendment process even would permit
a minority of state legislatures "to abolish the Federal
Union itself and substitute for it a loose confederation,
which appears to be the real goal of some of the advocates of
the proposed amendments."4  O' Meara warned that "[t]his
would leave us virtually defenseless in a hectic and
aggressive world, for a confederation of 50 independent
states, each free to go its own way, would be so weak that it
could not possibly resist the might of Communism."
4 2
Although Walter Lippmann acknowledged that three-
quarters of the state legislatures presently had no desire to
destroy civil liberties, he warned that "nobody can tell what
could happen in some terrible period of storm and stress. A
constitution should be made to stand up in the worst
weather, and it should not be possible, not even theoreti-
cally, for the 38 smallest states to lay down the law to the
rest.
429
E. Arguments Against the Apportionment Amendment
Opponents of the apportionment amendment warned
that it could perpetuate malapportionment in state legisla-
tures that would enable legislators to enact legislation that
would subvert civil liberties. They found the apportionment
amendment particularly menacing insofar as permanently
malapportioned legislatures also could enact pernicious
constitutional amendments if the Article V amendment
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
Id.
425. Id.
426. Amendment Plan Is Assailed by Solicitor General, supra note 409, at
48.
427. Joseph O'Meara, Introduction, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 623, 623-24 (1964)
(Introduction to Symposium on The Proposed Alteration of the Constitutioal
Amendatory Procedure).
428. Id. at 624.




were approved. As the New York State Bar Association's
Committee on Federal Constitution pointed out, the
apportionment amendment would forbid judicial review of
apportionment "for all time, and no matter how egregious
or willful the malapportionment might be."43° Professor
Burnham remarked that the reapportionment amendment
"would ensure that rurally-dominated rotten-boroughism at
the state level could be done away with, if at all, only by
revolution."431 Similarly, Arthur Freund predicted that the
amendment's adoption "would not only solidify the extreme
abuses now prevailing; it would make it unlikely that such
abuses could be corrected, and it would be a powerful
impetus to initiate even more glaring discriminations."432
Professor Black declared that "[t]his proposal would
constitute the first diminution since our history began of
any federal constitutional guaranty of liberty, justice or
equality."433
Indeed, opponents of the proposal argued that it would
nullify the Constitution's Guarantee Clause.3 As Professor
Auerbach warned, "[ilt is not inconceivable that in a time of
strife, districting and apportionment of representation in a
state legislature might become the instruments of
totalitarian rule in a particular state.4 5 Auerbach also
questioned whether the apportionment amendment actual-
ly served the interests of states' rights since denial of
legislative power to large blocs of urban citizens could cause
430. The Federal Constitution, supra note 272, at 460. The Committee
explained that
[w]hile many of us are concerned by the possibility of extreme
applications of Baker v. Carr and believe that the development of
decisions under it should be watched with care, we do not believe that
this is the time for an amendment or that the proper method is
complete reversal of the decision, resulting in perpetual exemption of
malapportionment, no matter how flagrant, from constitutional
limitations designed to protect our rights.
Id.
431. Burnham, supra note 284, at 532.
432. Freund, A Clear and Present Danger, supra note 408, at 20,800.
433. Black, Proposed Constitutional Amendments, supra note 387, at 639.
Black remarked that "[t]o begin cutting down our constitutional guarantees, to
begin introducing exceptions here and there into the concept of equality under
law, are solemn steps indeed." Id.
434. See Fennell, supra note 288, at 471; Black, Proposed Constitutional
Amendments, supra note 387, at 639; Auerbach, supra note 394, at 630.
435. Auerbach, supra note 394, at 630.
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urban municipalities to seek direct assistance from the
federal government.436
Opponents contended that the amendment would cut
the states entirely free from the moorings of the Equal
Protection Clause in apportionment, permitting them to
exclude disfavored groups altogether from representation in
the legislature. In particular, critics of the amendment
alleged that denial of federal amelioration of malap-
portionment would permit states to use apportionment as a
means of disenfranchising African Americans or other
minorities, as the state of Alabama had attempted in the
gerrymander that the Supreme Court had invalidated in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot.437 As New York attorney William G.
Fennell argued,
[t]his could mean that a state might redistrict its legislature so
that only real property owners might vote, or so that Negroes
could not vote, or to deny, or curtail, the voting rights of Catholics
or other religious groups . . . . If the Council of State Governments
has its way, the Supreme Court will no longer have the power to
protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority.4
Similarly, Professor Auerbach warned that the amendment
"would abridge the national guarantees of equality embed-
ded in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments... .""' Likewise, Black alleged that the amendment
"would reach beyond the Fourteenth Amendment 'equal
protection' and sanction the states in using 'apportionment'
as a guise for rank racial discrimination, in contravention of
at least the purpose and spirit of the Fifteenth
Amendment.,
40
Defenders of the amendment, however, argued that the
436. See id. at 630-31. Auerbach quoted the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations' 1955 warning that state governments would be
eclipsed "if minority interests are permitted to control the legislative branch of
State Government" insofar as "the people will turn to a more broadly responsive
National Government to obtain their needs." Id. (quoting ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 39-40 (1955)).
437. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See Black, Proposed Constitutional Amendments,
supra note 387, at 639; Auerbach, supra note 394, at 629.
438. Fennell, supra note 288, at 471.
439. Auerbach, supra note 394, at 329. Auerbach wrote that "surely we
should not permit the long, historic, and increasingly successful struggle of the
Negro citizen for the right to vote to culminate in districting and apportioning
schemes which deprive him of the fruits of victory." Id.
440. Black, Proposed Constitutional Amendments, supra note 387, at 639.
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Fifteenth Amendment would prevent any apportionment
that would disenfranchise African-Americans. Bozell
pointed out that Gomillion predated Baker and that "thus
presumably stands as good law quite apart from the contro-
versy provoked by Baker."441 Bozell pointed out that "if there
is any doubt about this, it would be no problem to qualify
the proposed new amendment by making clear that the
Fifteenth Amendment is not meant to be superceded. ' 4 2
F. Arguments Against the Court of the Union Amendment
Critics of the Court of the Union expressed fear that it,
like the other two amendments, would return the nation to
a confederacy that would permit subversion of fundamental
personal liberties. Denouncing the Court of the Union
proposal as "grotesque," Professor Burnham alleged that it
would overturn "the verdict of Appomattox" and "would
finally demonstrate that after all the Founders had not
created a nation.""4 3 Similarly, Professor Black averred that
the proposal negated "the powerful and life-giving idea that
our Constitution is law and that its character as national
law can only be upheld by giving its final interpretation
into the hands of a national judiciary.""44 The New York
State Bar Association's Committee alleged that the
amendment "would subjugate our Federal judiciary to the
states, and turn the supremacy clause of our Constitution
upside down."4 5 Commager predicted that "[i]n all likeli-
hood such a court would strip the Supreme Court of that
crucial function of harmonizing the Federal system which is
quintessential to the survival of the nation."4 6 And an
Illinois state judge remarked that "[iut's the first proposal I
441. Bozell, Watch Out for the Subverters!, supra note 391, at 398.
442. Id.
443. Burnham, supra note 284, at 532.
444. Black, Proposed Constitutional Amendments, supra note 387, at 639.
Black declared that
[t]he destruction of this idea and the substitution of the idea that final
judgment on constitutional questions is to be made by judicial
representatives of the states, taken one by one, again can rest only on
the theory, denied by the best thought and the best blood of our
history, that we are not a nation but a league.
Id.
445. New York State Bar Association Report, supra note 272, at 461.
446. Commager, supra note 2, at 5.
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have seen where a lower court judge goes up above the
court that is above it, and it is too fantastic to contem-
plate. 447
Critics of the proposal also contended that the function
of the so-called Court would be legislative rather than
judicial.448 Just as critics of the Article V proposal com-
plained that it would eliminate the people from the
amendment process, opponents of the Court of the Union
argued that it was anti-democratic because the Court would
act in the name of the states rather than in the interest of
the people.4 9 Opponents quoted Alexander Hamilton's
contention in The Federalist that "[s]tate judges, holding
their office during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too
little independent to be relied upon for an inflexible
execution of the national laws. 45 ° Critics also pointed out
that it would permit the chief justices of the smallest
twenty-six states, which contained only one-sixth of the
nation's population, to establish constitutional law for the
whole nation.45'
Some commentators pointed out, however, that the
Court of the Union would not have plenary power over
constitutional issues insofar as it would have no jurisdiction
over subjects on which the Constitution conferred exclusive
power in the federal government, including military affairs,
foreign commerce, or the minting of money."2 As a
447. Transcript, supra note 420, at A4836 (remarks of James 0. Monroe,
circuit judge of the Third Judicial Court of Illinois).
448. As the New York State Bar Association's committee observed,
[tihe proposed Court of the Union would be a court in little more than
name. Its fifty judges would be selected, paid and removed by their
respective states. From the very nature of the revisionary duty thrown
upon them, their functioning would be legislative rather than judicial.
This machinery for sectional and non-judicial determination of all
constitutional issues contrasts sadly with what it would replace-an
independent Federal judiciary.
New York State Bar Association Report, supra note 272, at 461.
449. The New York State Bar Association's committee remarked that "[tihe
duty of the 'Court of the Union' to decide issues as the representative of the
several states is not only frankly admitted, but claimed on behalf of this
proposal as a merit." New York State Bar Association Report, supra note 272, at
461.
450. See, e.g., Fennell, supra, note 288, at 470 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
81 (Alexander Hamilton)).
451. Transcript, supra note 420, at 4836 (remarks of James 0. Monroe,
circuit judge of the Third Judicial Court of Illinois).
452. See Stanley Meisler, Silent Amendments: Warren Charges Bar
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Mississippi lawyer argued, the court would have "extremely
limited, albeit important jurisdiction." '453  Echoing the
arguments of other states' rights advocates, he contended
that
in the limited field of reserved powers, it is entirely proper that a
decision of the United States Supreme Court should be overruled
and held for naught if at least twenty-six of the fifty states,
speaking through their judicial branches of government,
determine the decision to be in violation of the terms of the
Constitution.
454
Critics also identified practical problems. As a New
York lawyer pointed out, these included
the cumbersomeness of a court of 50 judges, the fact that a judge
of that court would have a part time job on that court and a full
time job on his own state bench, the burden on litigants required
to wait two years before knowing whether a Supreme Court
decision was final as to their rights, the likelihood of a losing
litigant "shopping around" to prevail upon the legislatures of five
states to make the demand necessary to convene the Court of the
Union to reconsider the Supreme Court decision in question, [and]
the inability of the litigants to terminate the litigation, since it
would be open to the states to bring the issue to the Court of the
Union."'
Similarly, Senator McGovern warned that "[sluch a
court, required to sit with a quorum of 38, would be
inefficient. Deliberations would be cumbersome, and
compromise to minimize dissenting and separate concur-
ring opinions would be difficult. If it sat frequently and
mutual confidence among the justices thrived, it would
paralyze the judicial process; if it sat infrequently, its
decisions would not be reliably judicious in the field of
Constitutional law." '456 McGovern believed that the Court of
the Union was "destructive of the entire concept of a
national government."457 Likewise, Black warned that "[tlhis
Abdicates Role by Silence on Constitutional Changes, NEW HAVEN REG., May 29,
1963, reprinted in 109 CONG. REC. 10,226 (1963).
453. Shanahan, supra note 286, at 635.
454. Id. at 635.
455. Fennell, supra note 288, at 470.
456. McGovern, supra note 413, at 7.
457. Id. at 8. McGovern declared that
the Court of the Union amendment would deprive the national
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court would lack two prime characteristics of courts in our
legal tradition: it would be, beyond argument, too large for
effective judicial deliberation, and, meeting sporadically, it
would never form any institutional tradition."'458 Similarly,
an Illinois state judge complained that the court would be
too big for any rational consensus or decision, and would
meet too seldom to form any tradition or establish a set of
jurisprudence.459 Black also pointed out that "[i]ts members
would be judges chosen for their attainments and promise
in other fields than constitutional law."
4 60
Even proponents of the Court of the Union acknowl-
edged the practical difficulties of judicial body composed of
fifty judges from fifty states, but they contended that the
benefits outweighed the disadvantages. Representative
George Grant of Alabama, who sponsored resolutions for
the Article V and Court of the Union amendments, frankly
admitted that "fifty judges would be unwieldy", but he
believed that their "discussions would be interesting."
4 61
Conceding that the Court of the Union could constitute a
cumbersome judiciary, another proponent argued that "it
would make the Supreme Court answerable to someone-
and who would be better equipped to combine both judicial
wisdom and the political feeling of the people of the whole
Nation than the Supreme Court justices (mostly elected by
popular vote) of the 50 states?4 62
Critics also warned of what Fennell termed
"Constitutional paralysis."4 3 As Fennell explained,
[t]he Supreme Court can reverse its own decisions and often does
so. The Court of the Union apparently would be without power to
government of ability to function through its own institutions
independent of reliance upon state concurrence, and subvert the
principle of national supremacy as designated in the Constitution.
Upon its adoption, the United States would cease to remain a sovereign
in its own house. There would arise a league of states as weak and as
ineffectual as the Confederation which preceded adoption of the
present Constitution.
Id., at 7-8.
458. Black, Proposed Constitutional Amendments, supra note 387, at 639.
459. Transcript, supra note 420, at 4836 (remarks of James 0. Monroe,
circuit judge of the Third Judicial Circuit of Illinois).
460. Id.
461. Morgan, supra note 230, at 84.
462. Malcolm B. Johnson, State Governments Propose States' Rights
Amendments, HUM. EVENTS, Feb. 16, 1963, at 133.
463. Fennell, supra note 288, at 470.
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reconsider and reverse its own decisions, giving them a greater
finality than decisions of the Supreme Court, since the only way a
decision of the Court of the Union would be reversed would be by
an amendment of the Constitution-the process for effecting which
... the Council of State Governments proposes to entrench in the
states.464
Fennell warned that this would in all probability stifle
constitutional growth.
Critics were particularly fearful that the Court of the
Union would subvert many of the Warren Court's civil
liberties decisions. According to Arthur Freund,
[tihe problems presented in the school desegregation cases, the
school prayer cases, and the right to vote cases are only a few of
the types of cases which would make of the Supreme Court a mere
whistle stop on the way to the final terminus of the Court of the
Union.465
Freund alleged that the proposal was "a direct attempt to
relegate the Supreme Court to a position far less than
supreme."466
Critics also pointed out that the Court of the Union
ultimately would need to grapple with the same
constitutional ambiguities that the Supreme Court regu-
larly encountered. As Senator McGovern asked,
[how does this new superior court decide any more judiciously the
policy issue involved in, say, the Brown case? They might come to
a different conclusion than the Supreme Court did, but the
difficult policy decision there appears to have been whether the
issue presented was one of civil rights, and therefore clearly within
the concern of the 14th Amendment, or public education, an area in
the tradition left essentially to state concern. Clearly, both were
involved. Both found sources for decision in the Constitution. The
choice had to be made. The "Court of the Union" would be no
better equipped, likely far less equipped, to make judicial sense
out of its resolution of the conflict.
Critics of the Court of the Union further warned that it
would be vulnerable to political pressure from voters
464. Id.
465. Freund, A Clear and Present Danger, supra note 408, at 20,800.
466. Id.
467. McGovern, supra note 413, at 7-8.
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because many state supreme court justices were elected to
their offices.. and that its members also might be subject to
pressure from state legislatures."9 Opponents pointed out
that federal judges in the South had been far more
courageous in enforcing civil rights statutes and case law
than had their state counterparts. Proponents, however,
contended that the Court would be less susceptible to
political influences than the Supreme Court, which they
claimed had been sorely compromised by politics.
4 71
Proponents of the measure also contended that its very
purpose was to make the law more responsive to the will of
the people. Far from disturbing the constitutional balance,
Jesse Helms argued, the amendments would "restore
balance, and return control of government to the people.4 72
Helms explained that a proposal to place a moderating
authority upon the actions of the U.S. Supreme Court
would never have arisen had it not been for the widespread
belief that the Court had exceeded its authority in cases
involving racial discrimination, religion, and sensitive
political matters.73 And even though many moderates and
conservatives opposed the Court of the Union proposal,
many of them continued to warn about the dangers of
excessive judicial activism. In rejoicing over the defeat of
the Court of the Union proposal and dismissing its
proponents as extremists, Professor Kurland nevertheless
468. Freund, A Clear and Present Danger, supra note 408, at 20,800.
469. Black, Proposed Constitutional Amendments, supra note 387, at 639.
Commenting on the dangers of parochial pressures on the Court of the Union,
Black declared that
[tihe mind staggers at the notion that the wisdom of Article III of the
Constitution and of Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, repeatedly
re-enacted in material substance, should come down to this-that the
masterwork of Marshall and Story, of Taney, of Taft and Hughes and
Holmes, should be turned over to a court so constituted.
Id.
470. Transcript, supra note 420, at 4836 (remarks of James 0. Monroe,
circuit judge of the Third Judicial Court of Illinois).
471. See, e.g., Helms, supra note 421. Helms argued that the Court of the
Union "would be free of the political manipulation which is apparent in many of
the Supreme Court's pronouncements." Id.
472. Id.
473. Id. Helms's reference to the Court's decisions on race was one of the
relatively rare references to these decisions by proponents of the amendments,
who preferred to hide any racial motivations for the amendments. Id. See also
supra notes 296-299 and accompanying text.
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averred that one could reasonably ask whether the Court
had "been unduly ambitious and grasping of power."47
G. The Collapse of the States'Rights Amendments
Support for the amendments continued to wither as
numerous organizations joined the opposition. In July 1963,
the proposed amendments were firmly denounced by the
Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, a
bipartisan body commissioned by Congress in 1959 to study
relationships between federal, state, and local govern-
ments.475 The Commission alleged that the amendments
would "disrupt our present constitutional balances so as to
put in jeopardy our fundamental civil liberties."476
Meanwhile, the ACLU contended that the three proposals
"seriously endanger the civil liberties" which our Constitu-
tion guarantees all citizens, and it disparaged the Court of
the Union proposal as "an attempt to overcome recent
Supreme Court decisions against racial discrimination,
unfair methods in criminal trials, and unequal legislative
districts." '
New York's Liberal Party denounced the amendments
as "a desperate attempt by the forces of reaction to halt the
social and economic progress of our nation." '478 The NAACP,
474. Kurland, The Court of the Union or Julius Caesar Revisited, supra note
297, at 636. Kurland quoted from various recent Supreme Court decisions on
such controversial subjects as reapportionment, race, and criminal procedure in
which dissenting justices had warned that the Court was engaging in undue
activism. Id. at 638-42.
475. Disunity Amendments Branded Subversive, MACHINIST, July 11, 1963,
reprinted in 109 CONG. REC. A4514-A4515 (1963). Members of the Commission
in 1963 included U.S. Senators Sam Erwin, Karl E. Mundt, and Edmund S.
Muskie; three members of the U.S. House of Representatives; Secretary of the
Treasury C. Douglas Dillon; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
Anthony Celebrezze; Robert C. Weaver, the administrator of the Housing and
Home Finance Agency; the governors of Kansas, Colorado, Georgia, and North
Carolina; three state legislators; three county officials; the mayors of Honolulu,
Minneapolis, and St. Louis; and three private citizens. Id. See also U.S. Panel
Opposes Curb On The Courts, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1963, at 26.
476. Disunity Amendments, supra note 475, at A4514.
477. A.C.L. U. Opposes Amendment Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1963, at B.
478. Liberals Attack Amendment Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1963, at 29. The
Liberal Party argued that the proposals "aim to nullify such decisions of the
Supreme Court as those on desegregation and legislative apportionment.
Negroes could thus be effectively disenfranchised. Their effect would be the
replacement of our Federal union with a confederacy." Id.
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the American Jewish Congress, and the American Jewish
Committee also opposed the amendments.479 Prominent
Roman Catholic journals, including Commonweal and
America, editorialized against the proposals. 4" Like so
many other opponents of the amendments, America pointed
out that they would transform the nation into a Con-
federacy.81 New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller and
Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman also were outspo-
ken in opposing the amendments. 82 The National Con-
ference of Mayors formally denounced the amendments,483
and a mildly negative discussion reaching countless
secondary school students appeared in Senior Scholastic.84
In September 1963, representatives of thirty national
liberal, labor, and religious groups organized a central
clearing house in Washington to direct opposition to the
amendments, with subsidiaries in each of the states where
legislatures were scheduled to meet during 1964.85
The amendments also suffered a major setback from
ABA opposition. With 114,000 members, nearly half of the
nation's attorneys, the ABA's opinion on any legal issue
carried great weight. Antagonists of the amendments
originally were pessimistic that the ABA would oppose the
amendments since the ABA had actively supported the
Bricker Amendment and the Twenty-Second Amendment,
and had not opposed a proposed amendment that would
have capped the federal income tax at a twenty-five percent
rate. 86 On May 21, 1963, however, one day before Warren's
ALI speech, the ABA's Board of Governors unanimously
voted to oppose the Article V and Court of the Union
amendments. 87 Although this did not represent official ABA
479. Lewis, supra note 298, at 1.
480. See generally States' Rights?, supra note 377; The Confederacy Revived,
AMERICA, June 8, 1963, at 821.
481. Id.
482. Douglas Dales, Governor Fights State Rights Bid, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
1963, at 20; Freeman Attacks High Court Critics, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1963, at
5.
483. Oberst, supra note 4, at 655.
484. See State Government: A Case of Disappearing Power?, SENIOR
SCHOLASTIC, Feb. 14, 1964.
485. Oberst, supra note 4, at 655.
486. See 109 CONG. REC. 8756 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Douglas).
487. Bar Fights Push On States' Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1963, at 23.
ABA President Sylvester C. Smith Jr. explained that the board opposed the
Article V amendment because it would have excluded Congress from the
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policy insofar as it lacked ratification by the House of
Delegates, which was not scheduled to meet until August,
the Board of Governors' opposition was influential. As the
New York Times explained, "[tlhe association is considered
politically conservative, and its opposition was expected to
undercut such support as the constitutional changes had
gained in responsible circles." '488 The board of governors'
action was particularly significant since the board normally
did not act on such matters between meetings, but met in
this instance because its leaders believed that an
emergency existed since so many legislatures were
considering the amendments.489
At the ABA's annual meeting in August, the Board of
Governors rejected the apportionment amendment by a vote
of ten to seven.49 ° Although an ABA committee endorsed the
apportionment amendment by a vote of six to one, the
ABA's House of Delegates voted 136 to 74 to oppose the
amendment.491 By voice vote, members of the House of
Delegates overwhelmingly voted down the other two
proposed amendments.4 Although Warren was disap-
pointed that the ABA was not even more forceful in its
opposition,493 Justice Harlan, the Court's most conservative
member, commended the ABA for rejecting "with an
unequivocal voice a proposal which in the name of
preserving our federal system would actually destroy it."'494
amendment process, and that it rejected the Court of the Union as "inconsistent
with the constitutional concept of our court system." Id.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Lawyers in Fight Over Court Curb, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1963, at 16.
491. Bar Blocks Plea For States' Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1963, at 19.
492. Id.
493. Warren complained in his memoirs that the ABA "was inert, thereby
giving aid and comfort to the supporters of the proposals. In spite of the ABA's
plethora of sections and committees, not one of them undertook discussion of
the legal issues with which the proposals were infected." WARREN, supra note
351, at 311. While Warren's allegation that the ABA was "inert" was unfair, the
ABA could have done more through its committees to alert the nation to the
perils of the amendments. Since, however, the amendments appeared doomed
by the time that the ABA met in August, there was little reason, at least by
then, for the ABA to risk tension within its membership by taking a more
activist stance in opposition to the amendments.
494. John M. Harlan, Judicial Usurpation: A Denigration of the Legislative
Process, 29 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 706, 707 (1963) (speech given at ABA
conference in Chicago, Aug. 13, 1963). Although Harlan praised states' rights
and judicial restraint, he called on lawyers to continue to defend the courts
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Many state and local bar associations also opposed the
measure, including the city bar associations of New York,
Philadelphia, and Chicago. 95 Although relatively few attor-
neys followed Warren's admonition for a "great national
debate on the amendments," the Madison County Bar
Association in Illinois voted forty to thirteen to oppose the
first two amendments and forty-three to ten to oppose the
Court of the Union proposal after hearing a debate between
Caldwell and Arthur Freund in July 1963. 496
Meanwhile, many conservative voices were added to the
growing chorus of opposition, including even many
proponents of government decentralization. Governor
George Romney of Michigan, who was widely regarded as a
possible 1964 Republican presidential nominee, declared on
the same day that Warren spoke to the ALI that
"[mfutilation of the Federal government is not the answer
to growing problems of centralization."497 In September,
Goldwater, another prospective GOP candidate said that
he opposed the amendments as impractical. Although
Goldwater later was an outspoken critic of the Supreme
Court's decisions throughout his 1964 presidential cam-
paign and ran on a platform that called for a constitutional
amendment to allow states to apportion one house of their
legislatures on a basis other than population, he never
endorsed the states' rights amendments."
Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal, a resolute but
always responsible critic of the Warren Court, editorialized
against the amendments."' Although the Journal assured
its readers that "none of these proposals ... are as
horrendous as their opponents claim," it cautioned against
making the "political frustration of the moment an excuse
for tinkering with the forms of government that have
against "ill-informed or intemperate criticism." Id.
495. See Rhoads, supra note 368, at 9.
496. B.J. Wander, First Constitutional Amendments Debate in Nation is
Held-Lawyers at Meeting Vote Down All the Amendments, EDWARDSVILLE
INTELLIGENCER, July 27, 1963, reprinted in 109 CONG. REC. A4538 (1963).
497. Crawford, supra note 303, at 31.
498. Goldwater Alters Integration Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1963, at 22.
499. Id. For a discussion of Goldwater's criticisms of the Supreme Court
during the 1964 presidential campaign, see William G. Ross, The Role of
Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 138-44
(2002).




served us so long so well." ' 1 Pointing out that the existing
amendment process already provided the people with an
adequate means of altering the Constitution to resist
encroachments upon their liberties, the Journal argued
that the real problem was not the absence of a constitu-
tional procedure to curtail centralized government but
rather the apparent lack of sufficient political support for
restraining federal power."2 As the Journal pointed out,
"the failings of the Supreme Court are the failings of men.
And the judges of any new 'Court of the Union' would be no
less men, no less politically chosen. ' '
Although the Conference of Chief Justices officially
ignored the amendment proposals at its 1963 meeting,
many of the chief justices appeared at least as perturbed
with the Supreme Court as they had been at the 1958
meeting that urged self-restraint by the Court. The
Conference without dissent adopted a resolution calling for
restrictions on the power granted by the Supreme Court to
lower federal courts to release state prisoners on habeas
corpus writs because of constitutional infirmities in their
trials."4 At the close of the session, outgoing chairman J.
Edwin Livingston, the chief justice of Alabama, castigated
the Supreme Court for its decisions on school prayer and
reapportionment. He alleged that "[t]he Constitution is
being remade by judicial fiat without following the lawful
processes of amendment and without the consent of the
governed." ' 5 Even though the Conference was officially
501. Id.
502. Id. The Journal expressed regret that
the nation has passed through a generation in which the people as a
whole have acquiesced in, and often encouraged, this enlargement of
the central government beyond any true need. The fault, if that it be,
lies not with the form of our government institutions but rather with
the political impulses given to those institutions.
Id.
503. Id.
504. Alabama Justice Hits High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1963, at 49.
Calling for state judgments to be reviewed only in the Supreme Court, the
Conference declared that procedures established by the Court for review in the
lower federal courts permitted "repetitive and successive readjudications and
imperil the sound administration of justice." Id.
505. Id. Livingston contended that these decisions revealed "a great need for
public realization of the alarming extent to which our form of government as
originally conceived... is being changed and altered." Id.
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silent about the Court of the Union, many chief justices
were reported to favor it."'
It is ironic but revealing that the Court of the Union
proposal failed to receive the official support of the very
group whose power it was intended to aggrandize, the state
chief justices. The failure of the chief justices to endorse the
proposal is yet another measure of its radicalism. While the
chief justices delivered stinging criticism of the Court in
their 1958 report and regretted what they regarded as the
Court's intrusion on state prerogatives, they were unwilling
to publicly support a measure that would radically alter the
institutional balance of power between the Supreme Court
and the state courts. Even though their 1958 resolution
may have given encouragement and momentum to the
Court of the Union proposal, there is no evidence that any
state chief justice promoted the Court of the Union,
whatever personal opinions some may have harbored.
Moreover, opponents of the plan generally did not blame
the chief justices for it. As Professor Kurland remarked,
[t]he conspiratorial leaders were the members of the Council of
State Governments. The daggers they proposed to use were the
chief justices of the various high state courts ... It should be made
clear that the chief justices of the states would be the instruments
of the crime and not its perpetrators.507
Although the states' rights amendments eventually
stirred considerable interest in elite circles, they received
relatively little notice among the general population. Public
apathy was revealed by a Gallup poll conducted late in May
1963, which indicated that only fourteen percent of the
respondents had heard or read about the Court of the Union
proposal. Of these, fifty-five percent expressed disapproval,
twenty-nine percent said that they approved, and sixteen
percent had no opinion. Outside the South, the plan was
506. LEO KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 452 (1967). Leo
Katcher, a journalist, quoted an unnamed former ABA official as saying that
"[ylou have no idea how many state chief justices favored the Court of the
Union plan." Id.
507. Kurland, The Court of the Union or Julius Caesar Revisited, supra note
297, at 636. Kurland pointed out that the Conference had affirmed that the
Supreme Court was the ultimate arbiter of federalism and that "[alny other
allocation of such power would seem to lead to chaos." Id. at 636 (quoting




opposed by sixty-seven percent and favored by only twenty-
one percent of those who had heard of it, while in the South
some forty-five percent favored it and only thirty-two
percent opposed it.5"8
By the autumn of 1963, the movement for the Article V
and Court of the Union amendments was virtually dead.9
The movement was the victim of defeats in key state
legislatures, the blistering opposition of elite opinion, the
failure of conservatives to rally to the cause, and the
absence of grassroots support. Even though moribund, the
movement straggled on for more than another year. Still
mindful of the progress that the movement had made
during its early months in the face of ignorance and apathy,
its opponents remained vigilant for any signs of its revival
and continued to caution against complacency. As late as
February 1964, McGovern warned that the amendments
were viable510 and a symposium on the amendments at
Notre Dame Law School early in 1964 treated them as if
they remained very much alive. 1 '
Even after the threat subsided, critics of the
amendments expressed shock that they had made such
headway, if only briefly. As the New York Times mused,
"[tihe disturbing question that remains, however, is how
such proposals could have swept through so easily in the
first place, especially in a state like New Jersey. How many
other harmful bills slip into law before anyone bothers to
consider their implications?""2
By August 1964, momentum against these two
amendments was so strong that opponents hoped to
persuade the annual meeting of the National Legislative
Conference in Honolulu to recommend rejection of the
amendments. 13 After the Conference Resolutions Com-
mittee tabled the proposed amendments, opponents failed
508. 3 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at
1830 (1972).
509. See Little Hope Seen For Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1963, at 57.
In late 1963, Warren Wood told a reporter that "[wie died, we bled, to get this
thing off the ground. Now, I'm not going to do another thing." Morgan, supra
note 230, at 89.
510. McGovern, supra note 413.
511. See 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 623 (1964).
512. Defending the Constitution, supra note 366, at 30.
513. Hawaii Leads Fight on States'Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1963, at 78.
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to force a floor vote.514 The Conference adopted a resolution
declaring that individual state legislators should decide for
themselves whether to adopt the amendments. 15 The
movement finally died with a whimper late in 1964, with
the landslide election victory for liberal Democrats. 16
The movement for the apportionment amendment
remained vital at least until 1965. After flagging during
late 1963 and early 1964, it was revived by the Supreme
Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims 5 7 in June 1964, which
confirmed the worst fears of states' rights advocates about
reapportionment insofar as it required both houses of the
state legislatures to be apportioned strictly on the basis of
population.51 William F. Buckley, Jr. spoke for conserva-
tives throughout the nation in lamenting that Reynolds "cut
deeply into the fabric of our federalism."19
Ironically, however, the intensification of opposition to
reapportionment in the wake of Reynolds helped to obscure
the amendment proposed by the General Assembly of the
States insofar as the high salience of the apportionment
controversy ensured that Congress became the principal
forum for anti-reapportionment measures. Following
Reynolds, conservatives in Congress at first rallied around
a so-called "court ripper" bill sponsored by Representative
Tuck of Virginia that would have deprived the Court of any
jurisdiction over state legislative apportionment litiga-
tion.52° The House passed the bill by a vote of 218 to 175.2'A
more moderate alternative sponsored by Senators Everett
Dirksen and Mike Mansfield would have placed a




516. Even after the election, opponents of the measures were not certain
that advocates of the amendments would not re-introduce them in the next
Congress. See Paul A. Freund, To Amend-or Not to Amend-the Constitution,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1964, at 33.
517. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
518. Id.
519. William F. Buckley, Jr., The Warren Court's New Constitution, 110
CONG. REC. A3479 (1964).
520. 110 CONG. REC. 11,625 (1964). See ROBERT G. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC
REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 385 (1968).
521. LYTLE, supra note 1, at 46.
522. DIXON, supra note 520, at 386.
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Meanwhile, the 1964 Republican platform on which
Goldwater ran for president called for a constitutional
amendment to permit one house of state legislatures to be
apportioned on a basis other than population. 23 The
Democratic landslide in 1964 crippled but by no means
ended efforts to override Reynolds by constitutional
amendment. In August 1965, a proposed amendment to
permit states to use factors other than population in
apportioning one house won the support of a substantial
majority of senators, falling only seven votes short of the
requisite two-thirds margin in a fifty-seven to thirty-nine
vote.2 4 A year later, a similar amendment5 5 failed, with the
Senate voting fifty-five to thirty-eight in support.526 The
1965 amendment received the ABA's endorsement. 27
At the same time, the states continued to petition
Congress for a constitutional convention to reverse the
apportionment decisions, and by March 1965, twenty-one
states had done so.58 Even though there was little chance
that the movement for a convention would muster the
requisite support of thirty-four states, this state pressure
gave needed support to the more viable congressional
proposals for an amendment. 9 It seems clear, moreover,
that state officials recognized that any viable amendment
would need to originate with Congress. Numerous state
legislators, particularly in California, endorsed the congres-
sional measures and lobbied for their approval.53 ° Similarly,
Caldwell urged Congress to approve the amendment.53'
523. Johnson, supra note 32, at 686. The platform expressed support for "a
Constitutional amendment, as well as legislation, enabling States having
bicameral legislatures to apportion one House on bases of their choosing,
including factors other than population." Id.
524. 111 CONG. REC. 19,373 (1965).
525. S.J. Res. 103, 89th Cong. (1966).
526. 112 Cong. Rec. 8579.
527. DIXON, supra note 520, at 402.
528. LYTLE, supra note 1, at 47.
529. Id.
530. See DIXON, supra note 520, at 372-73, 399.
531. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate on S.J. Res. 2, S.J. Res. 37, S.J. Res. 38,
S.J. Res. 44, 89th Cong. (1965) [hereinafter referred to as Hearings on
Reapportionment Amendments], at 369-72 (testimony of Millard F. Caldwell).
Caldwell advanced the novel constitutional argument that Congress had a duty
to submit the amendments to the state legislatures for their consideration
because public support for the amendments was so strong. Id. at 370. According
to Caldwell, the constitutional requirement that Congress find an amendment
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After the Senate's second defeat of the reapportionment
amendment in 1966,532 organized federal opposition to
Reynolds quickly withered away along with the state
movement for a constitutional convention.
III. REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF COURT-CURBING EFFORTS
BY STATE OFFICIALS
A. Court-Curbing Efforts Were Largely Tactical Rather
Than Practical or Principled
Like most other Court-curbing efforts, the states' rights
movement was motivated largely by hostility toward the
Court's opinions rather than by any principled or consistent
opposition to federal judicial power or judicial power in
general. 533Moreover, few antagonists of the Warren Court
appear to have had an abiding philosophical commitment to
the principle of states' rights. These neo-Confederates were
hostile toward a strong federal judiciary primarily for
pragmatic reasons: the federal courts opposed practices and
policies that served their social and economic interests. As
Professor Oberst observed in opposing the states' rights
amendments in 1963, "[s]tates' rights has been a shabby
cloak for a variety of unsupportable causes over the
years... It seldom involves dispassionate disinterested
concern for the proper structure of the Union." '534 Similarly,
to be "necessary" does not mean that Congress must find it to be "indispensably
requisite." Id. at 371. Caldwell explained that
[t]o say that two-thirds of each House of the Congress must, before
submission, be convinced of the wisdom of the proposal, is to say that
one more than one-third of the Members of either House can effectively
prevent the States or the people from returning to the condition of the
law as it existed in application for a century and a half before the
recent decisions were written. Any such view is not compatible with the
principles of representative government.
Id.
532. See DIXON, supra note 520, at 410.
533. For example, many of the antagonists of the Warren Court's activism
on behalf of civil liberties complained that the Court was excessively deferential
to congressional economic regulations. See Cook, supra note 228. Although
support for stricter judicial scrutiny of economic regulation reflected in part an
opposition to federal power, it is doubtful that antagonists of the Court would
have complained if the Court had more strictly reviewed state economic
legislation.
534. Oberst, supra note 4, at 647 (quoting Paul Oberst, The Supreme Court
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Professor Commager remarked in his denunciation of these
amendments that "[n]o political doctrine in American
history has been more consistently invoked on behalf of
privilege.""5 Conversely, embattled minorities whose rights
the federal government was protecting more than the states
normally had no objection to states' rights per se. As civil
rights activist Clarence Mitchell explained in 1958, African-
Americans were in favor of states' rights as long as blacks
were given rights in the states. 536
The states' rights movements also were expressions and
harbingers of a libertarianism which began to burgeon
during the 1960s. Although critics of the Court purported to
favor states' rights, many were opposed to any form of
governmental activism. Since the states were less likely to
interfere with private activity than was the federal
government, states' rights did not severely threaten the
principles of libertarians and provided an alternative to
anarchy that was more familiar, publicly respectable,
economically prudent, and politically viable. As Commager
pointed out, the proposed states' rights amendments
represented "not merely a recrudescence of states' rights"
but rather was "an expression of something deeper-of a
philosophy of antigovernment and of no government."537
Commager aptly perceived that states' rights advocates "do
not want to see state governments invigorated, carrying
through broad legislative programs; they want to see the
national Government frustrated, incompetent to carry
through legislative programs" involving such subjects as
race, education, taxation, and conservation.538 Even though
and States Rights, 48 KY. L.J. 63, 88 (1959)).
535. Commager, supra note 2, at 40. Commager also alleged that "none has
had a more egregious record of error and calumny." Id.
536. Hearings on Limitation of Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction,
supra note 77, at 488.
537. Commager, supra note 2, at 5. Decrying this philosophy "of
constitutional anarchy," Commager alleged that proponents of the amendments
were animated not by an ambition "to strengthen the states" but rather by a
desire "to paralyze the nation." Id. According to Commager, "the proponents of
these amendments are not genuinely concerned with the powers of the states.
They are concerned with non-powers in the nation." Id.
538. Id. "Does anyone really suppose," Commager asked,
that if the amendment permitting the states to bypass the Congress ...
became law, the states would proceed to set their domestic houses in
order to end the scandal of racial discrimination themselves, to reform
antiquated tax structures, to deal vigorously with the problems of
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Goldwater shied away from the states' rights amendments
and the 1964 Republican platform ignored them (although
it endorsed the congressional equivalent of the Assembly's
apportionment amendment), the movement for the
amendments was close kin to the new libertarianism that
found expression in the Goldwater insurgency and reached
its apogee during the Reagan Administration of the 1980s.
This combination of antagonism toward both the federal
judiciary and the federal government provided the states'
rights movement with a virulence that congressional Court-
curbing movements often have lacked. State officials
naturally may have had more reasons than members of
Congress to want to curb the Court because the Court
tended to aggrandize federal power at the expense of the
states. As Professor Black observed in 1960, "nothing
arouses greater occasional resentment, than the fact that
the states must be subjected, as a last resort, to the
requirement of the national Constitution and laws." '539
This resentment may have been particularly intense
when state officials believed that they were providing their
citizens with ample constitutional protections. For example,
Georgia State Supreme Court Chief Justice William
Duckworth complained bitterly to Justice Harlan in 1967
that the U.S. Supreme Court displayed arrogant contempt
for the ability of state judges to enforce the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants.54 ° Similarly, a Pennsylvania
state legislator who testified in favor of an apportionment
amendment insisted that there was "plenty of due process"
conservation and of public lands, to take care of the needs of public
education and public health through a series of constitutional
amendments?
Id. "Clearly," Commager argued, "the new authority would be used not to carry
through programs of public welfare but to repeal existing programs of public
welfare." Id.
539. CHARLES L. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 120-21 (1960).
540. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 307 (1986). Chief Justice Duckworth told Harlan that
[i]f your court would recognize that State courts are capable of honestly
and intelligently enforcing criminal laws-and by experience know
more than most of you about how to do it within the Constitution, the
flood-tide of crime would abate. No honest judge can or will deny that
the Constitution is the Supreme Law. But Justices of the Supreme
Court, although given the final word, are not superior in qualification,
dedication and honor in deciding cases.
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at the State level and that "our State courts are just as
effective as our Federal courts in remedying apportionment
inequities." 4'
Despite the intense controversy engendered by the
Warren Court on such sensitive subjects as race,
subversion, criminal justice, apportionment, and religion,
many realistic states' rights critics of the Court at both the
state and federal levels must have understood that the
imposition of serious institutional restraints on the Court
could be little more than a daydream. History taught that
most past movements to curb the Court had quickly fizzled
out, and dictated recognition that the present movement
lacked the broad public support and strong leadership that
was critical for success.
Accordingly, Court-curbing proposals were mostly
tactical, designed to call attention to grievances against the
Court, scare the Court into more conservative decisions,54
or at least help to persuade the President and the Senate to
appoint more conservative jurists. Indeed, most of the
states' rights nostrums were so quixotic that it is difficult to
believe that their proponents seriously regarded them as
practicable. Some of the proposed remedies even could have
exacerbated the conditions that states' rights advocates
decried. For example, the Court of the Union would have
returned power to the states, but it did not respond to the
concern of many conservatives that the judiciary had
acquired too much power at the expense of the other
branches of government. As Krock remarked, the Court of
the Union proposal would create a new and much more
nationally disunifying form of judicial supremacy.5 43
541. Hearings on Reapportionment Amendments, supra note 531, at 214-15
(testimony of E. Elmer Hawbaker).
542. For example, a Mississippi congressman in 1959 predicted that the
ABA's criticism of the Court
will not go unnoticed by the high Justices. Though they sit on the
highest court in the land... they as human beings are sensitive to
public opinion and more particularly to that of the American Bar
Association. Some of the Justices may get peeved. Some may even
withdraw membership from the bar association as the Chief Justice did
recently. But this of itself is clear evidence of the fact that the Court is
impressed with the current wave of criticism. It may, as a result, take a
second look before it again destroys a long line of stable decisions or
again resolves itself into a legislative body.
105 CONG. REC. 3052 (1959) (remarks of Rep. Abernethy).
543. Krock, Court and Critics, supra note 370, at El5.
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Accordingly, Senator Brooks admitted that his 1960 bill
for requiring selection of U.S. Supreme Court justices from
among state supreme court justices was tactical rather than
practical insofar as submission of the proposed amendment
would itself have a salutary effect, and help to restore
confidence to the people. 44 In April 1963, the Washington
Post expressed confidence that the legislatures and the
sponsors of the states' rights amendments "are airing
grievances, which apparently have no widespread ap-
peal." 4' In arguing in favor of the Court of the Union
proposal at the General Assembly of the States, one
delegate expressed hope that it would let the Supreme
Court know it was being watched. 46
Moreover, some critics of the Courts, particularly
members of Congress, may have criticized the Court as a
means of appealing to conservative voters. Comparing the
Court's critics to baseball fans who shout at the umpire, the
Christian Science Monitor observed in 1958 that the
authors of the numerous Court-curbing proposals "know
that they have no chance of becoming law; they are taking
this way of letting off steam or satisfying constituents."
Aware of the inherent difficulties of Court-curbing, many
conservatives had more incentive to apply their energies to
electing libertarians to Congress and Goldwater to the
presidency than to curb the Court. The expenditure of effort
and financial resources on partisan politics surely seemed
more practical, for even Goldwater's doomed presidential
campaign was hopeful compared with the colossal obstacles
that impeded any effort to diminish the Court's powers or to
reverse the outcome of the Civil War by reviving dual
federalism. Perhaps it is no accident that the states' rights
amendment movement germinated in the immediate
544. 106 CONG. REC. 3532 (1960). Brooks's bill, H.J. Res. 453, also would
have increased Southern representation on the Court by providing for the
appointment of one Justice from each of the seventeen judicial districts into
which the bill would have divided the nation.
545. WASH. POST, April 20, 1963.
546. Amending the Constitution, supra note 254, at 15.
547. Don't Shoot the Umpire, Editorial, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept.
28, 1958, reprinted in 104 CONG. REC. 1817 (1958). Similarly, Gerald W.
Johnson remarked in 1957 that "any tub-thumping congressman who had
milked the Red Scare for all it was worth" should give the Court "a vote of
thanks," for "he can cuss the Court with impunity, but if he is caught in the
campaign with a worn-out issue, he is a gone gosling." Gerald W. Johnson,
Cussing the Court, NEw REPUBLIC, July 15, 1957, at 11-12.
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aftermath of the 1962 congressional election, when the
Court's antagonists were not engaged in campaigns to elect
legislators or a president.
The tactical nature of hostility toward the Warren
Court may have diminished public support for states' rights
measures. As Professor McDowell has pointed out, no court-
curbing plan can succeed unless it is perceived as principled
rather than partisan.548 Like so many critics of the courts
throughout American history, many of the states' rights
advocates were motivated more by hostility toward
individual decisions than by any principled theory of
judicial power. As Professor Oberst observed, the General
Assembly of the States' proposed apportionment amend-
ment was "a blood brother, surely, to other proposals of
disappointed litigants to counter particular decisions of the
Supreme Court by taking away its jurisdiction in particular
class of cases."549 More pungently, a Roman Catholic periodi-
cal observed in 1957 that advocates of Court-curbing were
reminiscent of "children who want to quit the game because
they can't have their own way,"5 ' and the New Republic
remarked in 1959 that segregationists were "ready to swat
the Supreme Court with any bat that comes to hand." '551
Other commentators likewise remarked that the principal
complaint of the Court's critics was "not that there is a
Supreme Court but that the present Court does not reflect
their views."5 2
Some critics of the Warren Court, however, may
genuinely have believed that their Court-curbing proposals
could succeed. Although the memory of Roosevelt's failure
to pack the Court may have been fresh in the minds of all
but the younger antagonists of the courts, many critics of
the Courts, knowing little history, probably did not
understand that even FDR's unsuccessful plan received far
548. GARY L. MCDOWELL, CURBING THE COURTS: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER 11 (1988).
549. Oberst, supra note 4, at 656.
550. Comments on the Court, COMMONWEAL, July 26, 1957, at 426, (quoting
AvE MARIA).
551. One Part Politic-Two Parts Emotion, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 24, 1959, at
7.
552. Dunsford & Childress, supra note 151, at 63. Similarly, as Lewis
pointed out in 1960, criticism of the Court "is usually based on the court's
results rather than its reasons. The critics care much more about who won than
why." Anthony Lewis, High Court and Its Critics, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1960, at
25.
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more support than any of the myriad of other Court-curbing
proposals dating back almost to the beginning of the
Republic. Moreover, many critics of the Warren Court were
stubborn and sometimes self-righteous men and women
who had resolute faith in their ability to transform
American society. This conviction manifested itself in the
widespread belief among Goldwater supporters in 1964 that
a vast silent majority of conservatives would rise up on
election day and send Johnson home to his ranch. The
careful efforts of the authors of the states' rights
amendments to ensure that each legislature approved the
measures in exactly the same form indicates that they were
making a serious effort to call a constitutional convention,
for any states' rights language would have sufficed if the
sole point was to register a protest against the Court."' The
New Republic may have correctly assessed at least some of
the proponents of the amendments when it declared in May
1963 that "[t]he backers of these amendments mean
business. 554
Moreover, state officials who advocated Court-curbing
measures probably were more optimistic of their success
than were congressional critics. State legislators and jurists
who sought to curb the Court often had little exposure to
public opinion beyond their hometowns and their state
capitals, whose inhabitants, at least the elite ones, typically
shared the conservative opinions of these officials.
Immersed in such an environment, state officials easily
could believe that hostility toward the Warren Court was
greater than it actually was. In contrast, members of
Congress regularly were exposed to a greater range of
opinion, both in the Capitol and in the District of Columbia.
Moreover, they were more likely to represent larger and
more diverse constituencies than were state legislators. A
Mississippi legislator from a rotton borough could go
through life without discussing politics with anyone who
did not detest the Warren Court. In contrast, Mississippi
Senators John Stennis and James Eastland, though fierce
critics of the Court, worked closely and socialized with such
staunch admirers of the Court as their fellow Democrats,
553. Of course, the proponents of the states' rights amendments also may
have considered that the appearance of a real threat of a convention might
shake up the Court and the nation even if the threat was not so real.
554. Disunited States, supra note 376, at 5.
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Minnesota Senators Hubert Humphrey and Eugene
McCarthy.
B. State Officials Had Reasons to Wish to Preserve the
Court's Power
The efforts to curb the Warren Court, like earlier
Court-curbing movements,"55 also may have failed because
even the Court's critics recognized the legitimacy of the
Court's role and had reasons to wish to preserve its powers.
On at least some level, for example, most state judges and
many state legislators must have understood the character
of modern federalism and respected the Court's traditional
role as ultimate arbiter of the Constitution, even if many of
the Warren Court's rulings expanded federal power.
Members of the Court tried to facilitate such understand-
ing. In a 1964 address to the Conference of State Chief
Justices, Brennan, a former Supreme Court of New Jersey
justice, reminded the judges that state supreme courts and
the U.S. Supreme Court play necessarily different roles in
the judicial system and that the national perspective
demanded of a federal Supreme Court Justice may lead him
to different conclusions than a state judge would reach .5
Although some critics of the courts may have hoped
that their criticisms were laying the foundations for judicial
reform measures that might succeed if continued judicial
activism brought hostility to the Court to a boiling point,
they may have understood that the diminution of the
Court's powers would prove a pyrrhic victory. In particular,
both libertarian and traditional conservatives also may
have muted their efforts to curb the Court's power because
they recognized that the Court was the traditional bulwark
555. See generally Ross, supra note 9. During the Progressive Era, for
example, many progressives and labor leaders who criticized the Court
nevertheless perceived that a powerful judiciary could serve their interests by
offering protection against the hostility of legislative and executive officials. Id.
556. William J. Brennan, Jr., Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV.
945, 945-46, 948 (1964). Recalling that he experienced "considerable
astonishment" when he moved from Trenton to Washington and learned "how
different" was the work of the U.S. Supreme Court from that of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, Brennan explained that "[tihe work of each has a character, a
difficulty, and a complexity of its own, and none of these has its exact
counterpart in the other." Id. at 946. Brennan told the state chief justices that
"each tribunal is supreme in its own field, and in the final analysis neither can
do the other's job." Id.
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of property rights. Indeed, the Court from the time of Chief
Justice Marshall until 1937 had protected private property
more effectively and reliably than had state courts.
Although the Court since 1937 had not carefully scrutinized
the constitutionality of state and federal economic
legislation, the Court retained its power to nullify arbitrary
or confiscatory statutes or executive actions. Many critics of
the Court may have understood that the same power that
enabled the Court to protect racial and political minorities
could be used to protect private property and that the ebb
and flow of history might eventually return the Court to the
conservative fold. As Hand reminded liberals and conserva-
tives alike in his Holmes Lectures, property rights and
personal rights are inextricably linked.
Moreover, the anti-government biases of the libertarian
conservatives may have muted their efforts to curb the
Court insofar as they correctly perceived that Congress and
the Presidency were far more active agents of an
increasingly powerful federal government. Many conserva-
tives recognized that the amendments ultimately would not
serve their ends. For example, segregationist Senator
Erwin, a fierce critic of the Court, warned that "impatient
officials" who supported the Court of the Union "would
sacrifice their supreme values in their zeal to accomplish in
haste temporary ends which they desire."5 8
If conservatives had forgotten in twenty years that the
Court traditionally had displayed more solicitude for
property than for personal liberties, liberals were not
hesitant to recall this history. Dismissing as "sheer
rationalization" the contention that the Court was "neces-
sary to prevent the tyranny of the majority," Hook pointed
out that "it was property, not freedom, that the Supreme
Court safeguarded throughout most of its history." Hook
cautioned that "to make one's philosophy of judicial review
dependent upon the composition of the Court at any definite
time is cynical. Worse than cynical, it is foolish, for death
and the pendulum of history are sure to place on the bench
not merely conservatives but illiberals." 9  Similarly,
Harrington pointed out that many liberals who had rejoiced
over the Court's civil liberties decisions had forgotten that
557. See HAND, supra note 132, at 50-53.
558. 110 CONG. REC. 18,796 (1964).
559. Hook, supra note 144, at 47-48.
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judicial activism could also produce reactionary decisions
and that "the Supreme Court has a built-in tendency
toward conservatism."56 °
Conservatives also may have tempered their attacks on
the Court because they could not necessarily trust the
states to carry out their agenda. Indeed, state and local
courts did not entirely escape criticism by antagonists of the
federal judiciary. In 1967, for example, Smoot alleged that
"[mlany local and state courts refuse to mete out proper
punishment to rioters and other law breakers because the
magistrates of those courts are liberals of the type that J.
Edgar Hoover calls 'sob sisters' and 'bleeding hearts'."561
Smoot urged "decent people of all races [to] do whatever is
necessary at the local and state level to get rid of such court
officials, whether by impeachment or by action at the polls
if the officials are elected. Politicians who appoint such
court officials should be voted out of office. 5 61
Moreover, some state officials may have been loath to
curb the Court because their resentment toward it was
mixed with a curious and dubious gratitude. Both state and
federal officials and the coordinate branches of the federal
government have reason to favor a strong Court because
the Court so often has enabled Congress and the President,
as well as governors, state legislatures, and state judges to
escape the consequences of actions they have taken in the
crucible of political pressure. By nullifying such legislation,
the Court sometimes actually performs a favor for these
officials, many of whom are grateful even though some may
grumble or rattle Court-curbing threats in order to please
constituents. 6 ' After the Court's 1961 decision in Mapp v.
560. Harrington, supra note 221, at 656.
561. Dan Smoot, Race Wars, U.S.A.-Part X, DAN SMOOT REP., Oct. 9, 1967,
at 163.
562. Id.
563. Discussing the Court's review of state court decisions, Professor
Hartnett recently has observed that "[flaced with a choice between insulating
their judgments from Supreme Court review or partially insulating themselves
from internal political pressure, it is hardly surprising that most of the time
state judges opt for the latter." Edward Hartnett, Why Is the Supreme Court of
the United States Protecting State Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 907, 983 (1997). Discussing the Court's review of federal legislation,
Professor Menez observed in 1959 that "[o]ften under pressure from some
strong minority, Congress passes 'hot' legislation hoping that the Court will
negate it and 'bail it out'. . . At the same time that Congress virtually compels
the Court to correct its errors, it censures it for doing so." Joseph F. Menez, A
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Ohio,"" for example, California Attorney General Stanley
Mosk told Justice Douglas that while a bare majority of
justices of the California Supreme Court had interpreted
the state constitution to incorporate the exclusionary rule,
this state decision was politically so unpopular that there
was great pressure on trial judges to ignore or circumvent it
in order to help win re-election. 565 Mapp, Mosk informed
Douglas, took "the pressure off the local judges to create
exceptions and to follow the exclusionary rule and all its
ramifications.,566
C. Organizational Obstacles Impeded Court-Curbing
Like earlier efforts to curb the Court, proposals
advanced during the Warren Era were thwarted by
organizational problems. In particular, grassroots opposi-
tion to the Warren Court was weak since, as Harvard
sociologist David Reisman pointed out in 1957, the mass of
proponents of Court-curbing were "not a lobby or a party,
being inactive save in occasional elections; they are too
fundamentally unpolitical [sic] to constitute a serious
danger to the Court (outside the South)."67 Opposition to
the Court, however, extended far beyond the rustics who
helped to pay for "Impeach Earl Warren" billboards on the
back roads of America. It attracted the support of many
prominent state and federal officials who succeeded in
pushing such measures as H.R. 3, the Jenner-Butler bill,
the states' rights amendments, and the congressional
version of the reapportionment amendments much farther
than anti-Court measures have gone before or since. As
Brief In Support of the Supreme Court, 54 N.W. L. REV. 30, 36 (1959).
564. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment's guarantee
against unconstitutional searches and seizures applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
565. O'BRIEN, supra note 540, at 308.
566. Id.
567. David Reisman, New Critics of the Court, NEW REPUBLIC, July 29, 1957,
at 12. Reisman explained that
[iut is important to realize this, lest the Court itself conceivably be
intimidated by the current wave of attack to the point of failing to
carry further the implication of its recent decisions, or even to stick by
them unequivocally in the face of attempts by Congress and state
legislatures to get around them.
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Professor Freund warned in 1958, "opponents of the Court
enjoyed a tactical advantage insofar as they were well
organized," while "the interests served by the Court are
relatively less vocal and cohesive."68
Although the Warren Court's antagonists may have
been more vocal than cohesive, they probably were more
united in their grievances against the Court and in the
remedies that they proposed than were earlier critics of the
Court. In contrast to the five decades before 1937, when
antagonists of the Court often had substantially different
personal and political agendas and proposed a bewildering
array of different measures to curb the Court,569 the critics
of the Warren Court tended to share common political
philosophies and focused their energies on a relatively
limited number of Court-curbing measures.
State officials who attacked the Warren Court were
particularly cohesive because there was considerable
overlap among the types of persons who opposed the Court's
decisions on desegregation, criminal justice, school prayer,
and reapportionment. Although state officials outside the
South who objected to the Court's criminal justice and
reapportionment decisions may not have been segregation-
ists, most do not appear to have had any special sympathy
with the civil rights movement and many may have felt
antagonistic toward it. Since most of these officials
represented rural districts or lived in states with few
African-Americans, they had little reason to avoid coopera-
tion with segregationists. Similarly, most southern state
officials whose principal grievance with the Court was
desegregation tended to have scant sympathy with the
Court's decisions protecting the rights of political radicals
and criminals. Moreover, most southern state officials had
at least as much reason as their northern counterparts to
568. Freund, The Supreme Court Under Attack, supra note 147, at 3. Freund
stated that
the attacks on the Court come from a coalition of groups, and the
countervailing interests are not nearly so distinct and organized. There
is the sectional opposition arising from the desegregation case; the
opposition of officialdom of many states, deriving from decisions in the
field of criminal law enforcement; opposition from rural interests
growing out of the reapportionment decision; and from church groups,
as a result of the school prayer cases.
Id.
569. See RoSS, supra note 9, at 318.
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oppose the reapportionment decisions. Rather than
squandering their efforts on pet Court-curbing proposals,
most of these officials rallied around such viable proposals
as H.R. 3 and the Jenner-Butler bill during the 1950s.
During the 1960s, the states' rights amendments
represented a sophisticated effort by state officials to con-
centrate support behind a single set of measures. When
these failed, these officials transferred support to congres-
sional bills to overturn the apportionment decisions. Even
when state officials did not actually endorse Court-curbing
measures, they tended to try to speak with one voice. The
1957 resolution of the Conference of Chief Justices is the
classic example.
In some instances, however, divisions afflicted and may
have weakened the forces that were arrayed against the
Court. In particular, attitudes toward the Court's civil
liberties decisions may have divided libertarian and tradi-
tional conservatives and made it more difficult for them to
cooperate on a common Court-curbing strategy. The split
between statist conservatives and libertarian conservatives
was illustrated by reactions to the Court's 1958 decision
that the State Department could not deny passports to
Communists.5 70 David Lawrence declared that "if the
Supreme Court had ruled that treason now is lawful, it
could not have dealt a more devastating blow to the safety
of the people of America," and he accused the Court of
taking over the conduct of foreign relations. 71 More libertar-
ian conservatives, however, applauded the decision.
Disparaging "government by bureaucratic whim," The Wall
Street Journal contended that Communists who had broken
no law were entitled to travel abroad unless Congress
specifically determined that such travel threatened the
national security. Similarly, the conservative commenta-
tor William Henry Chamberlin argued that
there is no proved or visible advantage in dealing with Communist
conspiracy that warrants giving bureaucrats more power to
regulate the coming and going of ordinary citizens or justifies the
570. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
571. David Lawrence, Editorial, Legalizing Treason?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 18, 1958, at 100.
572. The Passport Decision, Editorial, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1958, at 12.
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denial to Americans of their historic right to leave their
country ... After all, this is a free country, isn't it?
57 3
Support by libertarian conservatives for the Court's civil
liberties decisions may have eroded their support for Court-
curbing measures insofar as they perceived the Court as
more libertarian than state courts or legislatures.
The movements to curb the Warren Court also were
hindered by the lack of leadership. Although the Court was
severely criticized by a remarkable number of persons who
occupied leadership positions, including prominent statejudges and legislators, no one of national stature emerged
to lead the anti-Court forces. Of course, even the leadership
of a national figure might not have enabled critics of the
Court to succeed with any significant Court-curbing meas-
ures. During the Progressive Era, even such titans as
Theodore Roosevelt and Robert M. LaFollette, Sr. were
thwarted in their proposals to curb the Court, and Franklin
D. Roosevelt's Court-packing plan was defeated when FDR
was at the height of his power.
D. Campaigns by Elites To Protect the Court
Just as the anti-Court movement was hobbled by lack
of leadership, efforts to thwart Court-curbing were greatly
helped by the many prominent political and legal figures
who defended the Court's institutional powers. As in
previous times when critics besieged the Court, elite
opinion rallied behind the Justices, sounding alarms about
the dangers of Court-curbing measures.57" As the movement
for the states' rights amendments were petering out early
in 1964, Professor Kurland expressed gratification that "the
warnings of lions in the streets-instead of under the
throne-were timely heeded as well as sounded."575 Kurland
was only partially correct, for the most vocal opponents of
the amendments were closer to the throne than to the
streets-closer to the centers of power than to the
grassroots of America. Warren's veiled but unmistakable
criticism of the Court of the Union was consistent with
efforts by Chief Justices Hughes, Taft, and Marshall to
ward off attacks on the Court. Despite the misgivings of
573. William Henry Chamberlin, The Right to Tour, WALL ST. J., June 30,
1958, at 8.
598 [Vol. 50
2002] ATTACKS ON THE WARREN COURT
many of its conservative members, even the ABA helped to
defeat the Court-curbing movements, just as the ABA had
helped to protect the Court during the 1920s and in 1937576.
Celler, who at first believed that the 1958 efforts to
curb the Court's jurisdiction would succeed, concluded that
the campaign failed largely because "an articulate minority
in both Houses ... cracked the solid wall of assumptions
surrounding the Court-curbing proposals" by pointing out
the threat to judicial independence.
E. Institutional Obstacles Impeded Court-Curbing
Efforts to curb the Court also were hindered by
significant institutional obstacles. As Professor Choper once
observed,
[a]ll the dominant forces of inertia-of maintenance of status quo,
of inaction due to the frequent absence of cohesive majorities and
to the fragmentation of power-that are present in the national
political process work to safeguard the Court, and indeed are
magnified in the case of an attack on the Court's historic
independence.
578
Recognition of these institutional obstacles may have
influenced choices of strategies, for the proposals of the
Court's antagonists during the 1950s and 1960s differed
from those of earlier critics of the Court. In contrast to
populists, progressives, and labor leaders who often
advocated curtailment or abolition of judicial review during
the half century before 1937,"'9 critics of the Warren Court
rarely tried to diminish the Court's essential institutional
powers. Instead, they most frequently advocated denial of
574. See e.g., ROSS, supra note 9, at 202-04, 206-07, 223-25, 238-39, 241-46,
260-66, 274, 276 (discussing elite opposition to Court-curbing proposals during
the 1920s).
575. Kurland, supra note 297, at 636.
576. See Ross, supra note 9, at 239-40, 242-44, 302.
577. Emanuel Celler, The Supreme Court Survives a Barrage, REPORTER,
Nov. 27, 1958, at 33. Celler believed that "[b]y raising the[sel issues articulately
and persistently," the minority "gained time for a cooler and more deliberate
consideration of these problems." Id.
578. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
55 (1980).
579. See generally, ROSS, supra note 9.
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jurisdiction over discrete subjects or alteration of the
balance of state and federal relations in a manner that
would only indirectly (albeit radically) diminish the Court's
role in reviewing state legislation. Although measures such
as interposition or the states' rights amendments that
would have revolutionized federalism were probably more
tactical than practical, efforts to curb the Court'sjurisdiction nearly succeeded during 1958. Avoidance of
direct assaults on the Court's powers may have reflected an
understanding that previous such efforts always had failed.
Recognition of the difficulties of curbing the Court's
fundamental powers or effecting a revolution in federalism
also may have channeled the energies of many states' rights
advocates into efforts to elect a President and a Senate that
would assure the appointment of more conservative
justices. Although earlier critics of the Court had recognized
that changing the Court from within was more practicable
than changing it from without, the Judicial Revolution of
1937 may have made antagonists of the Warren Court
particularly aware that altering the Court's personnel was
easier than curbing the Court's power. Reflecting this
recognition, Goldwater became the first presidential
candidate to make judicial appointments a persistent
campaign issue. In contrast to earlier presidential
candidates such as Theodore Roosevelt in 1912 and Robert
M. LaFollette in 1924, whose antagonism toward the Court
had inspired them to call for institutional reform, 8'
Goldwater merely pledged to nominate justices who would
reject the Warren Court's activism.581 Indeed, the scrutiny
applied to Supreme Court nominees, although paltry by
present standards, increased markedly during the 1950s
and early 1960s as conservatives of various stripes began to
interrogate nominees. For the first time, formal hearings on
judicial nominations became routine. Harlan, questioned by
isolationists during his 1955 confirmation hearings about
his views on national sovereignty, became the first nominee
ever queried about his views on substantive legal issues.582
In 1959, Potter Stewart became the first Supreme Court
580. See id. at 130-54, 254-84.
581. See Ross, supra note 499, at 143.
582. Hearings on the Nomination of John Marshall Harlan of N. Y. to be an
Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U. S. before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong. (1955).
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nominee ever questioned in detail about his political and
social views when conservatives interrogated him about his
opinions on desegregation and national security.
Timing also adversely affected the impact of much of
the criticism of state officials. As Professor Murphy points
out, "ItIhe governors indorsed states' rights legislation in
1956, almost two years before the peak of the congressional
attack, and the Chief Justices' criticism of the Court came a
few days too late to affect the fate of the bills in the Eighty-
fifth Congress." '584 Celler observed that "[clongressional
concern with the economic recession and defense matters,
as well as the late introduction of some of these bills, also
played a substantial part in their defeat."
5 85
Ultimately, even the relative degree of unity among the
Court's critics could not overcome the inherent difficulty of
overcoming the taboo against Court-curbing legislation,
much less the formidable obstacles of the constitutional
amendment process. As Professor Menez remarked,
[i]n its saner moments Congress knows there is not much point in
having a Constitution if there is not a Supreme Court to say when
it has been violated. Judicial review.., is too embedded in our
national life to be kicked around now. The Court is a terminal
point and serves the real need of bringing issues to a conclusion,
however it may gall us at times.
586
Similarly, Krock predicted in 1957 that critics of the Court
would have to content themselves with grumbling because
Congress consistently had recoiled from curbing the Court
in fear that the remedy will be worse than the cause of the
complaint.587
F. Economic Reasons for Frustration of the Court-Curbing
Campaigns
Economic factors also may help to account for the
583. See Hearings on the Nomination of Potter Stewart to be an Assoc.
Justice of the Supreme Court of the U. S. Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 86th Cong., 124-39 (1959).
584. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 253.
585. Celler, supra note 577, at 33.
586. Menez, supra note 563, at 59.
587. Arthur Krock, High Court's Critics Grumble But Conform, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1957, at E3.
601
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
failure of the Court-curbing movements of the Warren Era.
The unprecedented prosperity of this period may have
produced a self-confidence that inspired innovation and
experimentation, but the widespread economic contentment
that characterized the 1950s naturally diminished
incentives to radically transform institutions. Prosperity
also discouraged any type of radical change that could have
an adverse economic impact. During the 1950s, opponents
of interposition predicted that economic reality would cool
southern passions since political unrest could adversely
affect business interests. Pointing out that southern
business was now closely intertwined with national
business, The Nation in the wake of the 1957 Little Rock
crisis expressed hope that Faubus's lawlessness had
facilitated desegregation because "the Southern moderates
are not going to be lured into the suicidal position of open
defiance of the Constitution" insofar as "too much is at
stake."588 Pleased for once that the Eisenhower Administra-
tion maintained close ties with business leaders, The
Nation observed that the Administration was "in a position
to accelerate this process by appealing directly to the heads
of corporate enterprise."5  Similarly, Professor Freund
noted that "[any cloud of disorder hovering over the area
would darken the business scene. ' 59°
G. Ability of the Courts and the Court's Defenders to
Respond to Criticism
In contrast to previous Court-curbing periods, when
attacks on the Court may have influenced judicial decisions
that helped to mute the fury of the Court's assailants,"' the
impact of the states' rights movement on the Warren
Court's behavior is difficult to assess. Scholars generally
agree that the congressional firestorm of 1958 helped to
588. If It Takes All Winter, Editorial, NATION, Oct. 12, 1957, at 233-34.
"Does anyone believe," The Nation asked, "that American corporate enterprise,
which commands a vast army of Southern manpower-salesmen, clerks, factory
workers, executives-will look with favor on the participation of this personnel
in conspiracies to defy the authority of the federal courts?" Id. at 134.
589. Id.
590. Freund, Storm Over the American Supreme Court, supra note 193, at
355.
591. See Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18
VAND. L. REV. 925, 943 (1965); Ross, supra note 9, at 316-17.
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moderate the Court's opinions during the next few years."'
Moreover, the intense criticism of the middle 1960s,
culminating in widespread attacks on the Court's 1966
Miranda decision, 93 may have helped to tone down the
Warren Court's activism during its final years.594 As James
Bryce observed in 1891,
[tihe Supreme Court feels the touch of public opinion. Opinion is
stronger in America than anywhere else in the world, and judges
are only men. To yield a little may be prudent, for the tree that
cannot bend to the blast may be broken. A court is sometimes so
swayed consciously, more often unconsciously, because the
pervasive sympathy of numbers is irresistible, even by elderly
lawyers. 95
The relation between public criticism and judicial
behavior, however, is highly subtle. As Barry Friedman has
observed, "public comfort or discomfort will, ultimately,
have some impact on Supreme Court review and institu-
tional change .... [H]istory suggests law and politics are
inextricably intertwined, but at a distance, not in a close
fashion of political retribution for unpopular decisions. 596
But while congressional criticism of the Court may have
affected judicial behavior during at least some periods of
the Warren Court, there are no indications that the
criticism of state officials had any significant impact on the
Court. In particular, the interposition movement does not
appear to have shaken the Court's dedication to racial
equality, and the states' rights amendment movement of
1964 did not prevent the Court from extending the one
person-one vote principle in Reynolds. Since the
institutional obstacles that prevent Court-curbing within
the states are even greater than those that hinder
Congress, the Court had little incentive to respond to
pressure from the states. As Professor Cross has pointed
out, "[t]he Court assumes few institutional risks when
striking down state legislation. State governments cannot
592. See infra Part I-I.
593. Miranda v. Arizona, 377 U.S. 201 (1966) (holding that criminal
defendants have a right to counsel during custodial interrogation and that
interrogators must inform suspects of their constitutional rights).
594. See POWE, supra note 1, at 498.
595. 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 267 (2d ed. 1891).
596. See Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Four: Law's Politics, supra note 6, at 1064.
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directly punish or reward the Court."97 Although many
members of Congress professed antagonism toward the
Warren Court's alleged intrusions on states' rights, the
Court's general support for expansion of national power
may have satisfied more members of Congress than it
displeased. Since the Court is heavily dependent upon
Congress and the President for the maintenance of its
power, the Court is naturally far more loath to offend
coordinate branches of the federal government than to
antagonize the states.9
The Court's apparent failure to react to the criticism of
state officials may have been the most significant defeat of
the states' rights movement since this movement was
motivated largely by an effort to intimidate the Court
rather than change the Constitution. For example, while
one proponent of the amendments acknowledged as early as
February 1963 that "[i]t is almost impossible to hope" that
the amendments would succeed, he explained that "the
lineup of state legislative political power behind them can't
be ignored. If nothing else, they might be a psychological
restraint to the federal judiciary's reckless encroachment on
traditional state prerogatives."" 9
H. Harmony of the Court With Public Opinion
Many liberals who feared for the Court's power while it
was besieged during the Warren Era may have underesti-
mated the extent to which the values espoused by the Court
already reflected a broad political consensus. Perhaps more
than any other factor, the essential harmony between the
Court's judicial opinions and the socio-political opinions of
Americans may account for the failure of the attacks on the
Warren Court. As in previous eras,"' the Court remained
roughly consonant with the temper of the times, even
though many of its decisions offended significant segments
of the population. As Michael J. Klarman has demon-
597. Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1304, 1319
(1999).
598. Id. at 1317-19. Indeed, as Cross points out, "[a]cquiescing to the
demands of states' rights may aggravate Congress and limit the future
authority of the Court itself." Id. at 1319.
599. Johnson, supra note 462, at 133-34.
600. See e.g., ROSS, supra note 9, at 317.
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strated, the predicate for many of the Warren Court's
decisions was established by profound demographic and
cultural changes in American society during the early
twentieth century.6 °1 The failure of the states' rights
movement demonstrates the veracity of C. Herman
Pritchett's observation that public support for judicial
power has remained firm because "the Court has generally
told the country what it wanted to hear, and provided a
constitutional case for what the dominant interests in the
nation wanted to do. 6 2 As Krock pointed out in 1957,
Court-curbing movements always have failed because "the
Court will never take very long to catch up with the
political philosophy of a large popular majority." '
During the 1950s, the Court's desegregation decisions
were well received, largely because of significant changes in
social attitudes toward African-Americans.6 "4 Meanwhile,
the Court's decisions protecting subversives were rendered
at a time when fear of domestic subversion was waning.
65
Rather than following the election returns, the Court in
Gerald W. Johnson's opinion was "a step and a half ahead
of the election returns" in anticipating a likely diminution
of fear of domestic subversion.6 6 As Professor Latham
argued, the Justices for the first time in twenty years "feel
601. Michael J. Kiarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Michael J. Kiarman, Brown, Racial
Change, and the Civil Rights Revolution, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994).
602. C. Herman Pritchett, Judicial Supremacy from Marshall to Burger, in
ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 108 (M. Judd Harmon, ed.
1978).
603. Krock, High Court's Critics Grumble But Conform, supra note 587, at
E3.
604. See Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Revolution,
supra note 601, at 10-11.
605. Writing in the wake of Red Monday, one commentator observed that
"[t]he panic atmosphere of a decade ago no longer prevails in anything like the
same degree." Alan Barth, The Supreme Court's June 17th Opinions, NEW
REPUBLIC, July 1, 1957, at 9-11. Similarly, another commentary contended that
it was "not entirely a coincidence" that the Court made these rulings "at the
very moment that representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union
were getting into very serious negotiations" and that "the Court almost
certainly would not have turned against these practices if the sense of danger to
the state were in fact as great today as it was over most of the past two
decades." Joseph C. Harsch, Day of Decision, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June
19, 1957, reprinted in 103 CONG. REC. 10,296 (1957). The demise of
McCarthyism also presumably contributed to the diminution of public anxiety
over domestic subversion.
606. Johnson, supra note 547, at 11-12.
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themselves standing on a stable social base.""6 7
Public opinion polls during the 1950s consistently
indicated that a large majority of Americans outside the
South approved of Brown. 8 During the 1960s, the Court's
decisions on religion in the schools received critical support
from major religious denominations,6 °9 and reflected the
increased level of religious pluralism in America.61° The
Court's early decisions on criminal procedure, particularly
its decision on right to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright,
611
were broadly hailed for their fundamental fairness, an
attitude that in part reflected changing public attitudes
toward poverty.612 Similarly, opinion polls indicated that the
Court's decision in Reynolds, the most sweeping of its
reapportionment decisions, received far more approval than
disapproval.613
The support for the Court's decisions is all the more
remarkable since so many Americans continued to express
a strong commitment to states' rights. There was, however,
a substantial variation between the public's theoretical
solicitude toward states' rights and its practical support for
a powerful federal government. Although Americans tend to
express preference for states' rights over federal power,
Americans at least since the New Deal have overwhelm-
ingly been willing to accept the benefits provided by a
powerful federal government. The gap between theory and
practice during the Warren Era was revealed in a 1957
Gallup poll in which a large majority of persons polled in
every section of the nation described themselves as more
sympathetic toward persons who believed in states' rights
607. Latham, supra note 221, at 47.
608. 2 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at
1332-33, 1507 (1972). Gallup polls in both 1955 and 1957 indicated that 56
percent of Americans polled favored the decision and 38 percent opposed it. Id.
Much larger majorities of persons outside the South favored it, while the large
majority of Southerners opposed it. Id.
609. See LAUBACH, supra note 229, at 147.
610. See Klarman, supra note 601, at 46-62.
611. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
612. See Klarman, supra note 601, at 64-66.
613. 3 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1959-1971, at
1897-98. A poll conducted a month after Reynolds indicated that 47 percent
approved of the decision, 30 percent disapproved, and 23 percent had no
opinion. Moreover, persons approving the decision outnumbered those
disapproving in every region of the nation and among Republicans, Democrats,
and Independents. Id.
[Vol. 50606
2002] ATTACKS ON THE WARREN COURT
rather than those who believed that the federal government
should solve more problems.61 Although Americans contin-
ued to profess a devotion to states' rights during the 1960s,
the injustices done to African-Americans under the guise of
states' rights may have diminished public support for
Court-curbing measures that cloaked themselves under a
states' rights mantle. It may not be entirely fortuitous that
the states' rights amendment was forever stalled during the
spring of 1963, when public opinion sharply turned in favor
of federal civil rights legislation in the wake of violence
against civil rights demonstrators by city officials in
Birmingham. George Wallace's declaration of states' rights
when he stood in the doorway of the University of Alabama
to block integration in June 1963 also may have eroded
support for constitutional measures to enhance the rights of
the states.
Similarly, Professor Dixon has concluded that the
Assembly's proposal for an apportionment amendment
helped to "poison the well" for more moderate measures to
permit one house of state legislatures to be apportioned on
a basis other than population, the so-called "federal plan."15
According to Dixon, the Assembly's categorical opposition to
any judicial requirement of reapportionment encouraged
the news media and hence voters to regard the "federal
plan" as a ruse to eradicate the "one person, one vote
principle."616
Of course, the intensity of public opposition to the Court
was indicative of deep misgivings about the Court's
decisions that have continued to create hostility toward the
Court among many conservatives down to the present day.
Although the Court's opinions, at least in time, may have
614. 2 GALLUP, PUBLIC OPINION, supra note 608, at 1504-05. The results of
this poll, however, might have been at least somewhat skewed by the form of
the question, which asked whether a respondent tended to agree more with
"people who believe in states' rights or those who believe that more problems
should be turned over to the Government in Washington to try to solve." Id. The
phrase "turned over to the Government in Washington" suggests an abnegation
of local responsibility that might have encouraged answers more favorable to
states' rights. Id.
615. DIXON, supra note 520, at 398. Professor Dixon concluded that two
other proposals likewise helped to stigmatize the "federal plan"-
Representative Tuck's bill to strip the federal courts of all jurisdiction over
apportionment, and a proposal for a moratorium on court-ordered




helped change the thinking of some Americans about such
issues as race, school prayer, criminal justice, and
reapportionment, many Americans never were reconciled to
the Court's opinions on these subjects. As one commentator
remarked in 1957, "it is a pity that the American public is
so misinformed as to the proper role of the Court in civil
liberties matters. If they were not, the cries for the scalp of
the Court which are now heard never would have arisen.,
617
Indeed, many liberals worried that the Supreme Court's
civil liberties decisions were precarious because they were
not supported by comparable changes in attitudes among
the citizenry. Michael Harrington, for example, warned in
1958 that "our jubilation" about the Court's decisions
"should be somewhat tempered" because "we have not
achieved a mass consciousness of the importance of civil
liberties... Instead there has been a victory almost by
fiat."61 Many liberals were fond of quoting Frankfurter's
observation that" 'the real battles of liberalism are not won
in the Supreme Court,' but through 'a persistent, positive
translation of the liberal faith into the thoughts and acts of
the community.'""
I. Resilience of Public Respect for the Court
Court-curbing efforts also were stymied by the intense
and abiding public respect for the Court that has
consistently manifested itself throughout American history.
Even many who expressed misgivings about the Court's
ventures into areas traditionally reserved to state
discretion acknowledged, if often grudgingly, the justice of
the Court's decisions. Although Life Magazine lamented
that Reynolds "penetrated deep into the precincts of states'
rights" and diminished "individuality and national
heterogeneity," the editors nevertheless acknowledged that
617. Alfred L. Scanlon, Keepers of the Constitution, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23,
1957, at 20 (book review).
618. Harrington, supra note 221, at 655-56. Harrington particularly feared
that the growth of concentration of power in modern society would ensure
continuing threats to personal freedom. He warned that "we have yet to develop
in our society a general awareness of the significance of civil liberties and a
tradition of their defense. And this is what we must do if we wish to make sure
that the worse excesses of our recent history do not return." Id.
619. Horsky, supra note 87, at 1110 (quoting FELIx FRANKFURTER, LAW AND
POLITICS 197 (1925)).
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"existing inequalities were so flagrant and so apparently
impervious to change by those living under them that one
must admit that the Supreme Court may indeed have been
the only body capable of rectifying them."6 20 As Weissman
pointed out in 1959, "there is little doubt that, despite the
shrillness of the Court's critics, the people as a whole are
grateful for what Weissman described as the Court's
delivery of a "rebirth of freedom." '621 Weissman pointed out
that the "hostility of the critics is in its own way a
tribute."622
Even those who were dissatisfied with the Court may
have recognized the perils of tampering with the
Constitution. As Professor Freund pointed out in 1964,
"another reason for hesitation over the use of the amending
process is the risk of substituting new dissatisfactions for
old, new uncertainties for old perplexities., 623 Accordingly,
even many advocates of measures to overturn the Court's
decisions did not question the process by which the Court
had rendered such decisions. In urging Congress to approve
a reapportionment amendment, for example, the speaker of
the Missouri House in 1965 emphasized that he was not
questioning the constitutional correctness of the Supreme
Court's decision in Reynolds even though he wanted to
overturn Reynolds through an amendment.624  Although
many Americans shared the misgivings of the Court's
antagonists about individual judicial decisions, public
opinion polls indicated that a solid majority of Americans
620. Landmark I; Equal Votes, LIFE, June 26, 1964, at 4. Life also predicted
that "outraged proponents of states' rights may well find that, with urban areas
more honestly represented and therefore less tempted to seek help in
Washington, the state governments will in fact become more independent
within a better balanced federalism." Id.
621. Weissman, supra note 192, at 21.
622. Id.
623. Freund, To Amend-or Not to Amend-the Constitution, supra note
516, at 118.
624. Hearings on Reapportionment Amendments, supra note 531, at 175
(testimony of Thomas D. Graham). Graham stated that
I wish to make it clear that I have no desire to contend that the U.S.
Supreme Court has invaded an area which has been reserved, under
our Constitution, to the States. Nor do I wish to contend that the Court
has not properly interpreted the intent of the Constitution .... I
therefore also contend ... that the Congress. . . has a duty ... to give




opposed Court-curbing, just as a large majority of citizens
had opposed Roosevelt's Court-packing plan despite
widespread misgivings about the Hughes Court's nullifica-
tion of economic regulatory legislation.625 As Professor
Murphy observed in 1959, "it was the current Court's
performance that citizens rated low, not the body nor even
its functioning or operation."626 Writing in 1959, New York
University Law Professor Robert B. McKay observed that "a
probable reason for the almost surprising acquiescence in
[unpopular] judicial decisions" was the "enormous reservoir
of public respect for the Court as an institution."6 27 As Life
Magazine observed in May 1964:
[d]espite all the controversy over the Court and the Impeach Earl
Warren billboards, the Supreme Court as an institution still
commands a unique respect among the great majority of
Americans. Tourists in Washington often trip lightheartedly
through the halls of the capitol, where Congress sits, and chatter
unabashedly in front of the White House; the sight of the chaste,
white Supreme Court building, however, invariably fills them with
silence and awe.628
McKay believed that this respect for the Court was
based upon "an intuitive understanding" that the Court is
not undemocratic since "the judiciary also represents the
people. " 2 9 Or, as Yale Law Professor Eugene Rostow
observed, democracy is more than a commitment to popular
sovereignty, it is also a commitment to popular sovereignty.
under the law.63 °
CONCLUSION
The history of attacks on the Warren Court by state
officials provides abundant insights into the reasons why
Court-curbing movements have failed throughout American
history. The genesis and development of these neo-
625. See Ross, supra note 9, at 302.
626. MURPHY, supra note 39, at 483.
627. Robert B. McKay, The Supreme Court and Its Lawyer Critics, 28
FORDHAM L. REV. 615 (1959).
628. Ernest Havemann, Storm Center of Justice, LIFE, May 22, 1964, at 123.
629. McKay, supra note 627, at 615 (quoting Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. 57
HARv. L. REV. 389, 392 (1944) (book review)).
630. Eugene V. Rostow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 573, 580 (1958).
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Confederate measures were fairly typical of other anti-
Court movements even though they were organized by state
officials rather than by members of Congress. Although
unique in some ways, the political forces that thwarted
efforts by states' rights advocates to curb the Warren Court
were the same forces that had defeated earlier anti-Court
movements.
In particular, the Court-curbing schemes of both state
officials and members of Congress failed because there was
a broad harmony between the Court's decisions and public
opinion on such controversial issues as desegregation,
freedom of association, criminal justice, and reapportion-
ment, even though the Court's opinions on these subjects
provoked intense antagonism from vocal minorities of
Americans. Moreover, even many persons who opposed the
Court's decisions were loath to support Court-curbing
because they retained a pervasive and profound respect for
the judiciary as a guardian of personal liberties and
property. Indeed, many conservative critics of the Warren
Court may have worried that a profound alteration of
federalism could create political discord and uncertainty
that would disrupt the thumping prosperity of the period.
Like other Court-curbing campaigns, the states' rights
movement of the Warren Era faced immense organizational
obstacles. Although southern segregationists were able to
forge a coalition with many northerners who were hostile
toward the Court's decisions on criminal justice, reap-
portionment, and other non-racial issues, the prominence of
segregationists among proponents of Court-curbing helped
to stigmatize efforts to curb the Court even among many
advocates of states' rights. Antagonists of the Warren Court
never were able to command a majority in most state
legislatures or in Congress. Moreover, the movement was
divided between traditional conservatives and libertarians
since the latter welcomed some of the Court's civil liberties
decisions.
The strong defense of the Court by elites among judges,
lawyers, journalists, and academics also helped to frustrate
Court-curbing efforts by proponents of states' rights, many
of whom lacked the articulateness of the Court's defenders.
State officials also lacked the national political and media
connections that would have facilitated the enactment of
constitutional amendments.
Although states' rights advocates were much more
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united in the Court-curbing proposals that they advocated
than were most earlier antagonists of the Court, any major
diminution of the Court's powers still faced the daunting
obstacles of the constitutional amendment process. State
officials were at a particular disadvantage in their efforts to
initiate a constitutional amendment from statehouses
rather than from Congress, where every successful
amendment had originated. Accordingly, states' rights
advocates of the Warren Era became increasingly inter-
ested in the more realistic option of influencing the judicial
confirmation process, thereby presaging the focus on
judicial selection by more recent critics of the Court.
Recognizing the difficulties of reducing the Court's
powers, many of the Court's antagonists proposed Court-
curbing measures more as a way to ventilate grievances or
to try to intimidate the Court rather than as a serious effort
to diminish judicial power. Although conservative state
officials who criticized the Court helped to call attention to
the Court's activism, their radical proposals to curb the
Court's powers may have inhibited moderates and liberals
from expressing their own reservations about the Court's
growing activism. In contrast to many earlier Court-curbing
movements, particularly those of the Progressive Era, the
states' rights movement does not appear to have
significantly affected the Court's decisions.
Although the collapse of efforts by state officials to
diminish the Court's power provides a case study of why
Court-curbing movements have failed throughout American
history, such failure is not inevitable. Congress nearly
imposed several significant limitations on the Court's
jurisdiction during 1958, and the states' rights amendments
were approved by many state legislatures during a very
short period in 1963. These measures would have crippled
federalism and could have resulted in the nullification of
many Warren Court decisions that brought greater justice
to countless Americans. The intensity of opposition to the
Warren Court by states' rights advocates is a potent
reminder that the Court's power is not invincible and that
the Court must use its power responsibly-as did the
Warren Court-in order to continue to maintain the public
respect that is a necessary predicate of its institutional
prerogatives.
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